

Sthlm Policy Group (ed.)

Faith, Citizenship, Democracy and Peace in the Horn of Africa

A Report of the 7th Annual Conference
on the Horn of Africa
Lund, Sweden, October 17-19, 2008

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
LUND UNIVERSITY

SOMALIA INTERNATIONAL
REHABILITATION CENTRE

**Research Report
in Social Anthropology**

2009:4

A complete list of publications from
the Dept. of Sociology, Lund University,
can be found at the end of the book
and at www.soc.lu.se/info/publ.

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Graphic Design Infografen/Desktop

Typesetting Ilgot Liljedahl

Produktion Media-Tryck

Printed by Media-Tryck, Lund University, Lund, Sweden 2009

ISBN 91-7267-293-5

Publisher and Distribution

Media-Tryck

Lund University

Box 117

SE-221 00 Lund, Sweden

Fax 046-222 38 83 • E-post bookorder@se.lu.se • www.lu.se/media-tryck

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Acknowledgements

Somalia International Rehabilitation Centre (SIRC)' Board members deeply thank the sponsors of the conference: City of Lund, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Forum Syd/Sida, Lund University, Olof Palme Minnesfond, ABF Burlöv-Lundabygden, FN-Förbundet, Lunds Arbetarkommun and Folkuniversitetet in Lund.

We thank all scholars, civics, practitioners, diplomats, government representatives, politicians, who presented valuable papers and statements, participated in valuable panel debates, moderated conference workshops. We have to stress our thanks to Prof. Arne Ardeberg, Dr. Björn Möller, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Prof. Abdi Ismail Samatar and Prof. Janis Grobbelaar to their continues support to the Horn of Africa conference and moderating workshops and panel debates.

Special gratitude to the Horn of Africa diplomats: H. E. Mr. Dina Mufti, Ethiopian Ambassador to Sweden, Mr. Yonas Manna Bairu, Counsellor Chargé d'Affaires Eritrean Embassy in Stockholm, and Mr. Jeremy Lester, Head of the Regions of the Horn of Africa, Eastern Africa and Indian Ocean Department, European Commission for their great contribution to the conference.

We also profoundly thank co-partners of the conference: the Sudanese, Eritrean, Ethiopian, and Djibouti associations in Lund.

We would like to thank the Mayor and the Vice Mayor of the City of Lund, Honorable Annika Annerby Jansson and Honorable Tranje Danielsson, for giving a warm reception to all the conference guests.

Special thanks to Count Pietersen, former Ambassador to UN, who always very proficiently and efficiently chair the Horn of Africa conference. We also thank those who co-chaired the conference namely Associate Prof. Hodan Isse, Engineer Ishael Siroiney, and as well as those who reported conference workshops.

We would like to thank Sthlm Policy Group for editing the proceedings of the conference and Gillian Nilsson for proof-reading the proceedings. We would like to thank the Department of Sociology and the Department of Economic History of Lund University for supporting the publications of the proceedings of the conference.

Finally, we thank everybody who participated in the conference and contributed to peace and development in the Horn of Africa.

Abdillahi Jama, Horn of Africa conference Coordinator & Chairman, Somalia International Rehabilitation Centre (SIRC) May 2009

Introduction: Faith, Citizenship, Democracy and Peace

The 7th annual Somalia International Rehabilitation Centre (SIRC) Conference of the Horn of Africa focused on “Faith, Citizenship, Democracy and Peace in the Horn of Africa”. The conference was held in Lund, Sweden, October 17-19, 2008. The content of this research report reflects some of the views and proceedings presented at the conference.

Ever since the first conference in 2002 scholars, civics, practitioners, politicians and other stakeholders from within and outside Horn of Africa have gathered in Lund for a few days each year to meet and discuss critical issues to peace and development in the region. The conferences have aimed to create a stimulating environment for building confidence among and between individuals who would rarely have the opportunity to meet. It has turned out that many discussions during the conferences throughout the years have contributed not only to multiple reflections on critical issues, but also many sentiments. Although discussions at times have been passionate the participants to the conference have shown a respect to and tolerance of other participants’ views and opinions of many regional and sensitive political issues.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001 triggered a debate on the role of Islam in conflict-ridden and poor areas of the world. The Horn of Africa accounts for both a poor and conflict-ridden region. Furthermore, approximately more than a half of the region’s 130 million people are Muslims. The other half is Christian or relate to different indigenous beliefs. Djibouti and Somalia are predominantly Sunni Muslim countries, whereas Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Sudan are fairly diverse societies.

The conference aimed to elaborate on multiple perspectives on faith, citizenship, democracy, and peace in the context of the Horn of Africa. In this context, we are interested in understanding the premises under which democracy can be built in the Horn of Africa; what is the basis for citizenship in the Horn of Africa; and what are the premises for a diverse society of faiths to build harmonious relations between individuals and different ethnic and religious groups in the Horn of Africa?

These issues are thorny and difficult, and especially in a region which is highly fragile. The conference provided a platform to explore these issues by gathering scholars, civics, practitioners, politicians and other stakeholders to share experiences and critically examine under what conditions **Faith, Citizenship, Democracy and**

Peace in the Horn of Africa are compatible with each other; and how the political and social environment needs to be shaped in order to make these concepts compatible.

PART I

Statements

Mr. Tranje Danielsson, Deputy Mayor City of Lund

Welcoming & Opening Remarks of the Horn of Africa conference

Ladies & Gentlemen,

On behalf of the people of the City of Lund, I would like to extend our warmest welcome to all of you, representatives from the world of academia, from government authorities, from the United Nations, from the European union, from Non Governmental Organisations and religious bodies, to this, the seventh Horn of Africa Conference on the topic “Faith, Citizenship, Democracy and Peace”.

In our media, we often – too often – only get to see reports of the problems facing the Horn of Africa. And to be sure – there are many and grave problems indeed. However, I shall not dwell on these problems. We all know them to well.

Instead, I want to focus on a message of hope. Some would perhaps call me naïve, but that is fine by me. Naïveté is better than hopelessness! To me, the opportunities to rectify the many problems and to build a materially as well as spiritually prosperous Horn of Africa are great:

You are strategically well placed at the crossroads between the Mediterranean, the Arab world and the Indian Subcontinent. You have maritime traditions that are thousands of years old.

You have a grand history – the Horn of Africa is one of the recognized cradles of human civilization.

The Kingdom of Aksum established in the north of modern-day Ethiopia and parts of Eritrea in the 1st century predated northern European states by almost a thousand years! The same goes for the age-old trade network between the ports along the Horn – it was established well over a thousand years before the northern European Hanseatic league!

UNESCO ranks the Horn of Africa as a Biodiversity hotspot. For its wealth in spices and other commodities, the Romans called this region *Regio Aromatica*.

So – the Horn of Africa is in many ways rich – in history, in culture, in tradition. But unfortunately, the modern day development of the Horn leaves something to be desired. But the flip-side of the coin is that you have a huge potential to fulfil!

Let me illustrate this by comparing with our own history.

As you might know, this part of Sweden used to be part of Denmark.

Many extremely bloody wars were fought between Denmark and Sweden, and these lands were time and again devastated by famines, disease and violence.

As late as the 1900s, people in the United States and elsewhere collected money to send to the impoverished, sick and starving Swedes. Adding to that, we were at the brink of war with Norway. People – which we today would call refugees – fled by large numbers to the United States of America and elsewhere.

But today, only a lifetime later, this part of Europe has performed an amazing turnaround. Norway and Denmark are our perhaps closest partners and friends. Social and economic progress has transformed the society, the people, the landscape – everything. The multinational *Öresund* area today reaps the benefits of the increased international co-operation and globalization. Not bad for a region with – in contrast to the Horn of Africa – a comparatively short history, a harsh climate, few people and a very peripheral geographical situation!

With that in mind, I really don't see why this development shouldn't be possible in the Horn of Africa!

And I believe that you all in this room today have a most important role to play in this development!

The challenges facing the Horn of Africa must be overcome in order for you to realize your vast economic and social potentials. They cannot be solved by one country or one actor alone. What we need are joint efforts and common decisions. This is just one reason why I believe that cooperative bodies like the *Horn of Africa Conference* are so important.

Having glanced through your very ambitious programme, I can see that you will be discussing fundamental issues for the future like:

The relationship between politics and religion, between identity and security
Human rights and The spreading/deepening of democracy.

The very fact that you – the representatives from so many countries and organizations and stakeholders in the future of the Horn of Africa can – and want – to meet and discuss these extremely important issues, gives me great hope for the future.

I am convinced that your meetings this weekend will not only spare us future sorrows. I do believe that you will contribute to a brighter and better future – not only for the Horn of Africa, but for us all!

Statement – Leaving the Somali People to Resolve Their Issue Themselves: the Only Solution

The invasion of the sovereign state of Somalia by external forces in gross violation of all international laws and principles is a shameful chapter in the history of the world that prides itself on its civilized laws and principles and modern philosophies of human rights. The massacre, destruction and displacement of innocent civilians that ensued after the invasion that was carried out in clear violation of the principles of the right to self-determination and the rule of law are by far one of the worst crimes on humanity in the 21st century.

The outcome of the ill-devised invasion has so far been nothing but failure and embarrassment. For two years the world has seen and heard the news of war, turmoil and human loss coming out of Mogadishu. Having entered into a quagmire of fire to please its masters, the minority TPLF regime in Ethiopia is now in desperate search for a way out.

Realizing that they are immersed deeply in an inescapable quagmire, the quarters that invaded Somalia have been making attempts to divide and weaken Somali opposition forces in a bid to cover up their failures and shake off accountability for the crimes on humanity they committed on the Somali people. It is to be recalled that the ill-conceived so-called reconciliation attempts made by external powers in Djibouti had failed without accomplishing anything because they did not include the wishes and desires of the Somali people and their political forces.

However, there is one fact that these quarters have been unable to recognize or refuse to recognize, i.e., the primary reason why the afore-mentioned attempts could not succeed is because the initiative was not taken by the Somali people themselves and its contents did not address Somali issues.

It is to be recalled that the Government of Eritrea had two years ago warned that the invasion of Somalia by the TPLF regime and the US Administration could only lead to an inescapable quagmire and that it will entail dangerous consequences for the Horn of Africa. The Eritrean government had also pointed out that the Somali issue should and could only be resolved by the Somalis themselves. But the warnings fell on deaf ears and the illegal invasion was carried out. In their attempt to cover up the failure they sustained in their initial erroneous measure through the use of excessive military force, these forces have in the past two years committed gross crimes

on humanity against the Somali people which history will never forget. The Somali experience of the past two years in particular and what the world has learned regarding the US Administration and their agents in general is that their tactic of trying to redeem one mistake by another is only a march forward to failure and destruction. Repeating in Kenya the failed attempt for the so-called reconciliation in Djibouti is a clear example of the aforementioned fact.

Although the US Administration and TPLF regime refuse to face facts as they are, their most formidable challenge in Somalia is the people's own initiative for peace and reconciliation. Thus, it is clear that there is only one effective solution, i.e. to accept and respect the Somali people's choice without interference. The problem is a Somali problem and accepting the fact that it can only be resolved by the Somalis themselves would be a wise move. The only constructive role the international community can play is to encourage and create conducive grounds for the Somali people to come together and deliberate on their differences, and more importantly to respect Somalia's territorial integrity!

In order to reach an agreement, which violates the territorial integrity of Somalia, dangerous and conspiratorial engagements, coordinated by the US Administration and the regime in Ethiopia, were recently held in Djibouti and Nairobi. This adventurous attempt to balkanize Somalia and install puppet regimes that would serve US and Ethiopian interests, and the destabilizing effect is not hard to discern. This latest spectacle, more than ever before, has exposed the Ethiopian regime's servitude.

Knowing that the 6 December 2006 Security Council Resolution 1725 explicitly forbids the deployment of forces from neighboring countries, the regime in Ethiopia, using the pretext of defending against a fabricated threat of terrorism from Somalia, and the thinly veiled claim of an invitation by the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG), which is self created, with the full blessing and support of the Bush Administration and some neighboring countries, carried out its blatant war of aggression. The invading army finds itself in an intractable quagmire, and the worsening insecurity and suffering of the people of Somalia remains ignored by the international community.

At this time, contrary to its initial boisterous entry into Somalia, the TPLF regime now finds itself in an intractable political debacle and is emaciated by incalculable human and material losses. In order to cover up its utter failure, at times it tries to put the blame on the TFG, and at other times, providing empty guarantees for peace and stability, like relocating its forces from Mogadishu and other towns, deploying its forces close to the border area, and making false promises to intervene when necessary, using the fabricated threats of terrorism as an excuse, similar to the security agreement sought by the Americans in Iraq that gives the Americans the upper hand, is attempting to engineer a similar mechanism that will allow it political and military interventions in sovereign Somali territory.

The regime in Ethiopia unilaterally appoints and removes officials within the TFG, and in violation of the sovereignty and the right to self determination of the Somali people has also gone to the extent of appointing cabinet ministers that would advance its own interests. This is unacceptable under any circumstance.

The Government of Eritrea, underlining that the solution to the problems in Somalia can only be ensured through the determination, choice, and participation of the entire people of Somalia, is also certain that the conspiracies that are being weaved by Washington, with the servitude of the regime in Ethiopia, and facilitation of IGAD, is doomed to fail.

The unconditional withdrawal of the invading Ethiopian army and all other foreign forces from Somali territories is vital. There is no doubt that the people of Somalia will unravel the conspiracies that are being weaved and challenge them accordingly, as they have done in the past.

In openly launching aggression against Eritrea and Somalia, the TPLF regime had not only disrupted the peace and stability of the Horn region, as it had been entrusted by its masters to do so, but also plunged Ethiopia into an inescapable political quagmire. As a result of its actions in carrying out its devious mission, the TPLF regime is now trapped in the tangled web of mounting popular opposition inside Ethiopia and strong legal challenges from outside. However, instead of rectifying past mistakes and respecting the choice of the people and the rule of law, the clique continues to repeat mistake after mistake. Recently, the TPLF clique engaged itself in diplomatic and media campaign to blow out of proportion the nonexistent 'conflict' between Eritrea and Djibouti. It is quite obvious that the purpose behind this political game is to further delay the implementation of the EEBC's final and binding ruling under the pretext of a fabricated 'new conflict'.

Nonetheless, the people of the Horn region should be aware beforehand that the TPLF regime's game of fire could only result in further chaos and destruction. Hence it should be emphasized that the people and Government of Eritrea will neither join in the charade devised to cover up the failed policies in our region nor will they be the sacrificial lamb for the devious machinations of alien forces.

Statement from the Embassy of Eritrea
At the Horn of Africa Conference VII
Lund 17-19 October 2008

The crisis in Somalia and the process of national reconciliation efforts have been on the agenda of IGAD, AU and the rest of the international community for a long time now. The peace and reconciliation process in Somalia finds itself at a new juncture. The establishment of a functioning government, the struggle against terrorism, the harmony within the Transitional Federal Institutions, the national reconciliation process, the deployment of AMISOM troops, and the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops have occupied a central place in the political discussions on Somalia. The international attention accorded to Somalia is also increasing now, albeit not forthcoming. The process seems to have been taking a positive course despite the immense challenges posed from different directions. In the discussions on the current developments in Somalia and the region, it will also be important to view the problem from a historical perspective, to have a clear understanding as to where it all originated, where it is now and the way forward.

Ethiopia has been actively supporting Somalia's national reconciliation efforts since the early 1990s, both unilaterally and under the auspice of IGAD. The collective effort of IGAD countries has finally succeeded in realizing the formation of the Transitional Federal Institutions. The process that led to this stage had the full support of the international community and the TFIs were accorded international legitimacy right from the beginning.

The second phase in the process was the relocation of the TFIs to Mogadishu, which was a very daunting task. Though the international community should have backed the TFIs to relocate to the capital by way of deploying peace keeping forces, it was reluctant to support the IGAD initiative and assist the relocation and thus, the continued hesitation contributed to the opportunity lost during that time. In the meantime the Islamic Courts Union controlled the capital city and became an obstacle for the reconciliation process. Efforts were made to reach out to this radical group on the basis of the Transitional Charter. But all endeavors of peace and reconciliation on the part of TFG turned out to be a failure due to the intransigence of the radicals in the ICU.

More and more, the ICU increasingly became aggressive, threatening both the TFG and the Ethiopian national security. The group publicly declared a holy war against Ethiopia and the TFG. In this regard, Ethiopia has patiently tried to handle the matter diplomatically, but to no avail. The Ethiopian Government had made its positions clear to ICU about its intentions with regard to Somalia. They had been told that the type of government in Somalia was not of Ethiopia's concern, but the

conduct of this government. They were enlightened to the fact that Ethiopia would even go to the extent of cooperating with an Islamic Republic of Somalia. The requirements were simple, they were asked to renounce violence as a means of resolving conflicts inside Somalia; and to respect Ethiopian sovereignty and to abstain from supporting anti-peace elements operating in that country, armed and trained by the Eritrean government with the objective of destabilizing Ethiopia. The reaction received from the ICU was the continuation of the war hysteria. Consequently, the TFG called for military assistance. Thus, as a matter of right to self defense, and as per the appeal made to it by the internationally recognized Somali Government to safeguard the TFG and its institutions from these radical groups, the Ethiopian Government intervened in Somalia. With a joint effort of Somali government forces and Ethiopian troops, the ICU forces were ousted from Somalia in a few weeks and the relocation of the TFG to Mogadishu was realized.

The main currents that merit the attention of this conference in the recent political developments are:

- Maintaining the sustainability of the window of opportunity,
- The peace and reconciliation process between the TFG and the ARS,
- The harmony among the TFIs and the development of governance,
- Terrorism, piracy and the defection of Eritrea to the terrorist camp,
- The reinforcement of AMISOM,
- The need for a coherent and concerted approach at all levels; regional and international,
- And the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops.

Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia has brought a new opportunity to the national reconciliation process. The TFG has been relocated to the capital for the first time since the collapse of Siad Barre's government in Somalia and thus, legal governance has emerged in the capital. Somalia was a forgotten affair for most members of the international community before the intervention. There seems now a growing interest by the international community and this was following Ethiopia's intervention. The intervention also paved the way for the deployment of AMISOM. AMISOM is now being reinforced by the new arrivals from Burundi. Even though much is desired from the international community and they need to be more forthcoming, the despair and hopelessness that had prevailed for more than a decade has ended thanks to the perseverance of the peace-loving people of Somalia, the IGAD member countries and of course Ethiopia. It is also in the interest of all Somalis to maintain the prevailing opportunities, despite the many ups and downs.

The peace process under the auspice of the UNSGSR between TFG and the ARS is a positive development in the right direction. Ethiopia fully endorses and supports any peace process that could bring lasting peace to Somalia, and encourages both parties to continue at the negotiation table. It is also important that they seriously implement the agreements reached. The Ethiopian government is of the view that

the national reconciliation process has to be all-inclusive to reach out to all forces that renounced terror as a means to achieve their goals.

The continuous internal discord between the authorities of the TFI has been a cumbersome problem to the development of governance and the expedition of the reconciliation process. Ethiopia had been invited earlier in the month of August to assist them to sort out their differences. After discussions, the parties signed a road map on which they:

- pledged to work towards creating better understanding, trust and confidence,
- agreed to abide by the supreme law of the country, the Transitional Federal Charter,
- and to take measures to reorganize the system of governance, establishment of administration, reorganization of the security forces, and revenue collections etc ...

The expectation that we have from the TFIs might have been exceeding their capacity. Nevertheless, what their partners are requesting is that they rise to be able to do something within their capacity and their reach. However, after their return to Mogadishu, the TFI authorities did not show willingness to implement their understanding and IGAD seized upon the matter.

The extraordinary meeting of the IGAD council of ministers, which took place on the sideline of the UN General Assembly in New York, on 24 September 2008, has called upon the TFIs authorities to implement the agreement. It has also decided for a meeting at a summit level in Nairobi, exclusively on Somalia, which is scheduled for 29 October. All Somali parliamentarians, the President and the Prime Minister are expected to attend the Nairobi Summit.

Ethiopia's decision to withdraw from Somalia is still standing. There is no intention from the Government's side to stay in Somalia. But the withdrawal shall be in a responsible manner where anarchy would not follow the pull out of the troops. The sole agenda Ethiopia has in Somalia is the restoration of stability and the rule of law in the country so it will not be a safe haven for the spread of destabilizing forces in Ethiopia and in the sub-region as well. That is why it is giving its unrestrained support to all reconciliation efforts.

The IGAD countries have more often than not, had a shared perspective on the national reconciliation efforts in Somalia. They have been guided by the decisions collectively arrived at by different levels of IGAD policy organs. Experience has taught us all the need to work in tandem on the basis of collective decisions. It is Ethiopia's hope that the international community will work with IGAD and the AU with the same perspective. The UN Security Council has also to take its responsibilities in reinforcing the stabilization forces and safeguarding the sea from piracy.

Finally, I urge all Somalia parties and stakeholders to seize this critical but still opportune moment to turn around the ugly face of Somalia and bring Somalia back to normalcy. To miss this opportunity will be the most disastrous miss in the turbulent history of this nation.

Thank you for listening

Dr. Sheikh Abdurahman Mohamud Farah Janaqow, Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia

Firstly I would like to thank the organizers of the conference for the invitation and the opportunity that you have given us to present our views.

Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, let me proceed to present to you the current status of Somalia from the following perspectives.

A. The political situation

The Somali people are going through the worst phase (so far) of the Somali crises and it is worth mentioning that this severe and harsh phase follows a period when the Somali people were beginning to enjoy a period of peace that they have not seen for a long time.

After the brief period of security and peace the current disaster we are going through erupted. Somalia went and is still going through a severe war in which many have lost their lives, many been arrested, many raped and many more had to flee their homes to find safety elsewhere. We believe that it is impossible to expect peace in Somalia while the foreign forces and those which have come into the country by force remain in Somalia. It is necessary that all of us should cooperate in stopping the current massacre of innocent people as well as solving the political confusion. The International community and all Somalis should support the Djibouti peace talks between ARS and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), led by the special UN representative Ambassador Ahmed Walad Abdalla.

The ARS is determined to support and implement the earlier decisions made regarding the implementation of peace in Somalia in order to move the peace process forward. Although we have overcome many hurdles and there are still other obstacles ahead, there is a hope and a general feeling that there has to be a way to create a better environment and it is beyond doubt, that a continuation of a war is not helping the Somali people. If there can be a process, peace talks that can deliver a peaceful outcome, an independent Somalia and its people with intact sovereignty, as well as a Somali government that can work and ensure the unity of the country, its security, justice and equality for all, then our ultimate goal will have been achieved.

B. Security

As known to all there has been a major security problem in the country and (if one can imagine this) it is actually deteriorating further; this creates major civil upheaval

and constant suffering where innocent civilians are always fleeing their homes, many are getting killed, many more are sustaining injuries. There are many violent cases of snipers shooting innocent people, kidnapping of innocent people and the indiscriminate heavy shelling of civilian areas, i.e. residential areas and markets. The closing of the airport which caused major problems to many people, who were already suffering from indiscriminate violence, increased the attacks against the civilian population even more.

It is also worth mentioning the piracy problem which has reached levels unseen before and causing problems for the country as well as the region and the world at large. We can ignore what is happening to those who are trying to help Somalia, who are subjected to kidnapping, and in some cases robbed and even killed. Therefore, it is important and urgent that these issues are resolved in order to reduce the suffering of the Somali people, and to protect their business interests as well as the interests of the region and the rest of the world. We believe that a solution is overdue in this area, and urgent steps should be taken in regard to the security, politics and humanitarian aspects of the problem.

The ARS promises that it will contribute positively to solving this problem utilizing its credible experience.

C. The Humanitarian issues

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The country is going through the worst humanitarian situation of the last terrible 20 years. More than 1.4 million people have left their homes and now survive without any proper shelter. We are also going through a severe drought that has affected many parts of the country as well as economic problems, the skyrocketing of food prices, which made many Somalis suffer even more.

As widely reported by the international aid organizations, 3.5 million Somalis are also suffering severely under famine conditions which are similar to the 1992 drought and famine. We would like to request and seek the support of the international community to help the Somali people, especially the internally displaced people.

We promise that we will give our utmost support to those who provide humanitarian aid to help us cope with this tragic phase of our history.

In Conclusion

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The current political, security, and humanitarian situations are all interlinked and this is deteriorating by the day. If there is no political solution, there will be no security and peaceful situation, and of course if there is no security, it will be hard to provide humanitarian assistance. Therefore the following is our suggestion:

1. That the implementation of Djibuti agreement should be supported by all parties including the international communities.
2. That all foreign forces leave the country. No peace can be achieved while one party tries to dominate the other with the help of foreign forces.
3. There has to be a credible and meaningful reconciliation process where all interested Somalis are allowed to attend and the role of foreign donors and external bodies is to restrict themselves to the provision of the facilitation process.
4. The urgent deployment of forces to help the re-establishment of different sectors of the army forces to help us re-establish peaceful environment.
5. The provision of urgent humanitarian support to the internally displaced people in Somalia. The removal of all roadblocks and other obstacles that hinder the delivery of this urgently needed aid and the provision of safety for the UN and other aid-providing people. The Alliance is committed to take its role in achieving the above mentioned goal.
6. To deal with war criminals and provide justice to all Somalis. War criminals should be brought in front of the international court of justice.

Again I would like to thank the organizers of this conference especially the coordinator, Abdullahi Jama, his colleagues and the Mayor of Lund. May Allah bless us all.

The Djibouti Agreement – challenges and prospects

First of all I would like to extend my greetings to everyone here and say what a privilege it is to come to Lund to address this most important conference for the first time.

We are here on behalf of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Somalia, Mr Ahmedou ould-Abdallah, who very much wanted to be here to meet you all but, as you may have heard serious political developments within the sub-region kept him in Nairobi.

As I understand it, this presentation is to set the scene for discussions on the current situation in Somalia. It will be made up of three components – The Djibouti Agreement itself, the challenges facing it and the future prospects

The Djibouti Agreement – why it came about

1. After 18 years of conflict and hardship, it was clear that the “business as usual” approach was not working and none of the previous agreements had delivered. A process in which the political, security and humanitarian components were tackled at the same time was needed.
2. There was a belief that Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) as they were created did not deliver between the time of their creation and the moment when the Union of Islamic Courts took over Mogadishu. It was widely believed that they continue to fail to deliver on the two main elements of the transition – the establishment of the rule of law and the creation of a sustainable democratic environment for the long term, namely a constitution on the basis of which multi-party elections could be held.
3. There was a state of intensification of opposition with considerable violence against the TFIs, which was growing in popularity.
4. The Ethiopian military intervention heightened the need for an urgent process for Somalis, both Government and opposition, to agree on a way forward.
5. The SRSO, after taking soundings, felt there was a potential opening and a willingness among some groups to move towards talks.

What is the Djibouti Agreement?

It is an open and flexible agreement, simple in its design, consisting of 11 Articles, which is intended to create a process.

1. Its main pillar is to create a non-violent, secure environment through a cessation of armed confrontation
2. The second pillar is to generate political debate and cooperation
3. The third pillar is to activate international assistance, including for reconstruction, to provide a pulling factor for peace
4. A fourth unwritten pillar is that it provides HOPE.

The Djibouti Agreement has two driving forces or engines: the High Level Committee which is dealing with issues concerning political cooperation, justice and impunity and the Joint Security Committee. Both committees have an equal number of members from each side. Next week, on October 25 and 26, they will hold their third round of meetings in Djibouti.

Where is the Djibouti Agreement now?

1. In hindsight one can say it may have come late in the day. It was initialled in June 2008 and signed in August 2008, only a year before the end of the transition.
2. The degree of cooperation of the two parties, although recognisable, may not be sufficient at this time. However it should be pointed out that since June this year significant changes have occurred: the Parties who initially refused to sit with each other are now jointly representing Somalia in the international arena including at the Security Council and International Contact Group. They are planning together as in the Banadir Administration and are ever more committed to performing together.
3. The Parties have completed the preparation of plans and now they are at the stage of implementation; the ceasefire has not been implemented but its arrangements are well on the way; there is extensive dialogue on working together in one government; the Parties are moving towards a joint constitutional process: while they were previously not convinced of the impact of international assistance, on Monday they will be talking together with the international community about the preparation of an international donor conference. We wish to thank Sweden for hosting this important occasion
4. We are clearly moving from planning to implementation
5. In the view of many progress is being made but it may be too slow for the current state of affairs. We have a positive context but the fighting continues. The Djibouti process now needs to be grounded inside Somalia.

Challenges

There are 3 rings of challenges

1. The Somali ring
2. The sub-regional ring
3. The international ring

1. Somali ring

At the heart of this challenge is the deep rooted mistrust among Somalis, compounded by weak leadership on all sides. This combination guarantees there will be opposition to any peace process at any time.

The most important challenge in this regard is the creation of a critical mass on board the Agreement, capable of attracting public support both inside Somalia and in the Diaspora. This mass should be large enough to create an irreversible cycle of peace.

The Diaspora, in the Somali case, is part and parcel of this public support. It is the expectation of all Parties, be they Somalis at the table or international partners that this extremely important component of the Somali public will unequivocally weigh in for peace regardless of their political views, background or perceived advantage. In this respect the Agreement is open and flexible to accept a critical mass but we have to ask whether it is open and flexible enough. We also need to examine whether it is the right time to bring on board others or whether we should first consolidate the two main parties.

Prolonged hopelessness and a strong minority of financial beneficiaries from the war will always work against the significant momentum towards peace. This generates hardliners on all sides be they extremists, warlords, religious extremists or uncompromising leaders.

The Parties targeted by the Djibouti Agreement are now weak and the challenge is now to prevent further divisions.

The agreement has a focus on South Central Somalia – many believe this is the correct focus.

Somali leaders do not appear to understand the concept of the transitional; there is a tendency to behave as if the current state of affairs will continue indefinitely

2 Sub-regional ring

At the heart of this ring is what is perceived as a highly interfering sub-region often seen as negative and competitive. Today the Ethiopian- Eritrean border conflict is playing itself out in Somalia and continuing in a state of proxy. The role of IGAD and the African Union in bringing peace to Somalia is a challenge along with their effective role in supporting the Djibouti Agreement.

3. International Ring

At the heart of this ring there is a perception of significant indifference. The challenges include wavering cohesion, coordination and collective impact. There is no doubt that the level of cohesion is improving but there are still short comings. There are still insufficient resources (donor fatigue) and more importantly today major problems for delivering assistance to those who need it. There are leadership disputes and competition among some countries and organizations to be seen as the saviors of Somalia.

Conversely, the memory of previous interventions in Somalia is creating a reluctance to do what is needed. This is seen by the difficulty in mobilizing a UN mandated stabilization force, or raising adequate resources for an African force, and the slowness in dealing with spoilers or violators of the arms embargo.

However the international community can and is responding with resolve, resources and relative speed when their own interests are affected – for example piracy where countries have taken robust action.

Prospects

Our vision for Somalia includes the following prospects:

This year has been bad but next year will be worse if we do not make tough choices.

In the very short term the Djibouti process should deliver access of aid to the millions of displaced and destitute allowing the safe return of IDPs and refugees. It is necessary to ensure that there is a competitive, transparent process to identify Somali contractors responsible for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to improve efficiency.

The Djibouti Agreement process should be the only game in town, with no parallel processes. This should enhance prospects for achieving the prime goal of establishing a critical mass of Somalis both inside the country and in the Diaspora on the same platform. In turn this would create an irreversible momentum for peace to implement a real transition where a secure environment provides the space for a non-violent settlement of differences, development of a basic minimum constitution, and its implementation to conduct a democratic process ending with elections.

In particular this prospect carries the possibility of a governance system that expresses greater unity and an environment of rule of law, transitional justice and community based reconciliation.

Specifically we are targeting the prospects of an irreversible, progressive Ethiopian withdrawal from Somalia within the context of a structured ceasefire, possibly in phases that prevent hard-line elements from all sides filling a vacuum. This would possibly involve the presence of a robust UN stabilization force, expanded international presence inside Somalia, and swift reform of the Somali security apparatus including the police and army.

Politically this vision is underpinned by implementing an agreement on political cooperation that brings the opposition into Government or provides a legal space for a recognized opposition working side by side on the evolution of a constitution and its implementation. It provides an improved environment for justice that involves dealing with the past and agreeing on a system for the future. It enables a dialogue process that takes on board the issue of unity and guarantees friendly relations with neighbours.

Finally this is a vision based on Somalis working together to return their homeland to its rightful place on the domestic, sub-regional and international stage.

This could sound ambitious but it is feasible as it has happened elsewhere including in Africa. Above all the Djibouti process is all about hope.

H. E. Ambassador Marika Fahlen, Sweden's Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

As we gather here at the seventh Horn of Africa Conference in Lund, the peoples and countries of the region are facing ever so daunting challenges – new and old, home grown and externally driven.

The topics chosen for this year's conference – faith, citizenship, democracy and peace – invite us to better understand what unites and divides communities, how good governance links up with the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens from threats and abuses, and how diversity and pluralism should stimulate not prevent peaceful co-existence.

I wish to congratulate Abdillahi Jama, the conference co-ordinator for bringing together such an extraordinary group of scholars to guide us through a Horn of Africa environment with larger opportunities for peace and human rights. The first step here in Lund, as in all peace-building endeavours, is to engage, listen and learn to appreciate different perspectives on difficult situations and how best to address them in co-operation.

Throughout the Horn of Africa, in different degrees of severity, people face threats to their basic livelihoods. Right now, a combination of factors has put 17 million people in urgent need of humanitarian aid. Drought comes on top of conflict, in some places the other way around. Spiralling food and fuel prices add to an already fragile development crisis.

As drought and a development-deficit expand we get inter-ethnic clashes killing off pastoralist and farming communities alike, within countries and across borders. Increasingly severe resource scarcity is tipping communities from poverty they could cope with to desperation they need to escape. In some localities we see fruitful inter-dependent co-existence turn into fierce competition where the use of deadly weapons comes into play.

Livelihoods lost breed a search for new survival strategies. Prime among them seems to be criminality, earning assets and cash never seen before by perpetrators or their dependents.

In such conditions, money, not vision, fuels armed and deadly violence, luring youngsters, indeed often children, to kill for pay.

With little of a political process under way, rebel movements and other insurgents, once united under a shared vision of justice and democratic transformation or other forms of political and social change, disintegrate into competing gangs, losing links not only to their former allies but also to the marginalised people in whose name

they took up arms in the first place. Trust is eroded and a dialogue for peace becomes more far fetched.

Why is it so difficult to win peace and so easy to pursue seemingly endless violence? Do we have a wrong approach to peace-mediation, to peace-building or conflict prevention? What new entry points are required to make peace and reconciliation attractive and how shall we make sure that peace once agreed is also delivering on its promises?

The CPA in Sudan, the main pillar for a peaceful future of that country, is a hundred-page constitution-like document, binding on the parties by law.

The more recent peace agreement for Somalia between the TFG and ARS is a mere 2.5 pages and builds on a process of inclusive dialogue to settle the extremely difficult, almost anarchic, security situation and embark on quick-impact recovery.

We cannot say that one peace agreement is better than the other. Essentially, they depend on how the parties honour their commitments and demonstrate that they put the welfare of the people ahead of their own interest for power.

To an extent, comprehensive peace agreements set the tune of citizenship and democratic governance, themes of this conference. But so do even more the constitutional frameworks resulting from peace-agreements or being part of them.

Another theme of this conference relates to faith or religion. Here we are touching norms and values of both the private and the political spheres of life. The politicization of religion is both polarising and unifying. In Sudan, the dilemma has been addressed under the motto of one country and two systems, illustrating the differences between the Muslim north and Christian south of the country. However, in Darfur, religion is not the issue of the conflict, although some might prefer political Islam and others a secular system of governance.

In Somalia, where Islam is the religion of the nation and clan-competition the cause of much fighting, the Islamic Courts in 2006 were successful in unifying people in Mogadishu and introducing some time of peace. Presently, Muslims are killing Muslims again and the world is almost helplessly looking on. The Djibouti agreement holds great potential for a positive change. As implementation advances, the agreement merits to be accompanied by unflinching international support. To this effect, Sweden is hosting, this coming Monday, a UN meeting on the mobilization of such support. We hope this will strengthen the readiness of the international community to engage in one of the most neglected and serious crises.

How could faith and the values of human dignity that most religions profess firstly prevent false myths and demonising images of the other and secondly foment confidence and trust for reconciliation through dialogue?

I look forward to the scholarly presentations on these and interrelated issues throughout this conference to inform our understanding of the complexities of peace and security on the Horn of Africa. This conference could certainly contribute to new thinking and new wide-ranging and open-minded partnerships for peace and development.

Sweden's aid and development in Somalia

Your Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,
Firstly I would like to join the other speakers and thank the organizers for arranging this important conference and for giving Sida the opportunity to give a presentation. Today I will limit my intervention and only talk about Somalia:

I would like to begin by summarising our view of the situation in Somalia currently. For Somalia, 2008 has been yet another year of political uncertainty, crime, armed conflict and displacement – especially in and around the capital Mogadishu and much of South-central Somalia. And while, more or less, violence can be reported to exist in ‘Puntland,’ ‘Somaliland’ and ‘Puntland’ are yet to resolve their disputes. In addition with the worst cereals harvest in 14 years in the country’s traditional bread-basket, 2008 was also one of the worst years since civil war erupted. This resulted in a humanitarian disaster which could rival the 1992-1993 famine in the country. Increasing insecurity, driven by the recent surge in violence, threatens the entire humanitarian response in the country.

The global food crisis, on the other hand, combined with drought conditions and insecurity has resulted in all-time record high prices in Somalia with increases in the range of several hundred percent. According to OCHA, for example, this is extreme even in the current context of the global food crisis. Neighbouring countries like Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya are, for example, **‘only’** experiencing average food price increases of 75%. In South-central Somalia, prices of locally-produced cereals such as sorghum have increased up to over 400% over the last 15 months or so while prices of imported rice, which is the main staple food for the urbanites, increased by more than 300%. This price increase significantly deteriorated the purchasing power and ability of the larger majority of the Somali population.

The country is currently experiencing one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world which has already led to massive internal displacement and cross- border refugee influx to neighbouring countries and beyond. The continued impoverishment of the Somali people is occurring right now across all regions. In addition, Somalia is facing a service delivery crisis after an almost eighteen-year absence of effective central government. The already alarmingly low capacity levels for service delivery has also been eroded even further during 2008. At this junction, one can only argue that humanitarian assistance must of necessity meet the new needs of this

new emerging vulnerability in all three regions: ‘Somaliland,’ ‘Puntland’ and South-central Somalia.

As you well know, Somalia is a least developed, low-income, and food-deficit country. Global acute malnutrition rates are, for example, believed to be high – with rates above 20 percent in severe food insecurity areas. The situation in the South is aggravated by civil strife, insecurity and poor rains, while areas along the Juba River suffer from floods. Somalia has some of the world’s worst health indicators. Life expectancy at birth is 46.2 years and a quarter of the children die before they reach five.

But 2008 has also given us a few reasons for cautious optimism:

- The aid community is engaged in Somalia with the provision of humanitarian assistance and development aid. In this case, lives are being saved despite the challenges on the ground, for example insecurity!
- One other key result is the Djibouti peace process which, although work in progress, is also something we should build on
- Another is the fact that the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) and other, regional, parliaments have been convening, debating and producing laws with varying degrees of success and challenges.
- Also, work is in progress for an acceptable draft constitution. I understand that it is being jointly discussed by the participants of the Djibouti process, to start with and that, sooner than later, it will move onto wider consultations among the Somali public. And last, but certainly not least; the Somalia Diaspora remains engaged in the quest for a solution to the humanitarian crisis and for a sustainable peace. This conference is one example of this commitment.

It is indeed a great challenge to the Somali people, and to all of us, the international community in Somalia, on the need to appreciate the important Djibouti peace process: for example, having a roadmap for referendum, census and elections in accordance with the transitional federal Charter **will not be easy**. There are also other equally important transitional tasks that we should not forget nor ignore: for example, demarcation of boundaries, disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration, grassroots reconciliation.

Your Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen;

I would like to say a few words about Sida and our engagement in Somalia and about the approach of the Somali aid community.

As you maybe aware, Sida supported the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) 2008 with 62 MSEK from the humanitarian allocation.

In addition, funds were delegated to our Embassy in Nairobi for support to NGO partners included in the CAP 2008. With this funding, Sida entered into agreement with the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Oxfam Novib. Oxfam Novib, is currently assisting IDPs and their host communities with livelihood support, cash relief and cash for work; DRC is providing wet feeding in and around Mogadishu to vul-

nerable IDPs; while UNDP Somalia and the Danish Demining Group (DDG) are working on capacity building and mine clearance projects throughout the country.

Sida also allocated funds to the Swedish Rescue Services Agency for support to the establishment of a Mine Action Centre in South-central Somalia. A field office with the capacity to implement disposal of ERW was set up and a standby force at the hospital in Baidoa was trained to handle mine accidents. The project was a rapid response initiative in support of UNDP's Mine Action Programme and Sida's humanitarian contribution to the programme will phase out in 2008.

We are also engaged in more long-term development. For example, we have a partnership with UNDP with a number of key projects. UNDP is working with Somali actors on rule of law and security including support to the police; on institutional capacity building, a start-up package, and on the constitution-making process. We are also supporting the implementation of the Djibouti agreement through UNDP. Through Sida-funding, DIAKONIA Sweden is currently working on a civic and democracy education project with two other important components: a girl education project and a teachers' training college in Garowe, the only of their kind in the country. They are also thinking of testing the idea on other parts in South-central Somalia.

There are, of course, many challenges, but, despite these constraints and the many others I spoke of earlier, Sida believes that our interventions are addressing critical humanitarian -- and to some extent development-related -- needs in Somalia. While the situation has deteriorated, humanitarian actors and the aid community continue to look for new and innovative ways to access the destitute communities. You will agree with me that this difficult security situation calls for operational flexibility, which involves higher risks and higher costs of delivery.

From the donors' side, we are doing everything possible to increase the effectiveness of aid through better coordination and harmonisation among us. Throughout 2008, Sida continued to support initiatives for joint donor funding and engaged actively in coordination through various donor for like the Somali Donor Group (SDG) and the Coordination of International Support to Somalia (CISS). Due to the continued insecurity, however, there has been no gradual shift of coordination from Nairobi into Somalia as was foreseen earlier. As evidence of the growing efforts towards harmonisation, three joint planning workshops or retreats involving the international community will be held during the months of October and November in Kenya. This harmonisation is based on alignment to the comprehensive Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which was developed in a consultative and participatory manner.

Furthermore, there are plans to hold an international meeting on reconstruction and development in January or February 2009 in line with the Djibouti agreement. Although it is far from certain that the necessary improvements in the security situation will have been made by then, preparations are being made for the meeting, while developments are closely monitored. As part of this preparation process, a first pre-conference technical meeting outside Uppsala is slotted for October 21 – 22,

2008 which is a clear sign of Sweden's high degree of interest in, and willingness to support, Somalia.

As you can all predict, the Somali peace process and more specifically the implementation of the Djibouti agreement, will remain the key determinant for Swedish development cooperation in 2009 and beyond. If the agreement holds and the security situation improves, and it is my hope that it will *Insha Allah*, it is our intention to adopt a more long-term approach. There is a need to continue and strengthen the link between the ongoing political and peace processes with the development engagement through the UN and INGOs.

Your Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen;

I want to conclude my brief remarks to this important conference by acknowledging how honoured I am to be here with you today and to tell you that I look forward to the outcome of the conference but also beyond, for the benefit of a peaceful and prosperous Somalia. I thank you.

PART II

Security perspectives on Horn of Africa

Transforming Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: The Need to Focus on Shared Security¹

This paper explains the concept that is gaining currency with track II conflict transformation practitioners, in response to the many challenges affecting security of nations, states, people and individuals in the Horn of Africa. The concept of *shared security* and its application to the Horn of Africa, specifically the role that faith communities can play in bringing about and sustaining *shared security* is explained. This is done by focussing on, and explaining issues that interplay to advance sustainable peace and guarantee security for residents of the Horn of Africa.

By critiquing the *realpolitik* approach to security, this paper suggests that an answer to security for the Horn may be found after carefully studying the anthropology of the conflicts affecting the nations and states of the Horn of Africa. With more incidences of violent conflicts occurring within than between states, and increasing resource-based wars fought by non-state actors complicating the 'markets of violence', allocating so much resources to the purchase of arms and to maintaining standing armies and security agencies may not necessarily be the only answer to addressing the security problems on the Horn. While the threat to security has dramatically shifted from those of external threats to internal strife, mostly directly related to socio-economic and political injustices, precisely not addressing these issues, or paying lip-service to them, is therefore an aberration.

With this paradigm shift to security, the response to the same must change – especially in the Horn of Africa. *Shared security* is proposed as one of the approaches to address the security problems of the Horn. Drawing from the assets in the faith traditions – including spiritual, moral and social – will help contribute to resolution and transformation of the conflicts in the Horn, and is therefore recommended in this paper.

Introduction

Shared security is the most attractive and comparatively inexpensive strategy to respond to insecurity in the Horn of Africa. By its very nature, the concept of a shared

1 Ms. Sandra Kidwigira, the African Council of Religious Leaders (ACRL-*Religions for Peace*) Conflict Transformation Department Intern is acknowledged for her work in doing background research and literature search to prepare for this paper.

security goes beyond the notion of national security. This approach is multi-dimensional and holistic. The broadened and all-inclusive definition of shared security brings into account the socio-economic, political and religio-cultural threats to security. It requires that all sectors of society acknowledge their common vulnerabilities and the shared responsibility to address them. This paper investigates what faith organizations can do, and have been doing, to make the Horn of Africa more secure, or insecure.

This is a critique of the political realism approach to security in the Horn. Either a military solution has taken precedent, for example the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia, striking at suspected 'terrorist' sites and individuals, and the Ethiopia – Eritrea 'unfinished' war (perhaps now being fought in Somalia) thus militarizing the region: Or they have been treated individually as isolated cases of wars (for example the Sudan War). A multi-stakeholder approach to security indeed takes into consideration the fact that shared security may never be achieved by a single actor or sector acting independently. This approach calls for diverse actors and sectors, including the faith communities which can expand the analysis of conflicts. In times of violent conflicts, religions become 'identity markers' and almost always 'mobilizing' tools in response to conflicts – violent or otherwise as has been witnessed in the Horn of Africa.

Why are the Horn Countries Failing?

The Horn of Africa is considered to be one of the most vulnerable regions in the world. This assessment takes into consideration the socio-economic, political, security, ideological, religious and state response to conflicts.² The ongoing so-called 'war on terror', counter-terrorism measures, the region's state response and strategies adopted to fight political opponents, irredentist and separatist movements, have all notably contributed to instability in the Horn.³

The appalling social conditions, despondency, poverty and injustice in most parts of the Horn of Africa invite extremist and violent ideas. Amidst unprecedented increasing global prosperity in general terms⁴, the Horn of Africa, is among the few regions in the world that is stagnating, if not recording increasing levels of poverty.⁵

Rendering security and stability more fragile and difficult for the countries of the Horn is a question of governance. Understanding why groups of people or entire ethnic communities have resorted to violence against state systems or other commu-

2 Cited by Anneli Botha in Wafula Okumu and Anneli Botha (Eds.). *Africa's Vulnerability to Terrorism and its Ability to Combat it*. Institute for Security Studies. 2007. p.32.

3 Ibid

4 Today, we live in the most prosperous of times, ever, in human history. In 2007, the world economic output topped US\$60 trillion. The world's more than one thousand billionaires came not only from the rich countries such as the US, Germany and Japan, they also came from the developing and low income countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, Russia, Thailand and Venezuela.

5 Ironically, at this time of unprecedented global prosperity, registered in both the developed and developing countries, we, unfortunately, have the contrasting situation of nearly 1 billion people living on less than \$1 a day; 800 million people going to bed hungry every night; 1 billion people without access to clean drinking water, and 2 billion people without access to proper sanitation.

nities can be explained by the kind of governance – democratic or otherwise practiced in a country, levels of participation in the democratic processes, accountability, government effectiveness, the rule of law, and sharing the national resources among other factors.⁶ All combine to determine how fragile a country is.

Stable countries are characterized by a ‘high degree of political continuity in a political system’, free political participation that allows dissenting voices to be aired freely without harassment, insignificant extra-constitutional or external threats to governments and state authority, and equitable sharing of national resources. None of the countries in the Horn can therefore be classified as ‘fully stable’, as they do not encompass all these characteristics.

Some states in the Horn exhibited characteristics of stable, weak and failed states at the same time when analysed against the characteristics tabulated. For example, a state such as Eritrea would be considered weak when judged for political power and failed when judged for infrastructure and democratic ideals. Somalia would be judged as collapsed in its entirety. States such as Kenya, Uganda and to some extent Tanzania, would, to a large extent be classified as weak or fragile, moving towards stable in certain respects.

Table 1 Characteristics of weak, failed, and collapsed states.

	Weak States	Failed States	Collapsed States
Characteristics	Weak states are inherently weak owing to geographical, physical, or fundamental economic constraints	States are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous and contested by warring factions	Extreme format of a failed state
Political Power	Despots do not recognize the role of political opposition. The latter are often considered “enemies” and dealt with accordingly	Official power is often limited to the capital and one or more areas are controlled by an ethnic group. State failure can be measured by the geographical control of the official government. The status of warlords and non-state actors is on the increase, since the state is increasingly losing its legitimacy	Vacuum of authority filled by warlords. Ethnic and clan affiliation becomes the norm. Warlords often reach international agreements
Level of Conflict	States harbour ethnic, religious, linguistic or other inter-communal tensions that are becoming overtly violent	Civil wars stem from existing inter-communal tensions. Government security forces face two or more insurgencies, a variety of civil unrest, but violence is directed predominantly against the state	Sense of anarchy despite control of warlords. Crime might decrease, although kidnappings for ransom might be common
Law Enforcement	High crime rates; high levels of corruption and harassment of civil society	Failed states cannot control their borders. Police forces are paralyzed, leading to the escalation of criminal violence. Smuggling becomes common. Both rebel groups and the government target citizens. Warlords based on ethnic and clan solidarity often provide security	Warlords gained control over regions and sub-regions through their own security apparatuses. Economic structures are built on illegal firearm and narcotic trafficking
Infrastructure	Infrastructure networks are deteriorating	Infrastructure is gradually destroyed. Literacy rates are falling and mortality rates are on the increase	Infrastructure is under the control of warlords. Basic needs are provided for based on funds received from external beneficiaries

6 Most countries in the Horn score dismally in the generally acceptable ideals and practice in governance.

Diagram 1 showing characteristics of weak, failed or collapsed states. Source: Anneli Botha, in Anneli Botha in Wafula Okumu and Anneli Botha (Eds.). p. 32

Subversion of the rule of law (Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan); extensive impunity (Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan); external interference by hegemony (Somalia) and most importantly the markets of violence (Somalia and increasingly Eritrea) have ensured that conflicts in the Horn of Africa remain intractable and difficult to resolve.

Responding to these Weaknesses: Misplaced Priorities or Simply Ignorance?

By 2007, there were more than 700 million small arms and light weapons and 18 billion rounds of ammunition in circulation worldwide. Eight million new weapons entered the market each year. The vast military expenditure by state and non-state actors, porous borders in the countries of the Horn, presence of irredentist and separatist movements on either side of borders between two nations, are partly responsible for the easy access to weaponry and violent activities transcending national borders.

The Horn of African countries have been a recipient of all sorts of weaponry, excluding nuclear and the most modern sophisticated heavy weaponry (fighters and tanks). Countries of the Horn of Africa such as the Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and others have resorted to this 'expensive answer to security'. This has not worked, and their individual and collective security may not have been achieved. Instead, the region (and the countries in it) has become more insecure, and awash with small and light weapons.

With new threats to security, including and related to environmental degradation, food and energy crises, terrorism, increasing appreciation for democratic institutions and dispensation by the general population (amidst weak democratic institutions) – prioritizing national security based on vast military expenditures continues to fail to guarantee security for those who spend these kinds of resources and attention on military strategies and response only.

Today, more violent conflicts occur within states than between states. There are an increasing number of wars being fought by non-state actors. Most of these violent conflicts are resource-based, encouraged by poverty and fuelled by the very resources that are supposed to lift the conflictual parties out of poverty. Therefore, to allocate vast amounts of resources to purchase arms and maintain standing armies and security agencies while the threat to security has dramatically shifted from those of external threats to internal strife is an aberration.

In the Horn of Africa, most of the current conflicts are internal. Conflicts currently going on in Darfur (Sudan), Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Kenya in the Horn of Africa are all within the states except for some instances. Previous and current civil wars in Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia and more recently the low intensity conflict in Kenya confirmed that national security apparatus cannot adequately address emerging threats to security. They simply crumbled as a result of internal strife.

In the Horn of Africa, just as is the case with the rest of Africa, conflicts are more ethnic, religious or regionally based.⁷ As such, prevention, transformation or any form of intervention require that these issues are addressed, and become a part of the analysis of the conflict.

Proposal for Shared Security

By its very nature, the concept of shared security goes beyond national security. Shared security in its broadest sense acknowledges the solidarity of the human family 'by approaching security from the perspective of human rights and needs, and focusing on the protection of the individual from external threats'. Therefore, national security becomes simply one of the many cogs in the wheel to the attainment of shared security. An approach to security thus becomes wider, in which even the non-traditional security issues such as poverty, environment, food, and even illiteracy are addressed. It becomes multi-dimensional and holistic.

In a broadened and an all-inclusive definition of shared security, the socio-economic, political and cultural threats to security, including but not limited to health, environment, education, culture, general well-being and sustainable livelihoods are taken into account. It requires that all sectors of society acknowledge their common vulnerabilities and the shared responsibility to address them.

A multi-stakeholder approach to security indeed takes into consideration the fact that shared security may never be achieved by a single sector acting independently. This approach calls for diverse sectors, including the faith communities which can expand the analysis of conflicts. In times of violent conflicts, religions become 'identity markers' and almost always 'mobilizing' tools in response to conflicts – violent or otherwise. In most cases, we see religions being hijacked by extremists, unscrupulous power brokers, dishonest politicians and the sensationalist media. It is only religious leaders who can step in and stop religions from being hijacked by anyone.

In attempting to prevent conflicts, religious leaders, institutions and communities have to step forward and be part of the early warning system to conflict, and resolve those conflicts before they turn violent. Faith communities can, in a multi-stakeholder approach to shared security, be critical entities in complementing what other stakeholders are doing. By working in cooperation with other stakeholders, including governments, faith communities are well placed to analyze basic 'anthropologies of vulnerabilities', – which is crucial for governments in determining the security needs of its citizens. And in cooperating with governments, faith communities or religions must never be co-opted by governments for their political agenda.

Increasing globalization has accentuated the 'interdependence of nations' and the common vulnerabilities faced by the human race. Challenges such as increasingly unjust societies occasioned by economic inequalities, looming ecological disaster,

⁷ Bethwel Kiplagat gave this analysis in his paper, *The Role of Religion in Conflict Resolution. Relationship between State and Religious Organization*. Unpublished. In this analysis, he distinguishes conflicts in Latin America as manifested in class struggles unlike those of Africa which are ethnic, religious or regionally based.

‘widespread militarization of nations, cultural, religious and ethnic polarization of peoples and nations that threaten life both at the local and global levels’ are indeed security issues that must be addressed. A multi-stakeholder approach to these issues positions the human race to achieve a higher quality and sustainable security that is shared by all.

Underlying long term challenges to security such as poverty, climate change, competition for natural resources, marginalization and deprivation – all combine to complicate security issues and attempts to resolve conflicts. Religious traditions possess unique spiritual, moral and social assets which when mobilized, can greatly contribute to the attainment of sustainable shared security and peace.

Spiritual assets: Spiritual assets defy easy description and can be manipulated for sectarian or political purposes, but typically they point to what is most elemental and ‘given’ within religious visions regarding the meaning of human life. By so doing, they can provide courage and strength to believers in the midst of tragedy; make available the strength to bear the unbearable, to find grounds for hope when all seems hopeless, and to forgive the unforgivable. The willingness to forgive after situations of extreme violence is a relevant example.

Moral assets: Religious communities have moral assets or capacities that build upon and unfold the strengths of their spiritualities. The moral assets of many religious traditions include much beyond the simple elaboration of a code of ethics, such as mechanisms of inculcating moral visions by means of an intimate grammar of religious identity, provisions for engagement with tragedy, suffering and moral failure, as much as with moments of human success and authenticity; and a dynamic context for engaging new social challenges, with the advantage that these challenges can be examined in relationship to communal memory preserved in a variety of traditions. Fundamentally, most religious moral traditions ask their members to judge and care for others by the same standard as they would judge and care for themselves. These moral assets provide underpinnings for the dynamics of reciprocity essential to shared security. For example, these standards can provide a concrete moral basis for establishing a communal consensus regarding the need to address injustices and work for the non-violent resolution of conflict.

Social assets: The social assets of religious communities include the vast panoply of religious infrastructures: local churches, mosques or temples; the women’s and youth associations associated with them; their linkages at district levels; the national denominational organizations; councils of churches, and mosques; and the large number of religiously affiliated NGOs, schools, hospitals. The scale of religious infrastructure varies from country to country, but in most developing countries it is by any measure the most developed, inter-connected, and locally led social infrastructure in existence, reaching from the smallest village to the capital and beyond. These social assets can be re-imagined as delivery platforms for the kinds of services (advocacy, education, institution building and a variety of concrete services) relevant to shared security.

Shared Security for the Horn of Africa

The *realpolitik* aka political realism approach as the only answer to the attainment of security in the region has simply not worked. It will not. For decades now, countries in the Horn of Africa including Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea and more recently Kenya have experienced widespread violence and breaches of peace. On many occasions, the states themselves have been associated with the initiation of these conflicts. Certainly, many states in the region have been observed to have prolonged and escalated the conflicts in order to achieve certain goals.

The proposal for shared security for the Horn of Africa does not denigrate the role of states in the region. It in fact identifies the states as key elements to a successful attainment of security. What it does, shared security rejects threats and coercion normally associated with the state systems 'as primary means of generating order and stability'. It brings into the equation fundamental issues that define the needs of the people in the Horn, such as human rights, socio-economic justice, identity among others.

In Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan, the state apparatus has been noted to have been major generators and escalators of conflicts. The Sudan government has on many occasions allegedly generated and escalated conflicts in the Darfur region. The Ethiopian government has been condemned by human rights organizations for its role in escalating conflicts in the Ogaden and Southern Ethiopia. Somalia's Transitional Federal Government has been accused of colluding with warlords and criminal gangs to generate and escalate conflicts in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia. In some cases, it has done this with the help of foreign powers.

Shared security calls for a 'conflict sensitive' approach to politics and security similar to what the development actors call 'conflict sensitive' approaches to development. The foundations of less adversarial problem oriented politics are rooted in shared security. This is informed by the fact that none of the political sources of conflicts in the Horn of Africa have been resolved by force. Unless the basic needs of communities including identity are met, it is difficult to resolve the conflicts – this has been proven in the Horn of Africa.

It is important to understand the complexities of the Horn conflicts. Going beyond the simplistic analyses of these conflicts, their sources, the parties involved and the impediments to their solutions will yield a better understanding and therefore, perhaps, better solutions. Better analysis is needed, viewing it from many perspectives, and from a multi-stakeholders approach.

A multi-disciplinary and multi-level analysis of the conflicts in the Horn is paramount. The shared security paradigm demands that all stakeholders to conflicts are taken into consideration. State systems alone can never deliver peace. It is important to understand the different linkages within and between 'different political complexes'.

There is a need for more 'realistic analysis of the political economy of the war' – who benefits, who loses, how the losing populations cope, what mechanism they have devised for coping. This calls for paying more attention to 'conflict dynamics

rather than statics'. Tracking the Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia conflicts through time, identifying their patterns, trends and shifting goals would help in the overall design of what kind of security is most desirable.

Conclusion

When confronted with such realities, religious organizations, institutions and leaders must step forward to contribute to the shared security proposed for the Horn of Africa. The Horn conflict system is complex, and not static. Dealing with these complexities requires an expanded and multi-level holistic approach. As entities that have worked 'on' and 'in' conflicts, with varying success, it becomes logical to mobilize the resources inherent in the religious traditions – especially the social, moral and spiritual assets to achieve the shared security the Horn of Africa needs.

Whatever categories the states in the Horn of Africa find themselves today, the last thing that can assure them security is the continuation of the 'post-colonial neo-patrimonial'⁸ arrangements (and more recently of the liberators from dictatorships)⁹ in which leaders standing at the top of the pyramid and supported by 'cronies in civilian and military bureaucracies' define and decide what path the nation should follow. Moving from failed, anarchic or anaemic state to stable, requires that the shared security model is applied.

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⁸ For example Kenya and Tanzania

⁹ For example Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and Burundi

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The War On Terrorism in the Horn of Africa and its Aftermath

The Horn of Africa has been entangled in series of never-ending conflicts. Protracted guerilla wars lasting more than 30 years, the only two major conventional large scale wars in Africa and between African nations. Both the Ethiopia-Somalia (1977) and Eritrea-Ethiopia (1998-2000) happened in this region. Tragically, the ends of conflicts mark the beginning of new ones, thus feeding into the never-ending and escalating spiral of conflict breeding conflict. Hence, it is to be expected that the current situation will be a projection of the past trend. The outlines of this grim future have already started to emerge. It is important for all concerned to heed the writing on the wall to avoid repeating the past.

The purpose of this presentation is to highlight the importance of breaking the spiraling cycles of violence. Glimpses of the past are necessary to understand the causes of conflicts and eventually to find remedies. However, due to limitations of time, the focus here will be centered on the situation in Somalia. The Somali issue, both in terms of relations with neighboring countries and its internal situation, constitute one of the major cores of the perennial conflicts. Now Somalia is labeled as part of the “war on terrorism” in Africa.

Conflicts in the region can be divided chronologically into the colonial, independence, and post-independence eras. During colonization the region was one of the few places where popular and armed resistance to colonization took place. Hassen Abdille Osman (the Mad Mullah) fought the British and Ethiopians for two decades. The partition of Somali lands into various colonial domains hindered the unification of all Somali territories under one country. The effort to create Greater Somalia was met by stiff resistance from the two big countries that have large Somali populations and territories within their control, Ethiopia and Kenya. Equally important was the resistance to the effort by Djibouti, which has a large non-Somali Afar population. Somalis in the Ogaden in Ethiopia and the Northern Frontier District in Somalia waged armed war of liberation. Eventually, the armed forces of the Republic of Somalia entered the Ogaden and liberated almost the entire territory for a brief period. The USSR took command of the war on the Ethiopian side and used Cuban mechanized units and South Yemeni heavy artillery to drive the Somali army out of the Ogaden. This event ushered in a period of internal resistance against the Siyad Barre regime. The government was so weak that when it fell, the country without

a succeeding government up to this moment: a stateless country. This situation led into the present, where effort is being made to establish a working government.

After a decade and half of anarchy, local Islamic courts started restoring law and order in their communities. The grassroots movements had a snowball effect, eventually culminating into the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). It became evident the UIC was going to achieve stability and a government for Somalia. Unfortunately, in 2006 Ethiopia supported by the U.S. invaded Somalia, under the pretext that it was invited by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). To the outside world, the war was presented as part of the global war on terrorism. The only justification given was that individuals involved in the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were hiding in Somalia and that at least one of the leaders of the UIC is linked with or has sympathies towards Al Qaeda.

Initial success in dislodging the UIC from the towns was followed by urban and rural guerilla offensives. Two years later, the U. I. C controls large parts of the country and is fast gaining momentum. Now, the question for Ethiopia is whether to stay in Somalia or withdraw. Staying at present troop levels will be ineffective in preventing victory by the resistance forces. Increasing its involvement will be ineffective while it increases the risk of more casualties and humiliation. Other countries do not seem to be interested in sending troops in sufficient strength to replace the Ethiopians and to stand against the Somali resistance. The situation is shaping up to be the typical confrontation between occupying colonial armies and wars of liberation. In such confrontations, the example of history favors the forces of liberation.

The U. S. will have to review its policy on Somalia, and for that matter the entire region. The move against the U.I.C. was naïve and an overreaction. The Somali people were trying to establish a viable government where none existed. The possibility that the Sharia courts were the driving force should have been a welcome situation. At least there was one force that made the people accept the institution of government and rule of law. In addition, it was an effective tool for bringing warlords under control. The warlords are the equivalent of feudal lords in medieval Europe that resisted the creation of nation states and the creation of central government. The fact that Islamic law was to prevail should not be anybody's concern except the Somali people, who happen to be almost all Muslims, anyway.

Nevertheless, the "zero-tolerance" of terrorism policy of post 9/11 U. S. resulted in prompt action taken against suspected terrorists and their supporters anywhere in the world. The U.I.C. and some elements of its leadership may have been caught in this situation. They were identified as "nodes" in the Al Qaeda network. Nodes are involved in the movement of weapons, finance, and personnel and support of terrorist missions. The global war on terrorism calls for swift destruction of such elements. Now, given the power of hindsight, the threat posed by the U.I.C., even under the alleged conditions, does not warrant the death of 10,000 civilians, displacement of millions, and the wanton destruction of the country.

The other monumental mistake by the U. S. was to allow and assist Ethiopia to invade Somalia. It is difficult to imagine what else one can do to discredit any action taken in Somalia than to bring Ethiopian troops into the country. The behavior

of Ethiopian troops in Somalia reinforces the unhappy, ages-old experience of the Somali people. It made their worst fear come true. There is a lot of bad blood between the Ethiopians and Somalis, and blood feuds do not go away easily in this part of the world.

Predictably, the net effect of Ethiopian and U.S. adventure in Somalia was the invigoration of spirit of resistance among the Somali people. Much in line with what has been happening historically in this region, the end of this phase of conflict will lead to a new and higher plane of conflict. The net effect of Ethiopian involvement in Somalia may be summarized as follows:

1. Entry of Ethiopian troops in Somalia was seen as an invasion of the country and an accomplishment of Ethiopia's long-standing objective of destroying Somalia as a nation. The presence of Ethiopian troops became the most intractable issue in the peace process between the TFG and forces of resistance.
2. It doomed the possibility of the TFG getting support of the people because it came to be seen as an instrument of the Ethiopian government.
3. It re-ignited Somali irredentism and the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, which subsided after the 1977 Ogaden War.
4. Ethiopian occupation of Somalia and their brutal tactics energized the resistance and created a rallying cause.
5. It created a link between the anti-Ethiopian "occupation" struggle in Somalia with the liberation movement in the Ogaden.
6. It gave the conflict a religious twist: Ethiopia, a "Christian nation" subjugating Moslem Somalia. This consequence will itself be a major cause of future conflicts due to the rise of Islamic extremism. This may become the legacy of the "self-fulfilling" prophecy of U.S. and Ethiopian involvement in Somalia.
7. It created the possibility of resistance to Ethiopian governmental authority by Oromo Muslims in eastern Ormoia and eventually the entire country. After all, it was the coming of the Oromos in between the forces of Mohammed Gurey (Gagn) and Christian highlands that stopped its complete Islamization.

Of all the possibilities, the revival of Somali irredentism coupled with a religious war will be lasting and devastating on Ethiopia and the region. By jumping into Somalia, Ethiopia is playing with fire. Invasion of Somalia was a move that was a move that even Haile Selassie or Mengistu Haile Mariam did not take. Now the situation is that even if Ethiopian troops withdraw out of Somalia the war in the Ogaden will continue. Historically, the conflagration in the Ogaden spilled over into eastern Oromia. At this time, the problem could easily transform itself into a religious war and involve non-Oromo people.

Now the use of foreign forces in Somalia has run its full course and proven counterproductive, and discredited, the Somali resistance movements have to seize the moment. The outcome will depend on what the Somalis do and not on what outsiders do or can do. Perhaps, the first thing they need to do is to remove any links or semblances of links with Al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations. It does not serve

Somalia's purpose to be on the wrong side at this time. In the absence of concrete evidence, careless use of words and rhetoric are used to impute motive and behavior. This is one way they can get the U. S. and the war on terror machinery off their back.

The saddest situation in the region is that the U.N. and the African Union (A.U.) have failed as agents of peace in the region. In Eritrea, failure by both organizations to force Ethiopia accept demarcation of the border with Eritrea in accordance with the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission has put them out of the realm of enforcing international obligations by countries. In this regard, the behavior of the U. N. is matched by the League of Nations' silence in the face of Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, except this time, the shoe is on the other foot. The U. S. has prevented any U.N. action against Ethiopia, primarily as a reward for the latter's cooperation in the invasion of Somalia and enforcement of U. S. policy in the region, including serving as an "African Guantanamo". The situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia remains tense, with little chance given for an open war. However, having an open flame in an explosive area is not assurance for peace.

The Sudan is embroiled in Darfur while the question of the South still remains a hazy area. There are too many outside forces arrayed against the survival of the Sudan as a united and strong country. There are indications that some forces want it disintegrated. This is a country that will be in the headlines in the near future. Again, the primary responsibility for keeping the country in order rests on the government.

The problems that beset the region are daunting. However, there is still enough strength and means to put things on the right course if there is the will. Lamenting about the problems and miseries will not bring a solution except it clouds any possibilities that lay ahead. Hence, it is important to identify the strengths of the societies by looking at their history and culture. These strengths can be used to prop the societies up and chart new courses. Each country has its unique endowments.

In the case of Somalia, we hardly notice the fact that the society has been going on without a government for almost two decades. It is enough to imagine what will happen to an industrialized society if the police went on a strike for a few hours to understand the importance of this attribute. Somalia is a unique country in Africa that it has generally one ethnic group, one religion, and one language. Above all, the Somalis have the culture to bind people together peacefully. After all, they survived for thousands of years administering themselves and their scarce resources.

Eritrea has a spirit of patriotism and commitment that can literally accomplish the impossible. It has proven this notion to be true in conducting a war of liberation against an antagonist that is twenty times its size, armed to the teeth, and supported by the then superpowers. Its accomplishments in development are no less astounding than its war-time feats. Ethiopia and Sudan have the advantage of size in area and population, and availability of natural resources. Left unattended, these strengths can become weaknesses and force the countries to fall from their own weight.

The greatest threat, next to internal weaknesses, comes from the outside. Intervention by countries outside the region, have contributed to the continuity of conflicts. The region is of particular interest to outsiders because of its geographic

location controlling movement of ships in the Southern Red Sea and Arabian Sea, as a periphery to the oil-rich Persian Gulf hinterland, again as a periphery to the turbulent Middle East and by extension the war on terror. The region is also critical foothold in the new “scramble” for African resources.

In the absence of continental and international support for bringing peace in the region, the only recourse left is local resources. The successful resolution of the conflict in Eastern Sudan with the help and good offices of Eritrea is a good example that has to be emulated. Again the effort by Eritrea, Libya, and other African countries to bring reconciliation between Chad and Sudan and the Darfur conflict are commendable and useful moves.

In light of all the challenges, the strengths of people in the Horn of Africa have to be mobilized to create situations that will create peace internally and in relations with each other. To be successful, they have to keep all external forces away from their shores. Once the stage of conflict is passed, then it will be time to look for meaningful regional integration based on mutual respect and will. Intellectuals, all concerned individuals, and groups have the responsibility to assist in this worthwhile endeavor.

Implications of Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa

The fact that I am speaking on terrorism before this audience gives it more importance in a relative sense than it deserves. The sponsors asked me to address the subject and I expressed a willingness to do so. But I want to be very clear about its relative importance to other critical issues in the region. There are many challenges in the Horn of Africa that are far more important than international or domestic terrorism. Until governments in the Horn of Africa and their foreign supporters, including the United States, pay greater attention to these more pressing problems, political stability and quality of life for people in the Horn will not improve. Political marginalization, social and economic inequality, endemic poverty, pervasive corruption, poor governance, extremist ideology, and lack of tolerance are all greater threats than terrorism to political stability and economic progress in the Horn of Africa. In fact, these problems aid and abet terrorism. It is the responsibility of the governments in the Horn of Africa and their international partners to focus their efforts on solving these critical challenges. For the purposes of this discussion, I include East Africa as part of the region.

International versus Domestic Terrorism

Let me put the issue of terrorism and counterterrorism into its proper perspective. There is no universally accepted agreement on the definition of terrorism. The United States government defines “international terrorism” as involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. It defines “terrorism” as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents. These definitions of international terrorism and just plain terrorism are significant when we look at the situation in East Africa and the Horn.¹⁰

The vast majority of terrorist attacks in the Horn of Africa do not constitute international terrorism. They are, rather, acts of domestic terrorism perpetrated by groups

¹⁰ See Chapter 7 of the US Department of State *Country Reports on Terrorism 2006* for definitions of key terms. Available at www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82726.htm.

such as the Janjaweed in Sudan, the Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda, and, more recently, al-Shabaab in Somalia. Occasionally, terrorist acts carried out by followers who claim to represent one of these organizations qualify as international terrorism. In addition, indiscriminate attacks against non-combatant targets by governmental armies are seen by many in the region as acts of terrorism, although they do not fit the US government's definition of terrorism. The point I want to emphasize, however, is the need to distinguish between domestic terrorism, which has become fairly common in East Africa and the Horn, and the much less frequent international terrorism. The 1998 al-Qaeda bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and the assassination of foreign journalists and non-governmental organization staff in Somalia, some of the attacks allegedly carried out by al-Shabaab followers, are examples of international terrorism. My remarks will focus on the implications of international terrorism that have tended to drive American policy in the region since the 1998 embassy bombings and the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001.

Early International Terrorist Activity in the Region

First, I want to review briefly early international terrorist activity in the region. After seizing power in Sudan in 1989, the National Islamic Front and its allies in the military invited Osama bin Laden to establish a presence in the country. Between late 1989 and late 1991 al-Qaeda moved most of its best trained and experienced fighters, numbering 1,000 to 1,500, to Sudan. Although bin Laden retained an extensive infrastructure in Afghanistan and Pakistan, he joined his followers in Sudan late in 1991. Most outsiders initially thought bin Laden was a legitimate businessman in Sudan. It became apparent, however, that he also created terrorist training facilities and a confederation of terrorist organizations throughout the Muslim world. Sudan became increasingly concerned, however, about the poor state of its relations with the US and accepted an American request in the spring of 1996 to force bin Laden and his followers out of Sudan. Although bin Laden did not cut all of his ties with Sudan in 1996, his relations with the government grew increasingly strained as a result of internal divisions among the Sudanese leadership. Even before the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US, Sudan signaled Washington that it was ready to cooperate on counterterrorism.¹¹

Ethiopia has experienced relatively little international terrorist activity but continues to be subject to terrorist attacks aimed at influencing the domestic political situation. There were several international attacks in the mid-1990s perpetrated by al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya based in neighboring Somalia. The attacks stopped with the demise of the Somali organization. The Egyptian terrorist group Gama'at al-Islamiyya, with the help of the Sudanese government, tried to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during a visit to Addis Ababa in 1995. The Sudan-based

11 David H. Shinn, "Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn," *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, vol. 27, no. 1 (Summer 2007), pp. 50-52.

Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement carried out a few attacks inside Eritrea in the 1990s. Once Ethiopia and Eritrea normalized relations with Sudan in the late 1990s, Sudanese support for these terrorist groups ended.¹²

Al-Qaeda played a role in the attacks on American and United Nations forces in Somalia during the humanitarian intervention that began late in 1992. There is considerable debate, however, concerning the significance of al-Qaeda's role. A number of al-Qaeda documents have fallen into the hands of American intelligence. They have been declassified and released to the public. They clearly show that Africa regional al-Qaeda leader Abu Hafs made multiple trips to Somalia from the al-Qaeda base in Khartoum beginning in 1992. The first al-Qaeda operatives left Pakistan for Somalia early in 1993. They worked closely with al-Ittihad, established three training camps, and apparently took orders from the al-Qaeda headquarters in Khartoum. Although the experts on this early al-Qaeda engagement in Somalia are not in agreement, the weight of the evidence suggests that al-Qaeda was not very successful in co-opting Somalis.¹³

The Harmony Project at the US Military Academy at West Point, which analyzed all of the seized al-Qaeda documents, concluded that al-Qaeda thought Somalis would enthusiastically join its ranks. In fact, al-Qaeda underestimated the cost of operating in Somalia. Al-Qaeda constantly experienced extortion from Somali clans and unanticipated losses when bandits attacked their convoys. Al-Qaeda overestimated the degree to which Somalis would become jihadis, especially if there was no financial incentive. Many Somali clan leaders wanted the US and United Nations force to leave Somalia, but their first goal was the security of their clan against others. Al-Qaeda failed to understand the importance of traditional Sufi doctrine in Somali Islam and the degree of Somali attachment to clans and sub-clans. Al-Qaeda largely failed to overcome local loyalties although it did buy its way into a few sub-sub clans and managed to recruit a number of young Somalis who were attracted to the call for jihad. Some of these early recruits probably form the nucleus of today's Somali jihadis. Nevertheless, the Harmony Project found that the jihadi foreigners encountered more adversity than success.¹⁴

Al-Qaeda has had cells in Kenya since Wadih el-Hage, who had served as bin Laden's personal secretary and had US citizenship through marriage, arrived in Nairobi to run the al-Qaeda operation in 1994. Eventually arrested by the FBI, he was convicted in the US on terrorism charges in 2001. Abu Hafs and other al-Qaeda operatives began planning in 1994 for the 1998 embassy bombings. Kenya has been ground zero for international terrorist attacks. Al-Qaeda bombed the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel north of Mombasa in 2002 and, in the same attack, tried but failed to shoot down an Israeli passenger plane with two SA-7 missiles. Kenyan and international authorities have prevented other international terrorist attacks, including one on the new US embassy in Nairobi.¹⁵

12 Ibid., pp. 53-55.

13 Ibid., pp. 56-57.

14 Ibid., pp. 57-58.

15 Ibid., pp. 65-67.

Al-Qaeda began activities in Tanzania in 1993 by using diamonds, tanzanite, and rubies as a resource to make al-Qaeda cells in East Africa financially self-sufficient. Authorities captured two al-Qaeda operatives from Zanzibar who took part in the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Dar es Salaam. One has been convicted in a US court and is serving a life term in Colorado. The other acknowledged that he joined al-Qaeda but insisted he did not knowingly engage in a terrorist act.¹⁶

In 1994, al-Qaeda supported the obscure Salafi Foundation of Uganda, which eventually evolved into an anti-Uganda government group known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Al-Qaeda helped set up training camps for the ADF, which operated out of the eastern Congo. The ADF sporadically appears as a meaningful organization and then disappears. In 1998 Ugandan authorities detained twenty suspects linked to al-Qaeda who were believed to be planning an attack against the US embassy in Kampala.¹⁷

Somalia and Al-Shabaab

Turning to the current situation, the role of al-Shabaab in Somalia has received a great deal of attention in the past couple of years. Stig Jarle Hansen, senior researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research published in September 2008 the best analysis of al-Shabaab as an organization. He concluded that al-Shabaab is directed by a small group of Afghanistan veterans, former members of al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya, and Somali diaspora ideologues. Al-Shabaab's most prominent ideologue, according to Hansen, is Sheikh Fuad Muhammad Qalaf, a former imam from the now closed Rinkeby Mosque in Sweden. Al-Shabaab identified its principal leader in a November 2007 internet statement as Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubair, although there is some confusion about the background of this individual.¹⁸

Hansen explained that al-Shabaab leaders, at least until recently, have denied any formal link to al-Qaeda, but have expressed admiration for Osama bin Laden and other jihadists. While Hansen is not certain what role is being played by the small number of foreign al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia, he said al-Shabaab is clearly influenced by al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab leaders see the Somali conflict as part of a global war between the West and Islam. At the same time, he argued that most al-Shabaab rank and file fighters are motivated by a desire to force the Ethiopians out of Somalia and to have sharia courts enforce law and order. He added that al-Shabaab's hard-line ideology led to its break in 2007 with the Union of Islamic Courts and both subsequent factions of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS).¹⁹

Policy differences between the Union of Islamic Courts and al-Shabaab have increased in recent months. Al-Shabaab strongly opposed efforts by the Djibouti fac-

16 Ibid., pp. 67-68.

17 Ibid., pp. 68-69.

18 Stig Jarle Hansen, "Misspent Youth – Somalia's Shabab Insurgents," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 1 September 2008. This online analysis is only available by paid subscription.

19 Ibid. See also "Somalia's al-Shabab Reconstitutes Fighting Force," *CTC Sentinel*, vol. 1, issue 3, February 2008, pp. 17-19.

tion of the ARS, working with the Transitional Federal Government, to create a government of national unity in Somalia. The Union of Islamic Courts issued a statement in mid-September calling on al-Shabaab to abandon its attacks on aircraft that use Mogadishu airport, arguing that service in and out of the airport is needed to help sustain Somalis in the capital. There are disagreements between leaders of the Union of Islamic Courts and the group led by Sheikh Hassan Turki that recently seized power in Kismayu and claims to be linked to al-Shabaab. Finally, there seem to be different positions concerning the recent attacks on Ugandan and Burundi troops who are serving in Mogadishu as African Union peacekeepers. A group calling itself the Ras Kamboni fighters took credit for one of the attacks in September 2008. According to *Radio HornAfrik*, a spokesperson for the Union of Islamic Courts said the Ras Kamboni group was once under the Courts but apparently had become independent. The Court spokesperson then took credit for the attack on the Ugandans.²⁰

Ken Menkhaus, a professor at Davidson College and an American who has been following developments in Somalia for many years, made some important comments about al-Shabaab in September 2008. After al-Shabaab severed its links with the Union of Islamic Courts and the ARS, Menkhaus explained that jihadist cells in Mogadishu linked to al-Shabaab have engaged in a campaign of threats and alleged assassinations against Somalis who worked for western aid agencies or those who collaborated with United Nations agencies and western NGOs. Menkhaus emphasized, however, that not all al-Shabaab members embraced this policy.²¹ Al-Shabaab's spokesperson, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, condemned the policy of assassinations in July 2008, commenting that it was unbecoming for al-Shabaab to kill persons who are trying to help the Somali people. By October 2008, however, Robow warned the International Medical Corps and Care International to stop meddling in areas under al-Shabaab control. This al-Shabaab threat sent a chilling message to these and similar aid organizations.²²

§Jihadist cells in Mogadishu are increasingly fragmented and answer to no one. Menkhaus commented that some of these cells are believed to have targeted national aid workers and civil society leaders. At the same time, he did not rule out that some of the attacks taking place in Mogadishu could be the work of hardliners in the Transitional Federal Government. To the extent that al-Shabaab is behind the attacks against aid workers, he said they are a direct response to the US designation in March 2008 of al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization and the May 2008 US missile strike that killed al-Shabaab's leader, Aden Hashi Ayro.²³

20 "Two Somali Groups Claim Responsibility for Attack on Peacekeepers," *Radio HornAfrik*, 24 September 2008. Michael A. Weinstein, "Analysis: Ideological Diversity in Somalia's Islamic Courts Movement," *Garoweonline.com*, 25 September 2008. See at www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Analysis.shtml.

21 Ken Menkhaus, "A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare," *Enough Strategy Paper*, September 2008, pp. 4-5. Available at www.enoughproject.org.

22 Sunguta West, "New Strategy of Killing Aid Workers in Somalia – But Whose Strategy is it?" *Terrorism Focus*, vol. 5, issue 28 (29 July 2008). "Somali Islamists Warn Western Aid Agencies," *Reuters*, 3 October 2008.

23 Menkhaus, pp. 5-8.

Al-Shabaab's public position concerning a link to al-Qaeda may have changed in recent months. Al-Shabaab spokesperson Mukhtar Robow is quoted in a *Los Angeles Times* story that "we will take our orders from Sheik Osama bin Laden because we are his students."²⁴ Robow added that "al-Qaeda is the mother of the holy war in Somalia" and "most of our leaders were trained in al-Qaeda camps. We get our tactics and guidelines from them. Many have spent time with Osama bin Laden."²⁵ US Ambassador to Kenya, Michael Ranneberger expressed some doubts in the same *Los Angeles Times* article as to the closeness of the connection between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda. He suggested that al-Shabaab continues to run its own affairs and is not taking orders from al-Qaeda.²⁶

In view of the growing US pressure on al-Shabaab, however, it may well have concluded that it can attract financing and support by stressing a link with al-Qaeda that, in fact, may not yet be very significant. Al-Shabaab released in July 2008 a 24-minute video featuring Mukhtar Robow and Kenyan al-Qaeda operative Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, who has been implicated in the 1998 US embassy bombings. The video reaches out to al-Qaeda. Four internet forums regularly used by al-Qaeda carried the video.²⁷ In another development, the Head of Iraq's Investigation and Information Agency in the Ministry of Interior stated in July 2008 that documents and letters found during search operations in suburbs of Baghdad prove that al-Qaeda elements left Iraq for Somalia and Sudan.²⁸

Implications of US Counterterrorism Policy in the Horn

US counterterrorism policy in the Horn has included some programs that have contributed in a positive way to countering terrorist activities. Assistance to governments in the Horn for improved computerized tracking of suspect individuals by emigration departments and certain specialized counterterrorism training are examples. At the same time, US policy has emphasized the capturing or killing of persons who it believes have been involved in international terrorist attacks and an effort to deny Somalia as a safe haven for al-Qaeda operatives. The US has devoted an enormous amount of energy to tracking down three individuals – Fazul Abdullah Mohammed from the Comoro Islands, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan from Kenya, and Abu Talha al-Sudani from Sudan – all of whom were implicated in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.²⁹ Nabhan acknowledged in the July 2008 video that al-Sudani died more than a year ago in battle, presumably with Ethiopian

24 Edmund Sanders, "Conditions May Be Ripe for Al Qaeda in Somalia," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 August 2008.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Nick Grace, "The Long War Journal: Shabaab Reaches Out to al Qaeda Senior Leaders, Announces Death of al Sudani." *The Long War Journal*, 2 September 2008. See at www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/shabab_reaches_out_t-print.php.

28 Basil Adas, "Al Qaida Groups Leaving Iraq for Sudan, Somalia," *Gulf News*, 8 July 2008.

29 "Factbook – Hunted al Qaeda Militants in Africa," *Reuters*, 4 August 2008.

forces in Somalia.³⁰ Fazul and Nabhan remain very much at large. Kenyan police converged on Fazul's safe house in Malindi, along the Kenya coast, in August 2008. Fazul escaped again and, according to one account, is now in Tanzania.³¹ Fazul and Nabhan are believed to have moved in and out of Somalia in recent years. Although Ayro and al-Sudani, who are known to have been involved in international terrorist attacks, are no longer a threat, it strains credulity to argue that US counterterrorism policy in the Horn and East Africa has been a significant success after ten years of serious effort.

As I stated at the beginning, the main problem with US policy is that it does not give sufficient attention to working with host governments and civil society with the objective of ameliorating the reasons why so many persons living in the region provide support to committed terrorist operatives or refuse to identify them to responsible authorities. Making the Horn a better and more equitable place to live will probably never deter the Fazuls, Nabhans, and al-Sudanis of the world. But ameliorating the root causes of terrorism will almost certainly diminish the support and sustenance terrorists continue to receive from the population generally and reduce the temptation to become rank and file members of organizations like al-Shabaab. Elijah Karia, the Kenyan anti-terrorism unit chief in the Malindi area, told *Washington Post* reporter Stephanie McCrummen, for example, that Fazul receives the support of Kenyans who live along the coast and it is "only the sympathizers who are keeping him from being arrested."³²

Although many, perhaps most, Somalis disapprove of al-Shabaab, Menkhaus argued that Somali anger is now directed at Ethiopia, the Transitional Federal Government, and the United States. Menkhaus added that US policy in Somalia has had the effect of isolating more moderate members of the Somali opposition, generated a high level of anti-Americanism, and contributed to the radicalization of the population.³³ If Menkhaus is correct on this point, and I am inclined to agree with his analysis, the current US approach to counterterrorism in Somalia will not work. It must use greater discretion in its efforts to capture and/or kill bad guys and devote more resources and effort, working with local governments and groups, to resolve the root causes of terrorism.

Other knowledgeable observers have also been critical of US counterterrorism policy in the Horn. Reporting the views of several human rights activists and a US official familiar with Kenya's counterterrorism situation, Stephanie McCrummen wrote that Kenya's anti-terrorism unit, which the US helped finance through the East African Counterterrorism Initiative, is ineffective. Hundreds of Kenyans have been arrested on suspicion of terrorist activities. Only one has been successfully tried in court. Ali-Amin Kimathi, chairman of the Muslim Human Rights Forum in Kenya, told McCrummen that Kenya's anti-terrorism unit has cultivated a network

30 Grace.

31 "Al-Qaeda Planning Strike on Uganda in Retaliation for Somalia Peacekeeping Efforts?" *Terrorism Focus*, vol. 5, issue 34, 24 September 2008. "Al-Qaeda Man Feared Hiding in Tanzania," *This Day* (Dar es Salaam), 30 September 2008.

32 Stephanie McCrummen, "Hunt for Suspects in Embassy Bombings Elicits Anger in Kenya," *Washington Post*, 15 August 2008.

33 Menkhaus, p. 8.

of informants who often supply its agents with names of people who turn out to be business enemies or others with whom they are trying to settle scores.³⁴

In an August 2008 study of US efforts to counter terrorism in Kenya, Beth Whitaker of the University of North Carolina wrote that the US has repeatedly urged the Kenyan parliament to pass anti-terrorism legislation. Kenyan parliamentarians have refused to do so. Whitaker argued that Kenya is reluctant to cooperate in the open with the US war on terror because many Kenyans feel empowered by its democracy after years of experiencing autocratic rule. The democratization process in Kenya has contributed to the mobilization of the minority Muslim community. Kenyans generally view the concept of security much more broadly than the view implied by the US. Most Kenyans still see terrorism as largely an American or Israeli problem. Finally, Kenyan resistance to US demands is linked to similar concerns expressed by Europeans. Whitaker, although acknowledging quiet Kenyan cooperation with the US on counterterrorism, concluded that the same democratic system that the US promoted in Kenya has now made it difficult for the US to obtain complete cooperation in the war on terror, at least in the short term.³⁵

Sudan, which remains on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism, has been a surprising success story in US efforts to counter international terrorism in the region. While the Sudanese government hosted Osama bin Laden during the first half of the 1990s, it is now working with the US to defeat international terrorists. In fact, al-Qaeda cells in Sudan are now attacking western interests in Sudan, including the assassination of a USAID officer in Khartoum in January 2008, to both harm Americans and to embarrass the same Sudanese government that once supported al-Qaeda. An obscure group calling itself Ansar al-Tawhid claimed credit for the killing of the American official. The government of Sudan captured and has put five Sudanese on trial for the assassination. In October 2008, the US embassy in Khartoum publicized a warning against Americans in Sudan from another obscure group calling itself al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Niles.³⁶

The State Department's *Country Reports on Terrorism 2006* stated that "the Sudanese government was a strong partner in the War on Terror and aggressively pursued terrorist operations directly involving threats to U.S. interests and personnel in Sudan."³⁷ A year later, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2007* commented that "the Sudanese government continued to cooperate in the War on Terror, pursuing terrorist operations directly involving threats to U.S. interests and personnel in Sudan. While the U.S.-Sudanese counterterrorism relationship remained solid, hard-line Sudanese officials continued to express resentment and distrust over actions by the USG and questioned the benefits of continued cooperation."³⁸

34 McCrummen.

35 Beth Elise Whitaker, "Reluctant Partners: Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Democracy in Kenya," *International Studies Perspectives*, vol. 9, issue 3, August 2008, pp. 264-266.

36 "US Warns of Al-Qaeda Threats in Sudan," *AFP*, 11 October 2008. "Alleged Killers of US Diplomat in Sudan to Stand Trial," *Sudan Tribune*, 6 August 2008.

37 US Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2006*, Chapter 3 (Sudan). See at www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82736.htm.

38 US Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2007*, Chapter 3 (Sudan). See at www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103711.htm.

This view reflects the disappointment among Sudanese officials that Sudan remains on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism in spite of its cooperation with Washington since the beginning of this century. This frustration will almost certainly increase now that North Korea has been removed from the state sponsors of terrorism list. The 2007 State Department report added that Sudan uncovered and largely dismantled a large-scale terrorist organization targeting western interests in Khartoum.³⁹

The Next Administration

If the US wants to make meaningful progress on countering support for international terrorist activity in East Africa and the Horn, it needs to reassess its entire approach to counterterrorism in the region. This means devoting more intellectual and financial resources to resolving terrorism's root causes. While the US and its partners in the region have killed and captured a number of terrorist operatives and interrupted several terrorist plots before they took place, there is little indication that US policy has decreased the willingness of persons living in East Africa and the Horn to end their support for or at least toleration of individuals who are prepared to use terrorist tactics against western interests and their governmental allies in the region. There has been even less progress in deterring support for groups that engage in the far more frequent acts of terrorism whose goal is regime change or is designed to embarrass existing authorities or competing political groups. It is also time to reassess the decision that keeps Sudan, a country now cooperating with the US on countering terrorism, on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism. This issue should be separated from Washington's legitimate disagreements with Khartoum over its policy in Darfur.

While the US government has often exaggerated the international terrorist threat in East Africa and the Horn and instituted a flawed policy for coping with it, some residents of these countries and their counterparts in the diaspora err on the side of understating the problem. I have had conversations with some individuals from the region who are essentially in denial and refuse to admit that international terrorism is an issue in spite of well documented terrorist attacks and public statements by al-Qaeda and indigenous terrorist organizations in the Horn that brag about their responsibility for these attacks. Neither the exaggeration of the threat of international terrorism nor its denial serves the interests of the US or the people and countries in the region.

39 Ibid.

Human Rights Challenges in the Horn of Africa

Thank you to the conference organizers for again inviting me to speak at this 7th annual conference on the Horn of Africa. My position with Amnesty International is researcher on the Horn of Africa – Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Somaliland, and Djibouti. For Sudan, I have to leave to other speakers the task of speaking on the continuing human rights and humanitarian crisis.

The topics being discussed this year are both new and old. Religious faith is a new focus, while democracy and the desire for peace have been the driving forces of the whole conference project.

My task is to give a human rights frame to the various workshop discussions, on the human rights challenges in each country over the past year and for the near future. I will address, first, the right to freedom of religious belief, and second, the citizenship and democracy rights to freedom of opinion, assembly and association. The international community has a duty to promote human rights internationally and in government aid programmes, and specifically to support human rights defenders – for example, through the European Union’s Declaration on Human Rights Defenders.

Amnesty International’s work is based on international human rights standards, so I will start by describing the international standards for religious freedom, which are closely linked to other rights.

International standards of freedom of religious belief

The universal right to religious freedom is contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which all UN member-states subscribe in principle, if not practice. It is affirmed in most of their constitutions, though not thereby always implemented. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration makes the resounding and eloquent statement that “*Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes the freedom to change his [and of course her] religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others, and in public or private, to manifest his [or her] religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship or observance*”.

Article 19 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights added that “*No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his [or her] freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his [or her] choice*”. All the states in the Horn have ratified this

human rights treaty. They are obliged to submit regular reports to the Human Rights Committee on their implementation of this treaty, but they have not done so.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which all four states have ratified, also supports the right to "*free practice of religion*".

As international human rights developed further, especially under pressure from world civil society, the UN General Assembly in 1981 adopted a Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. This says in a preamble that "*religion or belief, for anyone who professes either, is one of the fundamental elements in [their] conception of life and that freedom of religion or belief should be fully respected and guaranteed*". It prohibits discrimination on the grounds of belonging to any particular faith or none. In 1986 the UN Human Rights Council established a Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion to report each year on violations of religious freedom throughout the world.

The Horn has a long and complex history of inter-faith relations between the difference societies and world religions in the region. It includes a high degree of active religious devotion and practice, and considerable customary inter-faith respect and tolerance. However, as elsewhere, there have also been periods and incidents of intolerance and faith-connected conflict, often politically-driven.

I will now describe briefly the situations in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Somaliland as regards religious freedom, and also freedom of opinion, assembly and association, as well as human rights in conflict.

Eritrea

In Eritrea, the Constitution permits freedom of religion. But soon after independence the government banned the Jehovah's Witness religion and stripped its believers of all basic citizen rights on the grounds that they refused national military service. National service is compulsory for men aged 18 to 40, and women 18 to 27, and is of indefinite length. As well as military tasks linked to the tense and unresolved aftermath of the border war with Ethiopia, it includes heavy labour on construction projects – which may be a violation of international conventions on forced labour. There are few exemptions and the right to conscientious objection is not recognized. Three Jehovah's Witnesses have been detained for 14 years incommunicado without charge or trial in Sawa military camp for refusing to bear arms, which is a doctrine of their religion worldwide.

The four main religions in Eritrea – the Orthodox, Catholic and Lutheran churches and Islam – are officially recognized, though subject to various legal restrictions and administrative interventions. The 80-year old Patriarch of the Eritrean Orthodox Church, Abune Antonios, was deposed by the government in 2006 and is detained incommunicado under house arrest. A year later the government appointed a new Patriarch, also contrary to church procedures. The deposed Patriarch is in poor health, with adequate medical treatment denied. Several Orthodox priests, and also some members of unofficial Muslim groups, are also detained incommunicado in prison without charge or trial.

Since 2002 there has been intensive persecution of minority Christian churches. The government banned all evangelical and Pentecostal churches, seized their premises and assets. Police frequently arrest believers worshipping in private homes or holding weddings. Military and security officers routinely torture religious prisoners to try to make them sign a statement to abandon their faith, which few do. Currently over 2,000 religious prisoners are held incommunicado in military and security prisons in extremely harsh conditions with virtually no medical treatment, which has led to several deaths. Worship is banned in the army, and bibles found by guards have been burned.

The persecuted minority churches have no political engagement and do not oppose national service – with the exception of the Jehovah's Witnesses, who oppose bearing of arms on faith grounds but not development service. The reason for this exceptionally severe degree of religious persecution is not related to any specifically political issues but is part of the far-reaching denial of basic human rights in Eritrea, where the government seems to demand only duties of its citizens without according them many basic rights of opinion and belief if they diverge from the official mould.

In a country closed to international human rights scrutiny or access, opposition parties are not allowed, national elections do not take place, there is no independent or private media, political dissent is not tolerated, there are no independent civil society groups or human rights organizations, and there is no impartial and independent justice system to uphold the rule of law. Torture of political and religious prisoners is routine, as well as of people evading or fleeing conscription. Victims are tied for long periods in painful positions, notably “the helicopter” technique. Thousands of political prisoners including journalists are detained arbitrarily without charge or trial and are held incommunicado. Several former senior government ministers and liberation leaders and some journalists are held in secret prisons since 2001, some feared dead.

Prisoners in Eritrea also include rejected Eritrean asylum seekers forcibly returned from several countries in contravention of the guidelines of the UN Office of the High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

Ethiopia

The Ethiopian Constitution recognises freedom of religion and this has generally been respected in this multi-faith country, dominated historically by the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, although there have been some political incidents affecting various religions. During the brutally repressive period of the Dergue under Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam from the 1974 revolution to its overthrow in 1991, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was brought under tight political control. The Patriarch, Abuna Tewoflos, was detained and murdered in prison. In the 1980s a sustained campaign, including large-scale arbitrary detention and torture, was mounted against minority religions of foreign origin – the evangelical and pentecostal churches. The leader of the Lutheran Ethiopian Evangelical Mekane Yesus Church, Pastor Gudina Tumsa, was detained together with the Orthodox Church Patriarch and murdered in

prison at the same time, on false accusations of links to the armed opposition Oromo Liberation Front.

Recent civil and political rights issues in Ethiopia have related to the 2005 elections, internal armed conflicts, and civil society activism. In the May 2005 elections, the opposition Coalition for Unity and Development (CUD) party claimed there had been huge election irregularities, despite officially winning a third of parliamentary seats. Over 190 people were killed by the security forces in anti-government demonstrations which turned violent. Thousands of CUD supporters were detained and the CUD leadership was put on trial under capital charges, together with private-media journalists and human rights defenders. Two prominent NGO leaders and human rights lawyers, Daniel Bekelle of ActionAid and Netsanet Demissie of the Organization for Social Justice in Ethiopia, were among 40 defendants including CUD leaders and journalists, who were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in a long and unfair political trial, where the prosecutor had demanded the death penalty. All were eventually released by March 2008 through an extraordinary mediation process conducted by respected Ethiopian civic figures. However, there was no actual reconciliation between the CUD and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's ruling party, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The government took steps to further restrict the media through a new Press Law. A proposed new NGO law, which is incompatible with Ethiopia's Constitution and international human rights treaty obligations, will have a very damaging effect on human rights and human rights defenders.

The revised draft Charities and Societies Ordinance currently before parliament threatens to impose new and unacceptable restrictions on national and international NGOs. The penalties for contravening it include lengthy imprisonment. Ethiopia's aid donors have criticised the bill but to little effect so far, even though it will mean shutting down many of their funded aid projects.

Further human rights challenges in Ethiopia derive from the long-running conflicts in the Oromia Region and the Somali Region (known as the Ogaden). These conflicts have been marked by severe human rights violations including large-scale arbitrary detention, torture and extrajudicial executions by the military against civilians suspected of links with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) particularly, and also the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The ONLF is also reported to have been responsible for some human rights abuses. The humanitarian crisis in the Somali Region, where there is a severe drought, has been worsened by government restrictions on aid agencies and the harsh effects on civilians of the counter-insurgency campaign.

Somalia

In Somalia, the 5-year transitional period was designed after 14 peace and reconciliation talks to bring the country out of failed statehood since 1991, civil war and warlordism, and massive violations of human rights against clan opponents, women and minorities. It created the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the Transitional

Federal Charter as an interim constitution, and other federal institutions such as the parliament. The transitional period ends in September next year. It has failed to give Somalis an effective government or justice system, or to bring peace and security for its citizens.

The Transitional Federal Charter on paper contains important articles on freedom of opinion and certain other basic human rights but with some notable deficiencies and omissions, including on freedom of religious belief, which should be corrected when the country develops a permanent constitution. It of course needs a considerable degree of effective governance and rule of law, as well as coordinated international support, to implement Charter rights and the country's international human rights treaty obligations.

But the political and humanitarian crisis seems only to intensify. Civilians are overwhelmingly the victims – communities displaced, minorities persecuted, property looted, livelihoods lost, people killed on suspicion of helping the enemy, women and girls raped, children forced into fighting.

This conference now gives the opportunity for significant actors in the process who are present here to seriously address these issues and outline a future for peace, reconciliation, democracy, and respect for human rights. We wait to hear particularly whether the recent 15th peace and reconciliation agreement signed in Djibouti recently between the TFG and the opposition Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), which includes former Islamic Courts Union (ICU) leaders, may provide some hope for a real transition to peace and reconciliation. However, the armed group formerly linked to the Islamic Courts Union, Al-Shabbab, continues the insurgency in Mogadishu and several other parts of south-central Somalia.

The rise of Islamic courts adhering to a newly introduced interpretation of Islamic law (or Shari'a) received considerable support from Somalis desiring an end to state failure, warlordism, lack of justice, impoverishment and extreme personal insecurity. The negative aspects of the Shari'a courts in terms of international legal rights – such as legal defence rights in trials, gender equality and *hudoud* punishments, prohibited by international law as cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments, for violent offences or “morality crimes” – were criticised by Somali human rights groups, who also opposed their use of the death penalty. Penalties of amputation of limbs were initially imposed but later stopped, though flogging punishments were common, including for religious “dress code” offences, and there were several executions after summary trials. However, it is generally recognized that in 2006 the Shari'a courts brought a considerable level of security to Mogadishu for a time.

As political and armed conflict escalated between the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and the TFG in 2006, the Ethiopian army intervened to support the TFG and drive the ICU forces from Mogadishu. Dozens of Somali asylum seekers fleeing the fighting were arrested in Kenya, supposedly suspected of being ICU supporters, were secretly rendered to Somalia and, along with others arrested in Somalia, were rendered onwards to secret detention in Ethiopia. Most of these rendition detainees appear to have been now released.

The most serious human rights issue in Somalia is the effect of the conflict on civilians, who have been forcibly displaced in massive numbers, caught in the cross-fire, subjected to indiscriminate and disproportionate artillery and rocket attacks by Ethiopian and TFG forces and insurgent militias, kidnapped for ransom or detained illegally in prisons, or targeted for assassination on account of their opinions. Abuses have been committed by all parties to the conflict, even though the perpetrators have often been difficult to identify, and witnesses have been violently threatened to keep silent. The African Union peace-keeping mission (AMISOM), with a weak mandate and small and incomplete force, has been powerless to protect civilians, or even civilian TFG officials. It is under attack from Al-Shabbab militias and has been unable to create the security conditions for the promised Ethiopian military withdrawal or to protect humanitarian assistance.

Over a million people are internally displaced in harsh conditions, particularly from Mogadishu, and half a million others have fled the country in recent months and cannot return safely while the conflict persists. Dozens of journalists have been killed for reporting on war crimes by all sides and have been falsely accused of being vehicles for “terrorist propaganda”. International humanitarian aid has been severely restricted, looted and 24 aid workers have been killed this year and others abducted. Human rights defenders seeking to document abuses have become victims themselves or have been forced to flee the country. International humanitarian law, as well as traditional Somali laws of war, has been grossly violated with impunity by all sides.

Five elements of progress would be:

- Stopping the flow of weapons, and the UN making its Somalia arms embargo meaningful through sanctions
- Human rights and protection of civilians being made a high priority in peace-keeping, with the UN and African Union placing a firm human rights protection mandate in regional or international peace-keeping in Somalia
- Priority action on the humanitarian emergency on the principle of the international “responsibility to protect”
- An international commission of inquiry into war crimes and crimes against humanity in Somalia, particularly in the past 2 years
- Ensuring that peace agreements also explicitly aim at justice and human rights.

Somaliland

The breakaway Republic of Somaliland in the north-west, though as yet unrecognized internationally, continues to be the only part of the collapsed Somali state with peace, an operative and elected government, a national administration, a multi-party political system and an active civil society sector.

A generally positive human rights record was weakened by government action in 2007 against several government critics, opposition activists and human rights de-

fenders, who were subjected to threats of violence, arbitrarily detained, or convicted in unfair political trials. All detainees, however, have been released under presidential pardons. Certain human rights issues such as these will need to be addressed in order for the Somaliland elections next year to be held in a positive environment.

Concluding comment on conflict in the Horn

The countries of the Horn have historically reflected external and cross-border political tensions and the spreading of internal conflicts across national borders. A revival of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border war of 1998-2000 has so far been narrowly averted but the border dispute is not over and both governments have huge numbers of troops mobilized near the border. Both governments are also involved in the conflicts in neighbouring countries in the Horn. New diplomatic efforts and mediation processes are urgently needed to resolve or reduce these conflicts one-by-one, as they all bring enormously harmful consequences for human rights.

Intersecting Values: Human Rights, Identity Politics and Regional Security: Their Impact on Somalia and the Horn of Africa

Introduction: Intersecting Values in the Horn of Africa

It is an honor to be among so many important figures in and analysts of politics in the Horn of Africa to discuss faith, citizenship, democracy and peace as a means of building capacity to promote human rights and development throughout the region. Many thanks to the organizers of this important conference for creating this opportunity. I approach this discussion both as a political scientist finishing my doctoral dissertation on Somaliland's claim to national self-determination, and as a human rights advocate with Amnesty International.⁴⁰

The intention behind my presentation today is to consider several sets of values that strongly influence political dynamics in and between Somalia, self-proclaimed independent Somaliland and Ethiopia – how we consider these sets of values independently, as well as how they have intersected in ways that contribute to enormous discord, despite their positive potential for change.

What do I mean by this?

First, international human rights and humanitarian law could be utilized to enforce the protection of civilians in war-torn Somalia, unrecognized Somaliland, and Ethiopia under a deeply centralized government. Instead human rights organizations and monitors are more often looked upon as threats to those who insist on political control or otherwise fear oversight. What have become international values are often misinterpreted or intentionally mislabeled as western values, and opposition to them is then justified on nationalist or religious grounds.

Second, identity politics on the Horn – most commonly ethnic, clan-based or religious – constitutes the fundamental basis for societal and community norms and

⁴⁰ For the past three years I have been serving as the Advocacy Director for Africa for AIUSA, while I am now on my way to our International Secretariat to serve as AI Researcher on the Horn of Africa. (I say this by way of correction to the published program.)

values. Rules governing social behavior, responsibilities and protection of rights have long been established on the basis of Quranic (in Somalia, Somaliland and parts of Ethiopia) and Biblical (in parts of Ethiopia) teachings and edicts. They have also been established through shared ethnic, clan family, clan and sub-clan experiences, in some cases since before recorded history. Yet these same values have frequently been misinterpreted or misused for political, financial and personal gains – at local, state and regional levels.

Third, a new set of values has risen to prominence over recent decades – those that belong to the category of national and international security concerns. While the desire to safeguard and protect what is perceived as one's own has existed as long as humankind, what is commonly known as "terrorism,"⁴¹ and what is commonly referred to as the "global war on terror" are much more modern phenomena. Unlike the first two sets of values named above, neither of these countervailing methods of warfare represents normative values per se. However, they are both frequently explained as a necessary means to protect ethnic, clan, religious or human rights, as well as national security. They must also, therefore, be understood to deeply complicate progress toward the protection of rights and the advancement of development throughout the Horn of Africa and other volatile areas of the world.

That said, I will now examine each of these categories of values more closely.

Human Rights in Somalia and the Horn

I will outline the current and intersecting human rights crises in Somalia, self-declared Somaliland and Ethiopia, as recently documented in several 2008 reports and public statements.⁴² I will also specifically highlight the international human rights laws which should help guide the behavior of all parties to conflict in Somalia.

On Somalia

Until mid to late 2007 TFG forces were believed to have been responsible for the majority of incidents of theft, looting, beatings and rape in and around Mogadishu. For example, one eyewitness reported seeing TFG soldiers seizing mobile phones from Somalis outside a mosque as they were leaving Friday prayers. Somali civilians reported that they were more afraid of TFG forces than Ethiopians. Religious and other traditional norms had clearly broken down in these cases of Somali government violence against Somali civilians.

This situation shifted in late 2007 with growing reports of incidents of theft, looting, beatings and rape, as well as unlawful killings, by Ethiopian forces, behavior

41 For the purposes of this paper terrorism is defined as the deliberate use of violence or threat of violence toward civilians to coerce a political or ideological outcome.

42 Please see <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/africa/east-africa/somalia> and <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/africa/east-africa/ethiopia> for a full list of Amnesty documents on Somalia, Somaliland and Ethiopia.

prohibited by religious and other traditional norms common to communities across Ethiopia.

In some instances involving rape and killing, the Somali government and Ethiopian forces targeted individuals and small groups of civilians. In other cases they targeted entire neighborhoods in disproportionate response to smaller scale attacks by armed opponents, sometimes decimating or emptying entire areas, and often resulting in injuries and unlawful killings of civilians.

Since early 2008, an escalating wave of attacks on humanitarian workers and human rights defenders has also been sweeping southern and central Somalia. At least 40 Somali human rights defenders and humanitarian workers were killed between 1 January and 10 September 2008 alone. Some were killed in robberies or kidnappings, and some victims were bystanders, but the majority were victims of targeted killings. While it is often difficult to determine the identity of the perpetrators of this violence, the majority are reported to have been affiliated with armed opposition groups, including al-Shabab militias.

Shelling and mortar fire have destroyed buildings and other civilian infrastructure, particularly in southern and central Somalia, resulting in deaths and injury of civilians. Large explosions have often emptied entire neighborhoods, as residents fled for safety. All parties to the conflict are reported to have carried out attacks on civilian-populated areas. A number of refugees told Amnesty International that they had left their homes (to collect water, food or other necessities) and when they returned their houses were simply gone, destroyed by rocket propelled grenades or mortar fire. Under international humanitarian law, civilians are unlawful targets for attack.

Displaced civilians from southern and central Somalia have also frequently reported being attacked on the road from Mogadishu to several destinations to the north and the southwest as they sought safety. Unidentified robbers have stolen money, food and other possessions. IDPs have been attacked or forced to pay fees at hundreds of check points and road blocks. One of the most dangerous areas reported was between Jowhar and Beletweyne on the route to Somaliland. AI received reports of violations against IDPs on the road in Somalia committed by Ethiopian and TFG troops, anti-government armed groups, clan gangs, and common bandits. At times perpetrators would cover their faces to mask their identity, but often survivors believed they could still identify them by language or appearance. While in September 2007, some drivers were able to travel through certain areas by virtue of their clan affiliation, this changed in late 2007 when clan affiliation no longer offered any assurance of favoritism in an attack. IDPs have been increasingly targeted even in cases where they shared clan affiliations with their attackers.

International Law Focus: Somalia

As we have stated in recent documents published by Amnesty International, all parties to the armed conflict in Somalia must comply with provisions of international law applicable to them. International humanitarian law governs the conduct of war, and seeks to protect civilians, others not participating in the hostilities and civilian

objects. Ethiopia and Somalia are both party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Ethiopia is party to the two Additional Protocols of 1977. All parties to the armed conflict, including non-state armed groups, must respect certain fundamental rules of international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflict, including those applicable to the conduct of hostilities under customary international law.

The principle of distinction is the cornerstone of the laws of war. All parties to the conflict have a responsibility to distinguish between civilians and civilian objects, which may not be attacked, and military objectives, which, subject to certain conditions, may be attacked. Civilian objects include homes, mosques, schools, hospitals and clinics. Direct attacks against civilians and civilian objects are prohibited, as are indiscriminate attacks. Disproportionate attacks, also prohibited, are those in which “collateral damage” would be regarded as excessive in relation to the direct military advantage to be gained. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions provides that civilians and other non-combatants “shall at all times be humanely treated.”

Both Somalia and Ethiopia are also subject to specific human rights obligations and are party to a number of international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the Convention against Torture), as well as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). Article 6 of the ICCPR and Article 4 of the ACHPR establish the obligation of state parties to ensure the enjoyment of the rights to physical integrity by all individuals under their jurisdiction. Article 19 of the ICCPR provides that everyone shall have the right of freedom of expression. Articles 8-12 of the ACHPR state that all persons, including journalists and human rights defenders, possess protected basic freedoms of conscience, association, assembly, movement and the right to receive and disseminate opinions and information within the law.

On Somaliland

It is also important to discuss self-declared independent Somaliland. While overall human rights and humanitarian conditions are often desperate in southern and central Somalia, as well as Puntland, a stable Somaliland has devoted attention to democratization, institutional capacity and development in its decade and a half-long pursuit of international recognition for independence. The contrast between Hargeisa and Mogadishu is striking, and the international community should consider what the government of Somaliland needs to maintain peace and stability, including bilateral assistance to ensure it has the capacity to institutionalize human rights protections.⁴³

However, Somaliland is not without its own set of human rights concerns. Its border with Puntland remains contested, with unfortunate outbreaks of fighting in late 2007 and 2008; the government of Somaliland has not established a monopoly

⁴³ Amnesty International takes no position on Somaliland’s quest for recognition of its self-declared independence.

on power in its boundary regions of Sool and Sanaag. In 2007 *Qaran* opposition leaders were imprisoned for several months after unfair trials. And the government of Somaliland issued an expulsion order for twenty-four young southern Somali journalists seeking refuge in Hargeisa in late 2007. To its credit that order was never carried out, and the government of Somaliland has also allowed itself to become the *de facto* refuge for thousands of southern Somali displaced persons fleeing armed conflict in Mogadishu, despite a near-total lack of international assistance to meet their basic needs. However, Amnesty International maintains strong concerns about regional and national security committees and individual government officials acting to limit freedom of speech and association among civil society groups in Somaliland.

Most recently, Somaliland's stability has also been negatively affected by political debate over a presidential agreement with a Saudi company to export livestock. In addition, Somaliland faces local and presidential elections, which have been postponed several times, most recently until April 2009, in part due to a delayed registration process. These postponements offer some cause for concern; local elections are currently scheduled only after presidential elections have taken place. According to Somaliland's constitution, multiple political associations can present candidates for local elections, out of which the top three become parties authorized to stand candidates in national elections. Holding presidential elections before local elections effectively eliminates the participation of all but the current three recognized parties. Popular dissatisfaction with this political situation is expected to heighten the government's security concerns which in turn is expected to result in further tightening of restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly in the months leading up to elections.

On Ethiopia

In early 2005, leading up to the May 15 elections, Ethiopia appeared to be turning a corner with respect to international human rights. The Government of Ethiopia was allowing some – albeit limited – international press access and space for political opposition rallies in Addis Ababa. Yet after the disputed 2005 elections, plagued by accusations of electoral fraud and mass protest demonstrations, political repression greatly increased. As reported by Amnesty International among others, these violations have included mass arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, extrajudicial killings, repression of ethnic minorities, intimidation of students and teachers, and suppression of press freedom. Political prisoners have been held in different sections of Kaliti prison on the outskirts of Addis Ababa. Conditions in the worst sections have been harsh, with severe overcrowding, inadequate sanitation and poor hygiene.

Amnesty International has consistently called for the immediate and unconditional release of those defendants whom it classified as prisoners of conscience,⁴⁴ as guaranteed by the Ethiopian Constitution and international human rights treaties which Ethiopia has ratified. Several trials of CUD leaders, journalists and human

⁴⁴ Amnesty International designates detainees as prisoners of conscience (POCs) when there is clear indication that they did not use or advocate violence but were peacefully exercising their right to freedom of expression, association and assembly,

rights defenders began in spring 2006, with the prosecution resting its case in April 2007. More than 30 defendants were acquitted. In June 38 others, including human rights leader Mesfin Woldemariam and parliamentarian Kifle Tigneh, were convicted and sentenced to life, but they were pardoned and released in July, after a presidential pardon was negotiated by Ethiopian elders and other parties. Hundreds more CUD members detained in 2005 are still believed to be held without trial.

A parliamentary inquiry was established in December 2005 to investigate the demonstration killings. This body initially concluded that Ethiopian security forces had used excessive force. However, the Chair and other members of the inquiry commission were later forced to flee the country, after receiving threats that they must alter their findings. The remaining members of the commission subsequently endorsed a report accepted by the parliament in October 2006 that the actions of the security forces had been “legal and necessary.” No member of the security forces has since been arrested or charged with any offense in connection with the demonstration violence.

Separately, the government of Ethiopia stepped up counter-insurgency operations in the Somali Region (commonly known as the Ogaden) in 2007,⁴⁵ including a blockade of aid and commercial trade that has had a devastating impact on conflict-affected districts of the region, including food shortages. These operations have also further injured the government of Ethiopia’s overall standing in the minds of Somalis in Somalia. Amnesty International has received reports of mass arrests, lengthy detentions without trial, beatings, rape and other forms of torture, forcible conscription and extrajudicial executions of alleged ONLF supporters by Ethiopian forces. And the ONLF has reportedly assassinated some civilian officials.

A UN fact-finding mission in August 2007 reported on the humanitarian crisis, but a subsequent mission to assess human rights conditions in the Somali Region has not yet materialized. In addition, Sultan Fowsi Mohamed Ali, a clan elder and mediator, was detained in August, reportedly to prevent him from speaking with members of the UN fact-finding mission, and he is still being detained without trial. Amnesty International considers him to be a prisoner of conscience.

While some reports indicate a partial lessening of abuses in the region, most particularly a partial lifting of Ethiopia’s blockade, there is no way to assess this information without full access for human rights monitors throughout the Somali region.

Additionally, in January and February 2007 Ethiopian forces in Somalia rendered at least 85 political prisoners to Ethiopia. Most had been arrested in Kenya when Kenya closed its border to people fleeing Somalia. Foreign nationals from some fourteen countries were released after some months and sent back to their countries of origin. In May 2007 the Ethiopian authorities acknowledged holding 41 detainees in military custody. These detainees included Somalis who are Kenyan citizens, two conscripted Eritrean journalists, and alleged members of armed Ethiopian opposition groups. Detainees from Kenya and Somalia were reported to have been tortured or ill-treated in secret military places of detention in Addis Ababa. Fifteen

45 This took place initially in response to attacks by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) on an oil installation in Obole in April 2007, which reportedly killed 65 Ethiopian and six Chinese oil workers.

refugees forcibly returned to Ethiopia by Sudan in August 2007 were detained in Ethiopia, and five people from the Somali Region were forcibly returned to Ethiopia by Somaliland in October 2007 and their whereabouts are unknown.

More recently, Amnesty International has become deeply concerned by the repressive draft Charities and Societies Proclamation, which clearly aims to undermine and frustrate the work of independent civil society organizations in Ethiopia, but would also bar foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International from operating in the country. The draft proclamation demonstrates the government's increasing intolerance of the work of human rights defenders and civil society organizations, and could be used by the government to conceal human rights violations and prevent public protest and criticism of its actions. If passed into law, the draft proclamation would frustrate the work of human rights defenders and NGOs, both Ethiopian and international, and would have a profound negative impact on the protection of human rights in Ethiopia under this administration.

The Ethiopian government issued a revised version of the draft in June and another in September 2008, but the majority of its content remains substantively similar to the original draft. Amnesty International considers that the draft proclamation remains incompatible with Ethiopia's national and international obligations and that, if passed into law, it would have an extensive and damaging effect on the human rights situation in Ethiopia. Amnesty International is seriously concerned that the provisions of the draft proclamation violate international and regional human rights treaties to which Ethiopia is a party and, as a result, would lead to an increase in human rights violations. The draft proclamation also violates provisions of the Ethiopian Constitution, particularly Article 31, which provides that "Everyone shall have the right to form associations for whatever purpose."

Identity Politics and International Response

In an article entitled, "Regional Politics, Human Rights and U.S. Policy in the Horn of Africa", published in the *Africa Policy Journal* in spring 2007, Professor Tricia Hepner and I attempted to demonstrate how political dynamics in the Horn of Africa are not only intimately linked with one another, but are also complex responses to international policy preferences. We argued that any successful foreign policy toward the Horn that will promote peace, stability, and human rights must begin with a serious and genuine consideration of regional dynamics, local perspectives on human rights, and the way in which bilateral foreign policies impact these factors. Policymakers must effectively address the ways that previous or existing policies have contributed to tensions and diplomatic impasse, including the implicit or explicit favoring of powerful foreign interests over the well-being and needs of local populations and governments. A more consistent ethic with respect to holistic but politically and culturally variable human rights concerns must be at the center of any comprehensive foreign policy on the Horn.

Unless the U.S. and other western powers develop comprehensive and principled strategies more sensitive to regional complexities and fairer to the rights perspectives and political and humanitarian needs of the Horn populations and their governments, greater strife and suffering are likely to result. Such strife and suffering are not only unacceptable from a holistic human rights perspective, but are contrary to global interests in the long run, as increasing political-economic instability in the Horn will only contribute to the growth of anti-western sentiment and the proliferation of terrorist ideologies that represent, more than anything else, weapons of the weak, desperate, and disenfranchised. Correcting misinterpretations of local identity politics is paramount among the actions necessary to improve foreign policies toward the Horn.

Perhaps one of the most egregious misinterpretations of regional identity politics is the gross over-simplification that argues an ideological conflict between a so-called “Christian Ethiopia” and “Muslim Somalia.” However, this is by no means the only over-simplification of identity politics in the Horn. Another obvious example has contributed to highly repressive Ethiopian government policy in the Somali region of Ethiopia, the frequent labeling of any Somali Ethiopian as ONLF,⁴⁶ and the blocking of humanitarian and commercial access to many areas of this region for extended periods of time.⁴⁷

Other instances of instrumentalist abuse of primordialist designations are common in Somalia and self-declared Somaliland – from the common western labeling of conflict in Somalia as Darod versus Hawiye, to the manipulation of Warsengeli and Dulbahanti communities in Sanag and Sool by the governments of Somaliland and Puntland, to outrageous assumptions about widespread religiously-based support for brutal attacks by armed opposition groups.

Amnesty International has found that armed violence and human rights abuses against civilians have been committed by all parties to the conflict in Somalia – including the Transitional Federal Government and the Government of Ethiopia, and al-Shabab and other non-state opposition armed groups. But violence and abuses have also been perpetrated by individuals and small groups that act as or on behalf of local sub-clans, economic actors and common bandits.

Conversely, local sub-clan and clan leaders have often served as mediators and peace-makers, and provided for the basic welfare of their own and other communities.

One of the bitter ironies of conflict since early 2007 when the TFG advanced on Mogadishu alongside Ethiopian forces is that the Islamic Courts Union had provided in and around Mogadishu a degree of safety and security to citizens not seen since the fall of Siad Barre. That is not to say that members of the ICU would not have been found guilty of violations against civil and political rights of civilians in Somalia, had they remained in power and had human rights groups been able to monitor conditions in the area.

46 Ogaden National Liberation Front

47 See Human Rights Report, June 2008.

Further, it is important to consider deep concerns about economic, social and cultural rights at the community level. So-called second and third generation rights are increasingly considered vital to human development, especially in poor or developing countries. Moreover, because all forms of rights are interrelated and mutually reinforcing, it typically follows that enhanced economic, social, and cultural rights strengthen civil and political rights, and vice versa. For many local and clan-based communities and religious leaders, it is “survival” rights which are elevated to the level of highest concern.

It is also not uncommon for some states, especially those which are poor, post-colonial or culturally oriented toward more collective values, to argue that civil and political rights must follow economic development and security. They argue that without access to a peaceful environment, clean water, sanitation, basic health care, education, decent housing and employment, issues like democratic and judicial reform are difficult to fathom at best and meaningless at worst.

Somali clan, religious, women and business leaders are coming together in the Diaspora – as demonstrated by this conference – to discuss their rights and concerns, and to forge a common vision for their country. We must also seek opportunities for local leaders who have remained in Somalia to be heard. As Professor Ken Menkhaus noted in 2005,⁴⁸ “the prolonged collapse of central government has not yet led to complete anarchy.... A variety of local forms of governance have emerged to provide Somali communities with at least minimal levels of public order.” The voices of those who performed this local governance must not be ignored.

Just as one cannot deny the role of ethnicity in Central African politics, one cannot deny the ongoing importance of clan structures in Somalia – not only as sources of friction, but as sources of traditional means of conflict resolution, economic subsistence, and social and political participation.

Finally, as I have been told repeatedly by Somali associates, the resolution of conflict in Somalia (and the international status of Somaliland) will be impossible without an understanding of Islam as a foundation for peaceful cooperation, and the normative structure virtually all Somalis share in common.

Regional Security and International Involvement

Even more difficult to parse than the complex roles of ethnicity, clan and religion on the Horn is the continual cycle of non-state warfare and regional military operations, often one in response to the other, on and on.

First, I suggest that it is imperative that we better understand the command structure and functions of different elements of what is too often considered homogenous – whether that be the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), “al-Shabab” militias, other armed opposition, or the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia.

48 Menkhaus, Kenneth J. 2005. Somalia and Somaliland: Terrorism, political Islam, and state collapse. In *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*. Edited by Robert I. Rotberg. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, p. 27.

Just as we need to understand the structure and function of institutions and key positions of authority in the governments of Ethiopia and Somaliland. While peace talks have continued to move forward, there are clearly divisions in these movements and governments, including those who may intentionally choose to play the role of spoilers of reconciliation and the institutionalization of human rights. We need to know who we are communicating with.

Second, I suggest that this learning process must also include a clearer understanding of the precise nature of the role of the United States in backing Ethiopia as it backs the TFG. More specifically, as human rights advocates, are we to see the U.S. as a party to the conflict in Somalia? If so, repeated air strikes should be condemned for their indiscriminate and disproportionate impact on the local civilian population. Or are we to see the U.S. as merely engaged in the broader “war on terror,” with Somalia as one of its main battle grounds? If so, “successful” air strikes should be condemned as “extra judicial executions,” as in the case of the killing of Adan Hashi Aryo. Perpetrators of human rights abuses should be held accountable under international standards of justice.

In relation to Ethiopia, how far will the U.S. and other major donors go to preserve their complex relationship with a government considered the most stable and powerful on the Horn? While U.S. congressional and State Department pressure surely helped to see scores of prisoners of conscience and political prisoners released in 2007, since that time there has been a marked reluctance to hold Addis accountability for violations committed by its security forces in the Somali region of Ethiopia and in Somalia; to carry out the boundary commission ruling on the Eritrea border; or to strenuously object to the draft proclamation that could destroy the remaining capability of most local and international organizations that work for human rights in Ethiopia. Mixed messages to Addis, even from within different institutions of the same government, abound. While western (donor) governments should not misuse their political and economic influence to prolong conflict among state and non-state actors across the Horn, they could certainly do a lot more to use that influence to help create the circumstances necessary for those same actors to come to reasonable agreement on how to end armed conflict and move forward in the best interests of their peoples.

Drawing again from Professor Hepner’s and my analysis in the *Africa Policy Journal*, scholars have long acknowledged that the protection of human rights entails a profoundly complex mix of cultural, political, economic, security and legal dynamics. This recognition does not preclude the advancement of human rights agendas. Those committed to upholding and implementing human rights in a given context must work at identifying areas of common ground and interest among the inter- and transnational actors involved. Beginning with a respect for critical differences and fostering cross-cultural dialogue allows similarities and shared objectives to subsequently emerge. This approach not only puts into practice the abstract notion of universal and unequivocal human dignity regardless of context, but also proceeds with genuine respect for the contexts themselves.

Western focus on counter-terrorism has to date played too significant a role. It has at times obstructed useful actions and it has contributed to the glaring absence of public statements and policy decisions in response to restrictions on civil society, and the abusive treatment of prisoners of conscience. It is too easy to assume that the international community has often chosen to ignore their own human rights norms in exchange for military bases, political intelligence and the façade of national stability. As Professor David Shinn has written, “U.S. counterterrorism policy can only achieve long-term success in Ethiopia by working to ameliorate the myriad economic, political, and social issues throughout the region in addition to strengthening and working with local security forces....”⁴⁹

Ethiopia’s concerns over its domestic and border security have received more attention from the international community than its concerns over the sustainable provision of food aid, medical care, education and other critical services for its population (ranked among the poorest in the world),⁵⁰ or the institutionalization of its own capacity to care for its citizens.

Perhaps the greatest failure of western policies on Somalia have been their shortsighted view of a complex national crisis that requires an historical understanding of clan and sub-clan dynamics, the legacy of mass brutality perpetrated under Siad Barre, and the implications of prolonged state collapse. Perhaps the greatest failure of international human rights advocacy on Somalia, and the Horn in general, is that it has too often allowed itself to be hijacked by counter-terrorism rhetoric, which narrows our view of the region, blinds us to the complexities of Somali politics, and leaves us feeling impotent to stop human rights abuses and violations or work to build institutions to protect against them.

Conclusion: Human Rights and Intersecting Values in the Horn of Africa

Contrary to what spoilers from all sides might have us believe, international human rights values are not at odds with the fundamental beliefs of major religions, the interests of traditional communities that have organized by ethnicity or clan, or the interests of governments to provide peace and security in their countries. In fact, centering discussions about peace and security, political participation and development around human rights can provide a unifying theme to bring together those who genuinely want to work for the betterment of peoples throughout the Horn. However, this would certainly require changes in conditions and changes in the behavior of all parties toward humanitarian workers, human rights monitors, investigations and judicial development and reform.

Many esteemed international human rights organizations do not currently have regular access to monitor, report and advocate for human rights in the Horn; humanitarian organizations may have access but their operations are deeply affected by

49 Shinn, David H. 2005. “Ethiopia: Governance and Terrorism.” In Rotberg, ed. *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*. 2005. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, p. 96.

50 Among other institutions, the World Bank continues to track Ethiopia’s poverty-stricken economy.

insecurity and government restrictions. This must change. Amnesty International would welcome the opportunity to be a constructive part of the dialogue necessary to bring about that change – by presenting the facts on the ground as we collect them, and by offering objective analysis and recommendations on what it will take, particularly regionally and internationally, to protect and institutionalize human rights protections for people throughout the Horn.

Universal human rights are not the enemy of local traditions, norms and customs but a complement to them. As, I presume, with everyone here at this conference, our goal is to create an environment where people's rights to physical integrity, freedom of expression, and economic well-being are not only protected but championed as a measure of the success of communities, states and regional organizations. We look forward to the day we reach this goal in Somalia, Ethiopia, Somaliland and throughout the Horn of Africa.

Challenges to Peace and Democracy in the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan

ABSTRACT: This paper is an attempt to contribute to dialogue and conversations aimed at peace building and democracy in the Horn of Africa. The paper discusses ideas for moving the democratic process forward, given that democracy is an outcome of free and open dialogue on key public policy issues about human development and good governance. The alternative to peaceful dialogue is political violence, war, repression and conflict from which no one benefits and from most states of the Horn States suffer. There is too much conflict within and among the states of the Horn of Africa. War is not a viable option for human development. War and violence is a negative sum game where all the parties involved lose. Even the “winner” in any war loses because human lives are lost and massive funds are diverted from development and poverty alleviation, and a generation of citizens perishes in the process. War among states is a result of leadership failure by one or both warring parties. War by rebels is primarily to control resources and capture power. War is a primitive and violent instinct of human behavior. War and civil conflicts are an outcome of abuse of monopoly power by governing elites and rebels over common citizens. The paper is an attempt to provide a perspective for critical and constructive thinking to consider viable policy solutions for peace and democracy necessary for human development and poverty alleviation in the Horn of Africa. It will touch on roots of instability and conflict including the relative level of democracy and freedom in each state, and the challenges that must be faced by each of the states to build peace and democracy and avoid conflict within and among the states. It is offered for dialogue among scholars, policy makers, and civil society groups and others concerned with peace, democracy and the resulting mass poverty of the region by discussing critical issues toward its objectives.

Concepts of Peace, Democracy and Sustainable Development

Let us begin with the basics of addressing the concepts expressed in the title. First, what does peace mean, and how can it be achieved and sustained? Peace is the *necessary* condition that must exist for human development and progress. But, it is *not*

sufficient, since peace cannot just simply occur out of the blue. Peace can be temporarily achieved under a repressive rule where citizens are silenced and denied the basic political choices such as in North Korea, for example. Durable peace must be based on the existence of real social conditions and free institutions, and justice that can sustain peace. Sustainable peace is possible when conditions of human security, liberty and freedom are present. Lack of peace or wars occur due to man made institutions and organizations that contribute to a state of war, conflict, fear, and human insecurity. Wars and political violence arise when individuals or groups rise in the midst of conflict they create, that leads to autocratic rule with no checks and balances, that are devoid of democratic institutions.

Violence and war occur when the democratic process based on dialogue and negotiation fail or are inhibited by one or both warring parties and when justice is denied. Conflict rises when dysfunctional institutions prevail that give rise to individual and group opportunistic behavior that enables them to abuse their power and responsibility. Thus, peace can be achieved if real efforts are made in addressing the roots of human conflict such as absolute poverty, destitution, lack of freedom, and severe inequality and injustice. The conditions that lead to conflict and war also include extreme inequality, injustice, repression, and abuse of power, extremism of various forms based on for example, ethnicity, clan, and religion. These are man made factors that can be changed with enlightened leadership under enabling environment. Natural factors such as drought and natural disaster can contribute to a lack of peace, but they are random and cannot be controlled easily. Public policy can promote peace and development by establishing democratic institutions and fair legal and justice systems to maintain and protect liberty, freedom, and human security based checks and balances.

Wars or civil conflicts have a direct negative impact on economic development in a number of ways. First, they divert resources away from development and poverty reduction activities. Given scarce resources the more a country spends on war, the less resources become available for development and poverty alleviation. The issue of the optimal level national defense force needed for protection of national security is important for any country. There are few nations around the world who can maintain peace with almost no or little army or defense force. This is not the case for Horn of Africa states, since they are located in a geo-politically hostile sub-region. But, if each Horn state can maintain peace with internal united and democratic strength, they can project their strength to promote peace and stability to their respective neighbors.

For example, a peaceful and democratic Ethiopia will have a positive synergetic effect on the Horn, since Ethiopia is the most populated multi-ethnic country in the sub-region. On the other hand, a balkanized and weakened Ethiopia engulfed with internal ethnic conflict and external rebellion is likely to lead to her own possible demise and that of the entire sub-region, leading to a massive human and humanitarian disaster. This outcome can be avoided if political elites in power are guided by a responsible and enlightened leadership that is accountable to the people and promotes a system of institutions with checks and balances (democratic institutions) and de-

velops effective means controlling opportunistic behavior of political actors. The peoples of the Horn share a common heritage and have lived together and interacted through generations across ethnicity based on trade. Sustainable development is a concept that requires peace and stability as a pre-condition. The idea of sustainable development was first defined by the United Nations Commission on Environment and Development in 1987 (the Brundtland Commission), as “*development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs*”.

The sustainable development concept differs from standard economic growth by incorporating the use of natural resources such as natural capital, defined as the value of the existing stock of natural resources such as land or soil, forests, fisheries, water, mineral deposits and the environment. Natural capital provides services to people just like financial, manufactured and human capital. Human capital investment is most important for economic development, and it can be achieved by investing in people or in education, health and skills by a responsible government. In the Horn land is the most important form of natural capital on which a majority of the people depend on for their livelihoods. Sustainable development can be measured by taking the country's Gross National Product (GNP) and subtracting depreciation of all forms of capital including manufactured, natural, and human capital to calculate the Sustainable National Product (SNNP). For the Horn of Africa states, SNNP has been declining steadily over the last half a century due to a combination of factors such as population growth, rising poverty, wars, insecure land tenure, exodus of skilled labor force or the “brain drain”, primarily driven by dysfunctional and failing political institutions and governance and lack of opportunity and freedom in the homeland. The region leads Africa in severe human capital flight or brain drain. The Horn has lost many of its educated people in various areas such as health and medicine, as well as in engineering, mathematics, and the natural and social sciences. Sustainable development is also about how a country manages its natural resource assets as well as its historical and cultural assets aimed at preserving them for future generations to cherish and enjoy. Ruling regimes in Ethiopia have failed to sustain the country's natural assets including cultural and historical assets over say the last half century.

Ethnic and Religious Identity in the Horn of Africa

Table 2 Ethnic and religious diversity in the Horn of Africa:

Country	Major Ethnic Groups	Religion
Djibouti	Issa-Somali (60%), Afar (35%), French (3%), Yemeni, Ethiopians, Italians and others (2%).	Islam (95%), Christianity (6%)
Eritrea	Tigrinya 50%, Tigre and Kunama 40%, Afar 4%, Saho 3%, other 3%	Islam, Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholic and Protestant.
Ethiopia	Oromo (40%), Amhara (30), Sidamo (9%), Tigray (5%) Shankella (6%), Somali (6%), Afar (4%), Gurage (2%), others (1%).	Islam (45-50%), Ethiopia Orthodox Christianity (35-40%) animists (12%), other (3%)
Somalia	Somali 85%, Bantu and other non-Somali 15%.	Sunni Muslims (100%)
Sudan	Ja' aliyin, Baggara and others (45%), Beja (10%), Dinka (8%), Nuba (6%), Nuer (4%), (2.7%), Zande (1.8%), Shilluk (1.6%), Bari (1.3%), Nubians (0.5%) Others (17%)	Islam (Sunni about 70%, mostly in the North) Christian (6.3%) divided into Roman Catholics (4.5%), Protestants (1.5%), and others (0.3%). Traditional beliefs (15-20%)

Source: Compiled from various archives, including Infoplease, HighBeam and Library of Congress Country Studies 2007.

A Brief Overview of the Horn of Africa’s Experience of Economic Development

Although the Horn has a long and rich historical and cultural heritage, its experience of modern economic growth and development is quite recent. The economies of the Horn depend on subsistence agriculture and pastoralism has not changed for generations. The experience of modern economic growth is about half a century old, and the experience of national government confined to recent years. This period can be divided roughly into three distinct periods in terms of economic development strategy. In discussing each of these periods, it is useful to refer to Professor Levine’s view of missed opportunities in his recent paper on Ethiopia” which identified “structural openings” that were missed or lost through political violence, rigidity, lack of reform, and absence of enlightened and democratic leadership. Levine expressed these views in a paper entitled “The Ethiopian Dilemma: Wrenching Processes”, where he pointed out how opportunities for peaceful solutions were lost due to primarily political dysfunction that led to violence under recent regimes. In Levine’s words” structural openings for Ethiopia under every regime that appeared over the past half century, openings which in each case found key players moving in negative direction due to dysfunctional political culture. Levine’s further reflects: “five such opportunities that were mishandled, as these became manifest in (1) the abortive coup of December 1960; (2) the ferment of 1974; (3) the regime change of 1991; (4) the Eritrean war of 1998; and (5) the May 2005 national election. The key point made is that each of these key historic events could have taken a different or more positive direction

to peace and reconciliation had the parties involved been inclusive, free, honest, and engaged in peaceful dialogue before and after each event. Unfortunately, that did not happen with unfortunate consequences of various degrees.

Thus, the key problem of undemocratic rule and lack of political choice remains, since the system reinforces upward accountability among local party functionaries, with no incentive or responsibility and accountability to serve local citizens. It also makes it difficult for multi-ethnic (civic based) political parties of the opposition to have a level field in politics to play a constructive role in the politics and governance of the country. It facilitates vertical (top down) integration and fails to promote horizontal or intra-state cooperation mobility of labor and capital needed for market institutions to develop or work for economic development to occur.

Therefore the key policy issue is how to democratize the top down ethnic federalism from the bottom up. For ethnic federalism to be sustainable and promote peace, it must be democratized with power devolved to local citizens for a broader and meaningful participation in governance.

In the absence of a serious democratic reform toward devolution of political and decision making power to local communities and citizens, the outcome of the system is not likely to be different from the centralized unitary state rule of the Derg era, except for the political ethnicity as an instrument of control. An authoritarian “ethnic federalism” that is not reformed to enable political and decision making authority or responsibility to local administration, and make regional and local decision policy makers accountable to the local citizens and communities will not be sustainable in the long run. For example, in some Woredas/Districts and Kebeles/sub-districts, a form of partisan political monologue of the ruling party called “Gingema” is practiced to insure the subordination of citizens at the Woreda and Kebeles to the zonal and ethnic regional administrations, reinforcing only upward accountability and responsibility. What is needed here is an honest dialogue of policy makers with local communities.

Moreover, according the World Bank and other sources Ethiopia is among the few countries that have scored high economic growth, close to 10% in recent years. But one must be concerned about the sources of growth and its sustainability. The key questions here are the following: Is the growth sustainable and equitable? What is the impact of growth on poverty reduction and, how equitable is it across the society and regions? How do we explain the paradox of prevailing mass urban and rural poverty in spite of the reported high economic growth? In spite of economic growth, broader measures of development in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI) are moving in a negative direction compared to the rise in economic growth.

Thus, the challenge of moving toward a more equitable and poverty focused growth by building on these achievements and by removing institutional roadblocks for sustainable development and poverty reduction is crucial and still remains in Ethiopia. Looking beyond GDP per capital growth, the indicators of human development are not promising as shown in the following figures: Life expectancy at birth is 52, Adult Literacy Rate is 132, Education (adult literacy & enrolment in primary, secondary & tertiary), and Per Capital Income is \$162, resulting in the overall the

Human Development Index (HDI =0.406). Ethiopia's ranks 169 out of 177 countries in HDI which is a more important measure of development than per capita income growth. So, the growth in GDP per capita has not translated in improvement in the Human Development Index as shown clearly in Figure 1.

Table 1 HDI, Population, area GDP, per capita income and Human Poverty Index (HPI) in the Greater Horn

Country	HDI rank	Population (in million)		Area (in million sq. km)	GDP (in billion in US\$)	Per capita income (in US\$)	Human Poverty Index (out of 120 developing countries)	
		1975	2004				Rank	Value %
Djibouti	148	0.2	0.8	0.023	0.7	851 (742)	52	30.0
Ethiopia	170	34.1	75.6	1.127	8.0	114 (110)	98	55.3
Eritrea	157	2.1	4.2	0.121	0.9	219 (175)	70	38.1
Kenya	152	13.5	35.5	0.582	16.1	481 (334)	60	35.5
Somalia	---	3.3	8.3	0.637	---	---	---	---
Sudan	141	17.1	39.1	2.505	21.1	594 (875)	54	31.1
Uganda	145	10.8	27.8	0.236	6.8	245 (332)	62	36.0
Total		81.1	191.3	5.231				

Source: Compiled from Human Development Report, 2006.




Figure 1 Economic Growth does not necessarily translate to improvement in Human Development in the short run

Moreover, Ethiopia's Human Development Index in relation to average HDI for Africa is below the average HDI for Africa and Asia even though it shows a rising trend. The figures also show that Asia's economic growth has led to more improve-

ment in Human Development Index than Africa's. This implies that if Ethiopia can sustain a fast economic growth as reported recently that may lead to an improvement in human development, provided the growth is labor intensive, equitable, employment generating. For this to happen, economic growth must be based on utilization of the country's abundant unskilled labor and be poverty focused.




Figure 2 Ethiopia's Human Development Index is below that of other developing regions including Africa, but it is rising.

Transforming Agriculture and Reforming Land Policy for Sustainable Development

The next key issue is to explore the potential areas for poverty reducing economic growth that will lead to improved an Human Development Index. These potential areas include Agriculture and Tourism where Ethiopia has a potential comparative advantage. In terms of Agricultural development, the current development strategy, centered on agriculture and rural economy or ADLI (Agricultural Development Led Industrialization Strategy) has the potential to reduce poverty if it leads to a sustained and equitable economic growth, if properly implemented by enabling local

governance. But the success of such a strategy, which has worked in other developing countries such as India and other Asian economies), requires the need to address structural and institutional problems such as land policy through informed dialogue and research.

Improvements in land policy and related structural and institutional impediments are essential to transform agriculture from the current subsistence system, in order to be an effective player in a global economic environment and to reduce absolute poverty at the national level. Institutional impediments with a negative impact on private investment and that impede mobility of labor and capital needed for market-based economic growth, need to be addressed. Problems of rent seeking and corruption can take deep roots in such an institutional environment. Policy and related institutional constraints need to be reformed along democratic lines based on experience and dialogue in a forum such as this, where scholars and public officials can exchange views.

For example, although the land lease system is a step forward from the previous land policy of the Derg period, it falls short of creating the flexible and free land markets needed to attract significant and sustained investment in the urban and rural economy.

There is also a critical need for land tenure security vested on rural farmers and investors. Farmers cannot use land as collateral for getting credit because they do not own their holdings or do not feel secure. Banks require land as collateral, which is not possible since it belongs to the state. There is also a critical need to consolidate the currently increasingly fragmented farms with population growth to create farms of different sizes (small, medium and large) to optimize agricultural and food production and add value to agricultural commodities by investing in agro-industries.

The land issue needs to be subject to an open and informed national public dialogue based on research aimed at improving land policy. Land policy is informed by volumes of research conducted by Ethiopian economists that have revealed evidence of land tenure insecurity and of which some have suggested alternative ways of improving it. Many have also proposed alternative forms of land tenure in rural economy such as private, community, and even state ownership where necessary, such as regarding forest or mineral land. It is the responsibility of the current and future Ethiopian governments to take these studies seriously and implement some of the ideas to transform agriculture and enable rural development. More informed dialogue, based on research and experience from other countries that have succeeded in using markets and agriculture as a vehicle of successful development and poverty reduction, must be considered; Ethiopia's own past experience with land policy and experiences of other countries such as India, South Korea, and Japan that have historically used agriculture to fuel national economic development.

For example, the debate on land policy appears to be polarized into two extreme opposing political views of those who on the one hand want to see open or unregulated land markets, and on the other hand by those who want land to remain under state monopoly ownership for ever. Both of these extremes will not offer a viable solution. The solution to the land question must be pragmatic and recognize alterna-

tive forms of property rights in land such as communal, private, and state or public property rights in selected land such as forest or where needed. Most important, public policy must allow for security of tenure required by farmers and investors to make the long-term investment on land and natural resources required to increase agricultural productivity and also to protect natural resources.

Some of the critical questions and policy issues needing to be addressed include the following: Does the existing land policy encourage private investment by those who wish to invest in agriculture and agro-industry? Do farmers have the security of land tenure required to adopt productive technologies or attract capital or credit aimed at increasing agricultural productivity? Does the current land policy enable farmers to make land-improving and natural resource-conserving investments such as planting trees and adopting soil conservation methods? Is there a relationship between land policy and the environmental degradation, in the form of soil erosion and deforestation that the country has experienced over the last 40 years? Is there a relationship between state control or ownership and democratic social outcomes? Is real democracy that empowers local communities and citizens possible with state control of land?

These and related key questions must be answered in an open and honest public dialogue informed by research, farmers' experiences, and other stakeholders. Political parties must address them, based on facts gathered from the local communities and citizens.

The challenge is to learn from the past and the comparative experiences of other countries that have successfully used agriculture and markets as a vehicle for economic development. Each of the periods in the recent history has its own negatives and positives. The challenge is to draw correct lessons from the past and not repeat past failures by building on the positives or successes, and to have the vision and courage to change failing institutions. There is a critical need for continuous institutional democratic reform based on current realities and experiences and informed and honest dialogue with all constituent groups and stakeholders. The process of open, inclusive, and research-based dialogue such as this forum is crucial before policies are formulated and implemented. This was missing in the past and must continue on a sustained basis in the future.

It is crucial to continue to undertake vigorous institutional reform, including constitutional reform based on experience aimed at promoting development and improving the lives of people by reducing the current level of absolute poverty and destitution in Ethiopia and to maintain the peace necessary for sustainable development.

Horn of Africa Potential Comparative Advantage in Agriculture & Livestock

In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia has a comparative advantage in agriculture and agro-industrial based enterprises. You may have heard of the old saying that Ethiopia has the potential to become the breadbasket of Africa and the Middle East. But, the real-

ity is far short of that potential. An extended feature article in the *New York Times* from almost 40 years ago (December 1, 1963), with the title, "Ethiopia: Nation of Vast Potential and Great Opportunities" describes this potential as follows: "*In 1944, during the Second World War, Ethiopia, through the Middle East Trading Center, made up the grain deficiencies for the whole of the Middle East. As a result the agricultural yield of the Ethiopian farmer was depended upon to feed the area during a period of shortage. The agricultural potential has since been extensively surveyed, and it has been established that, properly exploited, Ethiopia can feed and clothe over one hundred million people. The crops of Ethiopia are rich and diversified. Cereals, pulses, oil seeds, vegetables, grasses, roots, fiber, and timber crops are grown all year round. The wide variation of soils, climate and altitude are largely responsible for this extensive range of Ethiopia's agricultural production. The products of field, farm and forest have increased considerably since the war years. With the application of modern scientific methods of production, as have been introduced in recent years, there is no doubt that Ethiopia can live up to the reputation of being the granary of both the Middle East and Africa.*"

These statements were made almost 45 years ago. But the current reality of the country's agriculture and food security situation is far below that potential. In fact, Ethiopia is today one of the largest recipients of food aid in Africa. The primary cause of this failure stems from the political and institutional problems of the past three decades. But it is possible to turn things around. Yes. It is possible to realize this potential with a combination of proper public and private investment and a conducive institutional and policy environment. Private investment in agriculture and related industries is critical to unleash this potential. Private investment in small-holder and commercial farming is crucial for public support. Horn of Africa states have a great potential to exploit irrigation to develop their agriculture and livestock to reduce the high dependency on rainfall. But governments must encourage entrepreneurs engaged in investment in agriculture and livestock sector if the sub-region is to have a chance to reduce poverty and food insecurity, and to have any chance to participate in the global markets.

Two examples from Africa and Asia are illustrative. First, the former socialist country of Vietnam removed state controls of agriculture and became competitive in about a decade. Vietnam in the 1970's and early 1980's had like Ethiopia state control of land and agriculture. But Vietnamese political leaders rapidly moved to ease control on land and the country has become a major exporter of rice and coffee today. In the 1990s, Vietnam entered the coffee market and attracted coffee growers and agricultural scientists from African countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia and hired a global marketing firm to find new global markets. Today, Vietnam is a major exporter of coffee, exporting far more than Ethiopia, which is the home of coffee. Vietnam is the second global exporter of coffee after Brazil today!. This was made possible by capturing global value chains and improving rural infrastructure including by securing land rights with long and secure land leases for farmers (Eicher 2007, World Bank, 2007).

In Africa, the state of Mali is emerging as a democratic state following a president who has willingly relinquished power after two five-year terms, and Mali is now

becoming self-sufficient in rice. Mali is a land-locked country located in the Sahel desert and more drought prone than Ethiopia. But it invested in a huge irrigation scheme for food self-sufficiency. There are other recent cases in Africa such as Malawi and Mozambique that are moving towards transforming their agriculture to alleviate poverty and hunger. Although the difficulty of penetrating global markets cannot be underestimated, Ethiopia has a great potential to engage the global and information economy aimed at reducing income poverty. The potential of trade with Africa and the Middle East exists. Today, there is a vibrant trade between Ethiopia and Djibouti, where the latter's economy is booming as a result, and the Ethiopian economy is benefiting from access to the Djibouti Port. Ethiopia can also take advantage of provisions by the World Trade Organization (WTO), which are aimed at improving the export position of developing countries. But the trade rules of WTO need to be reformed in order to facilitate a level playing field for developing countries. Currently, global trade rules are biased against poor developing countries such as Ethiopia. Industrial economies such as the European Union and United States need to open their markets to primary or agricultural products of countries such as Ethiopia by removing massive subsidies to their agricultural sectors and abolishing trade barriers to agricultural commodity imports from Low Income Countries.

Horn states need to develop a strategic industrial policy where selected industries may need to be protected against imports until they mature and become globally competitive on their own merit. Such a subsidy or protection however needs to be strategic, selective, and temporary. There should not be a permanent blanket protection policy or a general *import substitution strategy* (IS) that will insulate the country's economy from global competition. The IS strategy has been a failure in other regions such as in Latin America in the 1980's. Horn of Africa states can take advantage of preferential trade agreements such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) designed by the United States government to allow thousands of goods to be imported to the United States on a duty free basis. AGOA is intended to provide export opportunities to the least developed nations of Africa to export textiles and clothing to the United States free of import duties until the year 2012. To take advantage of these and related global economic opportunities, Ethiopia needs to improve its export competitiveness, by improving and strengthening the institutional environment for domestic and foreign private investors. India and Asian countries subsidized agriculture in the early years of their economic growth. In Africa, it is reported that Malawi is becoming self-sufficient in maize by subsidizing fertilizer to small farmers.

Horn of Africa's Potential in Tourism and Eco-Tourism

With proper private and public investment and support, each Horn state has a great potential to develop a tourist industry. The country has a vast untapped potential in tourism and eco-tourism for several reasons that include: 1. A tropical climate with "13 months of sunshine", where tourists from Europe, North America, and the Middle East would love to visit and spend their holidays. Where on earth in the

world can one live without heat or air conditioning except in Ethiopia? 2. Ethiopia is the home of attractive places to visit that combine rich historical and cultural sites with game and natural beauty that can be developed for tourism, 3. It has a well-known hospitality towards visitors across ethnicity.

Neighboring Kenya developed its tourist industry to the point of making tourism the largest contributor to its GDP. Kenya's tourist industry was primarily based on wild animals or safari. Ethiopia can develop both game and historical and cultural attractions, and has a potential greater than that of Kenya under appropriate private and public investment and support. But there are many challenges ahead for Ethiopia in developing a successful tourist industry. Private investment in tourism is critical, but public investment especially in the area of infrastructure development is crucial. The government does *not* have a *comparative advantage* in running tours or hotels. These activities are best left to the private sector.

However, the government has a critical responsibility in building physical infrastructure such as roads and public parks. The construction in Addis such as the Ring Road and Bole Airport are important achievements. The Bole Airport has been improved to international standards. Ethiopia needs to address other service areas that can be improved with modest public and private investments such as significant improvement in internet connectivity and telecommunication with a potential for a significant return or revenue gains from the global and information economy of the 21st Century.

But the historic town of Lalibela, in spite of its historical significance of being the "eighth wonder of the world", is in extremely poor condition and a significant number of the residents are beggars. A modest public and private investment in such historic places and resorts in other parts of the country can generate significant revenues that can be used for poverty reduction in the respective areas. Tourist revenues can be used to generate job opportunities and build schools and health facilities for the local population. In general, public and private partnership is needed where the government invests in roads and physical infrastructure, and the tax revenues and fees generated from the private ventures in tourism and visitors are re-invested to improve the livelihood of the local population. Moreover, an increase in tourism can be an indicator of peace and stability. Foreign investment dollars may follow tourism. Thus, the challenge for Ethiopia is to develop a vibrant private sector including tourism that will be competitive by meeting the domestic demand for goods and services, and by penetrating the global markets in general, the markets of Africa and the Middle East in particular.

Challenges for Peace, Sustainable Economic Development and National Integration

There are at least four challenges that need to be overcome in order to achieve the sustainable development required to compete in the global and information economy of the 21st century or the Millennium. 1. The Challenge of developing and man-

aging human resources and population growth, 2. The Challenge of developing and reforming institutions of governance, 3. The Challenge of adopting poverty-focused and/or enabling economic growth policies that reduce the costs and risks of private investment in key sectors such as agriculture. 4. The Challenge of reversing the declining path of dependence by avoiding future political violence or more “missed steps” and by fostering free, inclusive and informed and responsible debate toward resolving critical national problems.

The Challenge of Developing and Managing Human Resources & Population Growth

The most significant element in the process of economic development of any nation is appropriate investment in its population, since people are both the means and beneficiaries of economic development. The quality of the population is the single most important factor that distinguishes economically successful nations from failed or poor states. Improving population quality requires investment in education, health care including nutrition, shelter, and clean water, guided by an *effective* and *capable* system of governance. Moreover, there is a need for managing population growth in Ethiopia where the current population is close to 80 million and it is expected to double in 20 years. Poor education, health, and adverse demographics are, in part, the outcome of ineffective policies and long economic decline. With its rapidly growing population, the Horn risks continued marginalization. Investment in population, especially its female population, can strengthen its capabilities and capacity. The Horn states lose productive labor through illness as any other region. This disparity will increase as HIV/AIDS incapacitates up to 4 % of its active labor force and depletes the skilled population of the Region. The effect of HIV/AIDS on the youth and future generation is especially devastating.

The Challenge of Developing and Reforming Institutions of Governance

The second challenge is to reduce food insecurity and poverty by improving institutions of governance aimed at developing a *capable* and *effective* system of government at national, regional, and local levels. This challenge depends on the development of leadership that is accountable, responsible, capable, and transparent at all levels. This implies a system of governance that allocates scarce resources both efficiently and equitably across all the current regional states. A *capable* and *effective* system of governance and leadership can only emerge under a democratic and representative government that is subject to and guided by the rule of law, independent judiciary, peaceful and open political competition, independent press. These basic pillars of democracy must be built into the current constitution with proper checks and balances such as term limits for significant political offices. Decision-making in the policy implementation process must be decentralized at the local level to local communities

by taking into consideration the cultural and economic settlement patterns of the population. Any system of governance that is imposed from the top is likely to fail in the long run.

For example, two democratic institutional improvements in Ethiopia have the potential to lead to good governance along democratic lines: 1. The development of a viable and responsible opposition party organized on a multi-ethnic or civic basis that can provide a policy choice to the current ruling party to the citizens. 2. The reforming of the current constitution that incorporates provisions such as debate on decentralization or federalism on a multi-ethnic basis and the adoption of constitutional two-term limits of key political offices.

A revised or an amended constitution under the current parliament should put such a term limit. It is important for the all stakeholders, the citizens at large, the current ruling party, and the various opposition groups to move along these lines in order to improve the country's institutions of governance. This process can begin by re-organization of the currently registered fragmented opposition parties into one united loyal opposition party (loyal to Ethiopia and her people) on a multi-ethnic or civic basis, and by the ruling party cooperating to make that possible. The ruling party can enable this and take charge.

The Challenge of Adopting Poverty-focused growth policies that reduce the costs and risks of private investments on key sectors such as agriculture and agro-industry

The challenge of adopting enabling policies that lead to rapid economic growth is related to the two challenges mentioned earlier. Agriculture and a pastoral-focused strategy are the best way of reducing food insecurity and generating greater employment in farming with linkages to non-farming sectors. Private investment in agriculture and agro-industry is especially crucial for Ethiopia, where the bulk of the population currently makes its livelihood in rural and agricultural related activities. Moreover, investment in agriculture must be pursued not only to reduce food insecurity, but also to alleviate poverty through employment creation and income generation in farm and non-farm sectors. Secured land rights are the best strategy for conserving natural resources or reversing land degradation and deforestation, since poverty forces people to overuse natural resources by accelerating deforestation and soil degradation in order to meet their basic survival needs.

The Challenge of Establishing Institutions for Development and Poverty Alleviation

An important issue left unexplored is what can be done for the future based on these historical and comparative experiences and lessons. While it may be true that

the Ethiopian problem derives from the 'burden of its history', this is also true for many other nation states around the world, including those that have succeeded in overcoming such historical burdens by a historical process of enlightened and visionary political leadership. Most successful democracies emerge from some form of historical processes that include revolutions. For example, the United States emerged from a devastating civil war in the 1800s and became a successful, united and modern democratic nation-state. Japan and Germany experienced devastating wars and emerged from dictatorships to become successful modern nation states. China emerged out of the devastating human rights abuse and murder of the Maoist revolution to become a modern and globally and economically competitive entity. Societies can get stuck for generations in what Douglass North called path dependence. The critical question then is how a society and polity can emerge out of the burden of past conflicts and produce an enlightened leadership that can guide it toward a viable polity and socio-economy under a democratic form of governance. Unfortunately, there is not a simple answer to this question. But, ruling elites (whether political, intellectual, ethnic, religious, beaucocratic) in every society must take a role in the transformation of the poor developing societies and economies of the Horn. No modern society can be transformed without some form of elite leadership, who often claim that they represent the masses even though the actual outcome of their actions may be the opposite. Such ruling elites have a better chance of success if they practice an open and inclusive dialogue with the common people and all other stakeholders of that society and learn from the grass roots. The regimes of the Horn have failed in this important political process. Moreover, current experiences around the globe show that elitism can take various forms and have ethnic, religious, and secular dimensions. Current experience from around the world also shows that governance organized under extremism based on ethnic, clanism, religious extremism is unlikely to be democratic or free. Governing elites, based on ethnicity, clanism, and religion, cannot form democratic or free governments. Government based on democratic and civic secularism has the best chance of success provided it is grounded on institutions or rules that disperse political and economic power among communities and protect with checks and balances aimed at advancing human freedom and liberty. Political elites and leadership can use their power to play a constructive or destructive role depending on the institutions or the rules of the game under which they operate, and the process by which they come to power. If political elites and leaders come to power through a natural process of dialogue and negotiation that follows from open and free and periodic elections, a society is likely to have a viable political system of democratic governance and legitimate leaders, than if they come to power violently. The challenge of building democratic and responsible governance in Ethiopia, African and many other developing countries is to develop rules or institutions that constrain the potentially destructive and opportunistic behavior of political elites, actors, and organizations and channel their behavior and actions to constructive purpose...

A further issue is the conditions under which political elites may play a constructive, rather than destructive, role in a society. In my view, this is best achieved by

developing a culture of constructive political dialogue under democratic institutions or when the rules of the political and economic game are designed in such a way that political and economic power is widely dispersed, shared, diffused, and decentralized among citizens and civil society groups, and protected by key democratic institutions such as the free press, independent judiciary, and the rule of law, and term limits on key political power holders. This process of political *power diffusion* and devolution aimed at empowering local communities is an evolutionary process that takes time, patience and hard work by political elites of both the ruling party and the opposition.

It must be an outcome of an open and inclusive dialogue and negotiations by all constituents and stakeholders in the political outcomes, including the presence or the emergence of an effective loyal political opposition and strong civil society groups or the “third force”. Moreover, without effective loyal political opposition, and strong civil society groups, any government is likely to degenerate to a dictatorship over time. Experience shows in Africa ruling parties begin to do serious damage to their economies and societies once they stay over 20 years, which in itself is too long. An example is the current Mugabe government of Zimbabwe. Although dictators may vary in their effectiveness or lack of it, no viable society should rely on the benevolence of a dictator for too long or be devoid of effective political choice and competition. Sometimes, the fact that the opposition wins may not be important.

What are crucial in democracy are the political credibility and the *threat of winning* by the opposition or the fear of being defeated by a ruling party that matters, even short of winning or losing elections. Mere elections do not constitute democracy in the absence of democratic institutions such as the free press and independent judiciary. For example, one can point to a rare case in point of a successful African state, namely Botswana which is regarded as the most democratic and stable state in Africa. Botswana’s political and economic success and stability is in part due to the presence of a strong opposition party, Botswana National Front (BNF) that provides a *credible threat of winning an election*, thus making or forcing the ruling party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) to be efficient, responsible, and accountable, even though the BNF has never been in power since independence in 1966. But the BNF wins many local elections, and most of my students when I was a visiting scholar at the University of Botswana were BNF supporters. There is also an *internal democracy* within the ruling party which leads to a peaceful change of the key head of the ruling party or the head of state. Botswana’s leaders can easily mingle with common people with no security. The story is different for its northern neighbor, Zimbabwe under Mugabe. Providing its citizens with political choice and freedom has contributed to Botswana being the most successfully governed and having the best managed economy and stable polity in Africa, where its rate of economic growth was the highest in the world even surpassing the Asian Tigers in the 1980s, a period which some have called the lost decade for most states of Africa. Botswana stands tall in the middle of massive political instability, violence and abuse of power in neighboring states such as Zimbabwe. On the other hand monopoly of political power and authoritarian single party rule of various forms in many African states has resulted in ruling elites

and autocracies that refuse to yield power and has impeded human progress, and contributes to socio-economic retardation and poverty in Africa.

A recent example of bad governance is that of Zimbabwe, which in spite of a promising start at independence in 1980, is now in shambles due to the current ruling dictator who has ruled for far too long, and abolished political opposition. Neighboring Botswana's economic success is not only due to diamond wealth and lack of ethnic diversity. In fact, diamonds and other natural resource wealth can be a curse under conflict and dictatorship as many examples in Africa show. Democratic and good governance allowed Botswana to plow back her diamond revenue for human and economic development, becoming a middle income country with the best human development index. The role of political culture is important in this evolutionary democratic transformation process. Differences in cultures, values, attitudes and beliefs prevalent in a society are partially responsible for differences in economic and political outcomes; societies totally undermine their cultural and historical heritage or fail to draw from their culture and traditions in the area of conflict resolution and try to copy or impose foreign ideologies for political expediency. An example is Ethiopia's attempt to copy and impose "scientific socialism" as happened during 1974-91 and the imposition of "ethnic federalism" on society by the post-1991 regime. Such top-down policies are unsustainable. They are undigested alien ideologies with no cultural roots and often open the road to massive economic and social disaster. Political elites in such societies fail to take an evolutionary approach similar to the historic experiences of successful states such as Japan, Turkey and Botswana. They undermine their historical and cultural heritage, by promoting policies based on historical revisionism and self-serving propaganda, and contribute to massive conflict and instability in their societies.

For Horn of Africa states, the challenge of developing democratic leadership and good governance is to learn from their own histories and the comparative experiences of other successful democratic nations about how to transform and modernize their economies in order to create a viable society and polity. An enlightened and visionary leadership, even short of democracy, is essential, since democracy is a process that takes time. Governments have a better chance of success if they focus on a few critical areas such as providing public and social goods, citizen and national security from foreign threats, enforcing the rule of law fairly, supporting agricultural research, investing in the people by providing quality education and health services, and promoting political and economic freedoms including freedom of the press and mobility for their citizens. The concept of the "developmental state" is nothing more than an efficient government that clearly understands and practices its responsibility for effective and good governing. Investment in infrastructure such as roads, information communication technology, and research are important areas for government support, as well as the promotion of policies that allow people to help themselves through market development and private initiatives. The role of a government or a developmental state is similar to that of the role of an effective referee in any sports game. If the referee is not competent or lacks credibility, capability and honesty to apply the rules of the game, the game will not be played successfully. Even if there is

a capacity, if the rules are not fairly enforced such as, for example, the referee being partisan or behaving as biased, the (economic) game is likely to fail and fights and conflicts are likely to occur, and massive corruption and rent seeking is likely to result destroying social and economic progress. The key question then is how to produce both an *effective* and *fair* system of responsible governance. It is what the idea of “developmental state” should mean.

Horn governments currently need to remove and/or significantly reform at least three institutional and policy impediments in order to be viable and competitive in the emerging global economy. The first is to democratize its institutions by moving toward a freely elected representative government over time based on majority rule, term limits, and the rule of law, independent justice, and a free press with a constitutional protection of individuals and minorities, and civil society groups. Given that Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic state, a non-ethnic civic-based democratic rule is most likely to lead to a peaceful and sustainable polity and society in the long run. Clan, ethnic, and religious based parties are likely to lead to a zero-sum game or even a negative-sum game, and lead to social conflict. Ethnicity and language differences are natural and should not be used as a tool for gaining political power or ruling over people by power elites. Political parties should be organized based on political, social and economic issues.

Moreover, social science studies and experiences around the world show that trying to impose an ethnic authoritarian rule is likely to fail in the long run, as demonstrated by the demise of apartheid rule in South Africa in 1994 and more recently by the fall of the rule of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Thus, current and future generations of Horn political elites and leaders of the ruling and opposition parties need to face up to the challenge of collectively producing a representative government with constitutional provisions such as term limits, peaceful political competition, ethnic and religious secularism and political and economic freedom for all citizens. Such leadership is the best way by which sustainable economic, social, educational progress can be promoted in the long run. In Africa today, a few countries are beginning to experience peaceful transition to democratic forms of governance in the 1990s. In addition to the traditional stable African democracies such as Botswana and Senegal, the list of African states that have experienced peaceful democratic transition, in recent years, is growing. It now includes countries such as Ghana, South Africa, Kenya, Mali, Kenya and Liberia.

Liberia elected the first female President in Africa. Ethiopia is among those African states that have yet to consolidate a peaceful democratic political transition. Kenya has moved forward in the democratic process by peacefully changing the national government in the last election, where a coalition of the opposition led by President Kibaki defeated the KANU party that has ruled since independence. Unfortunately, a contested result in the last election in 2007, led to political violence along tribal lines where several hundred citizens were killed and thousands were displaced due to political violence that followed from the contested results. It is noteworthy that post-election political violence in Ethiopia in 2005 did not result in ethnic-based violence at the community level. This is perhaps because Ethiopians across ethnic-

ity and communities have peacefully intermingled through long periods and do not fight along ethnic lines, even if some political elites try to incite ethnic sentiments.

The challenge of moving toward a multi-ethnic civic base democracy in the Horn of Africa

Ethiopia is among the Horn countries that conducted the most successful national election on May 15, 2005, when there was an estimated 90% voter turn out. This is a high turn out by any international standards and surpassed even mature democracies such as the United States.

The US elections show a voter turn out of at best 60 % of its citizens. Unfortunately, this encouraging beginning of the democratic process appears to be derailed temporarily, due to political violence and confrontation among the political parties. Here the ruling party's fear and surprise of a potential defeat, and the failure of some of the opposition party leaders to accept responsibility and enter the parliament in full force against all challenges derailed this process. The post-election conflict led to the arrest of key leaders of the opposition, the CUD (the Coalition for Unity and Democracy). The government charged them with "treason" and "genocide".

The attempt at compromise between the two main multi-ethnic opposition parties and the ruling EPRDF, which could have contributed to peace and advanced the process of national political reconciliation, did not happen. This missed opportunity that has been lost due to lack of compromise, trust, and peaceful dialogue between the contending parties resulted in deadly political violence that followed the elections. Moreover, Ethiopia needs to face up to the challenge of bringing other currently dissident political groups into the political process in the long run. This includes the OLF, ONLF, and other exiled parties which, if they believe in democratic unity and diversity, human freedom, and equality for peoples of the Ethiopian state, should be included in power sharing after a national political process. It is encouraging that some elements of the Oromo Liberation Front, have recently expressed the desire to participate, and may be moving away from secessionist motives by taking lessons from the outcome of the disaster of the Eritrean state languishing in poverty and oppression under its current ruler.

The Eritrean state under its current ruler has become a destabilizing state in the Horn of Africa, and in conflict with every state in the Horn such as Sudan, Djibouti, Yemen, and Ethiopia. Its ruler invaded Ethiopia in 1998 which ended in his defeat in 2000 when some 80,000 lives were lost and millions in damage to property with humanitarian consequences. If OLF and ONLF and others can renounce violence and commit to unity within a democratic Ethiopia, they should be given an opportunity to become a viable and credible political organization. But the OLF or ONLF or such groups cannot impose a monopoly rule over the people they claim they represent, the Oromos and the Somalis. They must develop democratic elites that have the courage and capacity to peacefully negotiate and reconcile with other opposition parties currently active in Ethiopia as well as the ruling party, the EPRDF.

The recommendation of this paper is for Ethiopian political parties to move toward multi-ethnic political and civic-based parties that provide alternative and public policy choices to the Ethiopian society across ethnicity. Ethnic, clan, and religious based parties are inherently conflict-prone and unsustainable.

The other key challenge for the Horn is to reduce absolute mass poverty and food insecurity, and to eradicate recurrent famines, as well combat natural resource and environmental degradations. Success in meeting these challenges also depends on democratic and responsible governance. Famines in Ethiopia and the rest of Africa are primarily the result of poverty, linked to failure of governance and misguided government-driven agricultural policies. Why should Ethiopia find itself today in famine that threatens millions, more than a decade after the demise of the former Communist Military Regime in 1991? It is unlikely that Ethiopia will transform its low productivity traditional agriculture under the prevailing state-owned land tenure without the security of tenure or vested by the ownership of farm land owned by farmers and embedded in rural farming communities. Such a policy is necessary to empower the majority of the Ethiopian population including women. The security of rural and urban land vested to citizens is essential to allow private investments on land, increase in agricultural production, and to reverse natural resource degradation such as soil erosion, and deforestation. The issue of land tenure and land policy should be taken out of politics and discussed freely, honestly, and openly among major civil society groups, professionals, private sector entrepreneurs, researchers and most importantly farmers and farm community and civil society group leaders in a free and honest environment, without intimidation by federal and local political elites and cadres. Currently, the views of a few politicians dominate public policy discourse at both the national and regional levels.

The fact that there is no open and inclusive public dialogue that we are aware of on such critical issues in Ethiopia retards democratization and sustainable development. Yet, Ethiopia and other Horn states have competent researchers, civic society leaders, professionals, business persons and other citizens with knowledge, experience and common sense who can enrich the debate on land policy and contribute to the transformation of agriculture in an efficient and equitable manner. Land tenure must be flexible and designed to promote efficiency and equity. Research on land tenure clearly shows that tenure security is a serious problem in Ethiopian agriculture, with its negative impact on agricultural productivity and environmental protection. The important policy issue about farm land here is how to design a flexible, equitable, and secure land tenure system that will bring knowledge, capital and technology to agriculture including accountability for the use of increasingly scarce land and natural resources such as water and forest wealth, under rapid population growth. History and empirical evidence from around the world clearly shows that state ownership or monopoly of land is likely to retard agricultural development and lead to natural resource degradation. It creates a de-facto monopoly single land lord, which is worse than several landlords of various sizes during pre-1974 Ethiopia. Why has South Korea managed to fuel its economy to become a modern industrial state while its sister northern state of North Korea languishes in starvation and mass poverty. Yet

South and North Koreans are the same people with the same culture? The difference has to do with the nature of institutions of governance including institutions of land ownership. The following *necessary conditions* must be met in order this strategy to poverty reduction and achieve the United Nations MDG goal of reducing absolute poverty by 50 percent in the Horn States.

- Political stability, good governance and security of land ownership rights.
- Sustained economic pro-poor growth where a safety net is only complementary
- Realization of agriculture's contribution to national economic development
- Small holder agriculture with secure land holding and with investment in medium and large farmers where feasible
- Utilization of the abundant resource of unskilled labor to create employment in the rural sector with linkages to non-farm sectors
- Invest in labor to increase productivity in the areas of health, education, nutrition and combating HIV/AIDS
- Promote mobility of labor and capital, and achieve national economic integration through mobility of labor and capital in search of opportunity.
- Attract the large Ethiopian Diaspora communities and individuals in the areas of development ranging from business, technology, science, and higher education. The remittances of the Ethiopian Diaspora are estimated to be more than the earnings from the total export of Ethiopia in coffee.

On the political front, the current and future governments of the Horn should allow free and peaceful political competition by providing a level playing field for peaceful political competition and free elections to occur. The opposition should rise to responsibility, be accountable and provide a clear political alternative and policies. Opposition politicians should not waste time in confrontation and personal attacks on the ruling party officials and organizations. Ethiopian political groups should not think in terms of eliminating each other. Politicians should move away from the culture of the politics of hate of individual actors and organizations. Such dysfunctional political behavior is both unethical and undemocratic. It leads to political violence and eventually to a dictatorship. Opposition political leaders including journalists should be released. No one should be imprisoned for expressing different political views, which the current constitution guarantees. Perhaps a code of conduct in the practice of politics can be instituted by a neutral body of non-partisan elder scholars both from the Diaspora and the homeland.

Key foreign donors and supporters such as the United States, as well the international community of donors, including NGOs, should help promote democratization and free elections, and hold those political groups that retard the democratic process accountable. The United States, currently engaged in the Horn as an ally of Ethiopia must continue her constructive engagement in the democratization, peace building and development of Ethiopia. The US should *not abandon* or isolate the Horn states under the current or any future governments that are accountable to their people. For example, the isolation of Ethiopia during 1974-1991 (when Eritrea

was still part of Ethiopia) due to the geo-politics of the cold war led to years of disaster in Ethiopia with socio-economic and humanitarian consequences.

A movement toward forming a credible coalition of opposition political parties should occur to challenge the political power monopoly of the ruling party at the ballot at the next and future elections. Such a coalition should be multi-ethnic, civic-based and democratic and motivated by promoting unity within diversity. Some of the opposition political parties that have just been formed need much work before they unite and mature, and develop detailed political and economic programs as an alternative to the current ruling regime. Neighboring Kenya has succeeded in forming a coalition of parties (called rainbow coalition) and managed to defeat the monopoly power of former president Daniel Moi and his Kenyan African National Union (KANU) that has ruled the country since independence. The fact that the ruling party, the EPRDF, was not defeated by the opposition by the official counts in the 2005 elections is *not* important. It is quite realistic to assume that it can be defeated in future elections, provided the opposition parties organize effectively, overcome internal conflicts, and unite, and that free and fair elections are enabled by the ruling party. On the other hand, if the ruling party is defeated in a future election, it must not assume it cannot come to power again in future elections, since under true democracy it has a chance to regain power. A recent example in Latin America is the Revolutionary Sandinista Party that was defeated by a conservative party. Since the Conservative party did not deliver as promised, the Sandinistas are back to power under free elections. This type of political progress is a sign of democratic maturity, political development, and civilized democratic politics. The Horn of Africa is currently trapped in a state of what Nobel Laureate economic historian Douglass North called the ‘historical path dependence’ of conflict and stagnation. Breaking out of this path is a formidable challenge to any society. Breaking out of the declining path depends on the emergence of an enlightened national leadership that promotes democratic institutions and ideas, makes investment in human development (education and health), infrastructure, and enhances economic diversification by promoting massive investments on key sectors of the economy such as agriculture, industry, including tourism.

If the political impasse is not overcome or the political violence is not controlled, the prospects of progress in the Horn and peace may be bleak, since the necessary private domestic and foreign investment may be discouraged due to uncertainty, risk, and insecurity for investors. To avoid this negative outcome, an enlightened and responsible leadership must be organized under a system of democratic governance, the rule of law and a true multi-ethnic and secular federal system grounded on protection property rights, and rights of individual citizens and communities as well as human rights. Whether the Horn societies that have evolved through a historical process, but have trapped themselves into a political impasse due to misguided elite power struggle and political violence and conflicts that have led to institutional and policy failures over at least the last four decades, can produce an enlightened and responsible government to build enabling democratic institutions and policies, aimed

at reducing poverty and enhancing socio-economic progress, still remains to be seen in the future.

The development of a dynamic socio-economy and polity in Horn economies is a long-term evolutionary process that takes time. It depends on addressing at least four interrelated or interlocking factors. 1. Improving governance and resolving conflicts including reducing corruption by strengthening democratic institutions at the federal, regional, and local levels. 2. Investing in people, since people are both the beneficiaries and the means of what makes human development. Investing in people means investment in quality education, health care, and combating the HIV/AIDS Pandemic. 3. Diversifying the economy and increasing global competitiveness. In the Horn states where the bulk of the population is currently in agriculture and pastoral activities, it is crucial to transform agriculture by adopting science and technology based on location specific research, aimed at reducing mass poverty, food insecurity, and recurrent famines. In spite of the ongoing focus on the Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) strategy, Ethiopia is yet to face up to the challenge of investing in and developing rural institutions which include what Carl Eicher of Michigan State University called the “prime movers of agricultural development”. These prime movers include: 1. New technology produced by public and private investments in agricultural research or imported from the global research system and adapted to local conditions, 2. Human capital in the form of professional, managerial and technical skills produced by investment in schools, agricultural colleges, faculties of agriculture and on-the-job training and experience, 3. Sustained growth of biological capital (genetic and husbandry improvements of crops, livestock, and forests), and physical capital (investments in dams, irrigation and roads), 4. Improvements in the performance of institutions such as marketing, credit, research and extension, 5. Favorable economic policy environment and political support for agriculture in a sustained manner.

There are too many institutional impediments such as farm land insecurity, ethnic federalism, clan conflict, abuse of power, inadequate credit and marketing, high fees and taxes that need to be removed. These impediments prohibit domestic and foreign private investment in agriculture and agro-processing industries, raise transaction costs by retarding the mobility of labor and capital among regional states and provinces, necessary for the development of a market economy. The Horn needs to enable the environment for private investment in labor-intensive manufacturing aimed at reducing dependence on a narrow range of agricultural export commodities such as coffee, as well as by investing in service areas such as tourism. Ethiopia has a potential comparative advantage in tourism due to an attractive climate, diversity in wild life, and historical or cultural attractions, as well as the well-known hospitality of its citizens to foreign visitors. 4. The country also needs to reduce foreign aid dependence and external debt, and to strengthen trade partnerships with other countries, including the economies of Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and North America by promoting regional trade, peace and stability.

The Potential Benefits of Regional Cooperation and Peace Building

Regional economic cooperation and trade would be beneficial for all states of the Horn of Africa. Regional cooperation expands economic space and markets including providing access to a huge coastline along the Indian Ocean if, for example Somalia and Ethiopia were to freely cooperate and trade. However, for economic cooperation to become a reality it is critical for Ethiopia and the other states of the sub-region such as Somalia and Eritrea to remove inter-state and intra-state conflicts and create dynamic societies, aimed at promoting democratic societies based on the rule of law and secularism. These states must learn to resolve political and ethnic conflicts by promoting free dialogue aimed at resolving conflicts peacefully.

As the most populated country in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia is a key state that is capable of taking leadership in this process of regional economic cooperation. But, for this to happen, Ethiopia and other states of the Horn should produce enlightened leadership that believes in and practices power sharing, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and understands how market economies work, including the appropriate role of private and public sectors in promoting economic development. Somalia is in the process of trying to re-constitute itself from its collapse in 1991. Sudan faces serious challenges toward democratization. The government in Khartoum must face up to the need to remove an autocratic Islamic rule from governance, and accommodate the demands of African Sudanese for freedom and liberty or self-government through a federal arrangement agreed upon by SPLA and the Government of Sudan. It is encouraging that Sudan formed a national unity government recently and signed a peace agreement following a 20 year civil war between the Islamic Government of Sudan and Southern Peoples Sudan Liberation Army (SPLA), where 2 million Sudanese perished along with a massive humanitarian disaster. The peace agreement was signed by the late SPLA and current government of Sudan, before the unfortunate death of SPLA leader John Garang in an alleged helicopter accident. So, there may be some hope for Sudan if its government rises to responsibility, and refrains from trying re-impose Islamic rule over the peoples of Southern Sudan. Neighboring Eritrea must face up to the challenge of liberating herself from an autocratic and irresponsible ruler. The state of Ethiopia must face up to the challenge of re-constituting herself along democratic lines, and take charge of her own renaissance through an internal democratic process, and by fostering peaceful economic cooperation in the Greater Horn of Africa sub-region and beyond.

The most recent set back toward regional cooperation in the Horn is the threat of Somali Islamists who are trying to impose an alien form of Islamic rule on Somali culture and society or trying to impose a form of Talibanism on Somalia. Political Islam is a foreign import that is alien to the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia. Recently, Ethiopia invited by the Somali Transitional Government, which is an internationally supported group, helped defeat the Islamists in a dramatic battle that lasted about one week. This single military action has provided an opportunity for Somali's elites to reconstitute their failed state since 1991, which has suffered from infighting among various clan warlords following the collapse of former dictator Said Bare.

So, there is hope for Somalis and the Horn for peace, democracy, and economic progress. The sub-states of Somaliland and Puntland have emerged from the rubble of the failed state of Somalia to be potentially viable democratic peaceful sub-states. These two sub-states are relatively peaceful and stable with viable economies and polities. Somaliland deserves to be recognized by the international community. There is a double standard by some states in recognizing independence of states. Why was Kosovo recognized and not Somaliland?

Concluding Remarks

In a conference of the African Development Forum III held in Addis Ababa on March 3-8, 2002 under the theme of “Defining Priorities for Regional Integration” a consensus was reached by African states on the critical need for *unity* stated as expressed in the following statement. “*Unity is the overwhelming demand of Africans across the continent. Africa’s political and economic integration promises to fulfill the aspirations of Africans of all walks of life*”. A similar desire for unity and integration is desired for the Horn economies and societies due to a shared culture and overlapping identities. But cooperation must be based on respecting cultural and linguistic diversity under democracy and the rule of law. Clan and ethnic diversity is natural and it is sustainable as long as there is democracy. Democracy is the best way of resolving potential ethnic and clan conflicts. Examples of nations which are diverse and democratic and have achieved various levels of sustainable development include India, the United States, and Malaysia.

Ethnic and clan diversity and identity becomes problematic when it is politicized or captured by ethnic extremists under authoritarian rule. It is the same with religion. Ethnic, clan, and religious extremism is creating serious conflicts and chaos in different societies in many societies.

Political and economic integration must take place in the Horn of Africa for sustainable peace and development to occur. But success in regional economic integration or the ultimate goal of the unity of Africa through institutions such as the African Union (AU) is not possible before economic and political integration and development takes place at the national or country level or each country becomes socially and economically viable. This must be based on a firm institutional foundation of economic development, democratic governance, and peace with justice at each individual African country level. It took European countries many years of internal or country level development before the European Union (EU) became a reality.

Why don’t Africa in general and the Horn of Africa attract FDI in today’s global economy? What are the key policies needed to create the necessary environment for FDI? African economies need to achieve an economic growth of at least 7% on a sustained basis to reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of its population and to achieve the MDG goal of cutting absolute poverty by 50 percent by 2015. This can only be achieved by significantly attracting private domestic and foreign investment, by making the economic environment more efficient, by enhancing the

capability and *effectiveness* of governments aimed at improving the business climate, reducing *transaction costs*, and creating a transparent legal and regulatory framework that will promote private investment. The current reality is that Africa is globally marginalized due to several reasons, a legacy of external factors such as colonialism and the Cold War, and the misguided domestic policies of African states during the post-independence period. Thus, national economic integration and development is imperative if Africa is to reverse rising poverty and food insecurity and become a partner in the global and information economy.

A recent editorial by the local private paper the *Reporter* expresses steps to move forward under its title *First things first*: “*As we have repeatedly stated, what really actuates our economic development is the behavior of the government towards business people and the policies pursued by it in that sector. Our success in joining the benefits of COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), and ADB (African Development Bank) hinges on strengthening our domestic market. Otherwise, we would never be able to benefit from whatever advantages we have through these organizations (and their conferences) before committing ourselves to work with COMESA, IGAD, and ADB; we need to do some house cleaning. There is no point in talking about foreign engagement without strengthening internal aspect except perhaps, and empty showing off to the IMF/WB and the developed world.*”

Finally, the 21st century is the era of knowledge-based and information economies. Horn of African economies need investment in quality education, research and human capital development to reverse the marginalization of its economy and capture the benefits of the global economy. Such investment must include the Internet and Information Technology (IT) that can be used to transfer technology and knowledge in the areas of education and research. Ethiopia must move forward in this regard like India, which has benefited from globalization. The government monopoly of the Internet must be seriously discussed and improved, by allowing greater competition from the private sector and by allowing satellite technology to be accessible to businesses, institutions of higher education and research and individuals. Policies to retain expertise and reverse the brain drain must be put in place, including creating an enabling environment for the private sector to be involved in the business of knowledge creation as well as increasing salaries of teachers and lecturers in higher education. Higher education is crucial to produce a skilled labor force for development of the Horn. In this regard the Horn needs to make massive investments on human capital and the institutions of *development knowledge* that comprise the three interlinked institutions of higher learning (teaching, research, and public service/outreach) needed to transform the key areas of subsistence agriculture and pastoral economy, aimed at reducing poverty and achieving a sustainable level of economic development. While the current expansion of regional universities is important in terms of providing more access to higher education, it must also be matched with quality improvement by providing proper incentives for national scholars as well as attracting academics from overseas for various periods by providing proper incentives. This will be another significant way the Horn of Africa can benefit from globalization that is based on skilled labor migration aimed at reversing

the brain drain through various innovative academic and research programs including online instructional technology, and short term periodic visits by academics and other skilled persons.

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PART III

The role of faith and
citizenship for democracy
and peace-building in
the Horn of Africa

Religion, Liberal Democracy and Citizenship: Some Critical Lessons for the Horn of Africa

The relationship between religion and democracy has been one of the most persistent debates in political philosophy and the dramatic surge of the Christian Right in the West, particularly in the United States of America and Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East, South Asia, North Africa and the Horn have brought the subject into worldwide prominence. These forces are forcefully trying to influence political decisions and mould public policies in accordance with their own religious convictions without regard to the interests of those who adhere to different religions or to no religion.

In the light of the rise and consolidation of the Islamic state in multi-religious Sudanese societies, the persecution of the Jehovah's Witnesses and Evangelical Christians in Eritrea, the rise and demise of the Islamic Courts, as well as the present surge of the extremist *Shabab* in Somalia, the presence of a *de facto* established state religion in Ethiopia where a substantial proportion of the population are Muslims, there are critical lessons the Horn of Africa can draw from the empirically informed and enlightened philosophical debates on the relationship between faith, democracy and citizenship.

The aim of the paper is not to analyse or discuss religious beliefs and practices in the Horn but rather to examine theoretically the relationship on the one hand, between religion and democracy and on the other, between religious and secular considerations in political action, public policy and voting in order to draw some insights on the relationship between religion and politics in the Horn.

Some of the questions the paper addresses are: should government be rigorously secular and neutral – neither favouring nor disfavoring religion, or compassionately predisposed toward religion, seeking to encourage the thriving of multiplicity of faiths? Can the fundamental core values of liberty, equality and toleration – the edifice of the foundation on which liberal democracy rests – be preserved and promoted without the separation of state and religious institutions? Should religion and religiously based moral convictions of citizens play any role in public life? Should religious convictions of decision-makers be allowed to influence the development of public policies? What are the potential dangers that may result from bringing religious convictions into political action, decision-making and voting?

Democracy, Religion and citizenship

There are several broad generalizations that can be made about the role and place of religion in liberal democracies. Freedom of religion is a central core value in liberal democracy. Free exercise of religion is an essential manifestation of fundamental human liberty which is granted equally to all persons by virtue of their humanity. Nevertheless, citizenship is not dependent on adherence to any religion or to an official religion or a state approved religion. One does not need to adhere to any religion to be a citizen of a liberal democratic state. This is because religion is not a constitutive element of citizenship (Dworkin 1983, 1985; 1986; Audi 2000; Rawls 1993). As McConnell (2000) states, “In a democratic society, it is not possible to grant or withhold the privileges or immunities of citizenship on the basis of adherence to one or another religion. Instead liberal regimes have developed a range of answers to the problem of citizenship ambiguity.” In a liberal democracy, a government neither punishes nor rewards citizens for professing a faith that is not shared by a majority of citizens or for adhering to a state approved religion. Citizens enjoy the freedom to express their religious views, and to form institutions consistent with those views, without fear of punishment (Erbele 2002; Staut 2004; Sandel 1996). Citizens cannot also be forced to perform religious rituals (Thiemann 1996), such as prayer attendance, including children at school. By the same token citizens are also free to reject religion.

John Rawls, the greatest political philosopher of our time, for example, states, “In democracy, basic rights and recognised claims do not depend on religious affiliation, social class, and so on. *A society in which rights and recognised claims depend on religious affiliation and social class, has no conception of citizenship at all*” (1985: 241) (emphasis added). It was not due to mere coincidence that the greatest constitution ever promulgated in human history – the US constitution – is Godless. As Kramnick and Moore (1996: 27) state perceptively,

The US Constitution, drafted in 1787 and ratified in 1788, is a Godless document. Its utter neglect of religion was no oversight; it was apparent to all. Self-consciously designed to be an instrument with which to structure the secular politics of individual interest and happiness, the Constitution was bitterly attacked for its failure to mention God or Christianity.

In a liberal democracy, not only are citizens free to profess any religion or no religion as long as they cause no infringement on others’ rights, but the idea of public religion is also anathema to the basic principles of liberal democracy. This is because a state that adopts public religion is incapable of preserving liberty and of treating its citizens equitably.

Most of the eminent theorists of political liberalism strongly believe that the fundamental core values of freedom, equality and toleration are best preserved and enhanced if religion and politics are kept apart in the public sphere. The exponents of political liberalism are uncompromisingly in favour of the ‘wall of separation between religious institutions and state’ (Dworkin 1983, 1985, 1986; Rawls 1971, 1985, 1993; Ackerman 1980; Sandel 1996; Audi 2000). A constitutional system

that excludes religion from politics is in the best interest of both religious freedom and liberal politics. According to John Rawls, "...religious, philosophical and moral convictions... are part of what we call 'non-public identity' matters that citizens may deal with in their 'personal affairs'" (1985: 277). Politics and public policies should be freed from religious convictions of politicians and policy-makers.

Why do liberal theorists oppose public religion? Different religions have different conceptions of the ultimate good and truth and adherents of different religions genuinely believe that their way is the best way if not the only way that constitutes the ultimate path to human fulfilment and happiness. Not only are these conceptions numerous and diverse, but each of them recommends unique ways of achieving the ultimate good. If the Sunni Muslims, Sh'ia Muslims, Islamic fundamentalists, Orthodox Christians, Catholics, Protestants, Jehovah's Witnesses, Pentecostals, Hindus, Buddhists, etc. bring in their religious convictions into politics and public policies but each of them insists on their unique ways of realising the ultimate good, the public sphere is likely to turn into a battleground. That is why it is important to keep religious convictions outside the public sphere.

The multitudes of conceptions and recommendations will inevitably lead to fierce competition and conflict. A government that shows preference for any of these diverse conceptions of the ultimate good and truth is intrinsically incapable of treating its citizens who adhere to different religions in a fair and equitable manner (Rawls 1993; Dworkin 1986; Audi 2000). Therefore, the need to treat citizens in fair and equitable manner necessitates that a state should not show preference for any of the diverse competing and conflicting conceptions of the common good. As Roland Dworkin (1986: 191) concludes, "... a liberal government will adopt a posture of 'neutrality' toward all substantive religious, moral and philosophical views." He further observes, "... government must be neutral on what might be called question of the good life... political decisions must be independent of any conception of the good life or what gives value to life" (1986: 191). In another work (1983: 47), he states that government, "must be neutral in one particular way: among conceptions of the good life. Whatever we may think privately, it cannot count as a justification for some rule of law or some political institution... Or that a life suffused with religion is better or worse than a wholly secular life" (*Ibid.*). Consistent with this line of argument, Michael Sandel also states:

The political philosophy by which we live is a certain version of liberal political theory. Its central idea is that government should be neutral toward the moral and religious views its citizens espouse. Since people disagree about the best way to live, government should not affirm in law any particular vision of the good life. Instead, it should provide a framework of rights that respects persons as free and independent selves, capable of choosing their own values and ends (1996: 4).

Why Separation of Religious Institutions and State?

The question of how religiously pluralistic, free and democratic society achieves an appropriate and sustainable harmony between religion and politics has been one of the most importunate controversies that has been pre-occupying not only liberal political thinkers (see Rawls 1993; Sandel 1996; Stout 2004; Erbele 2002; Dworkin 1985; Audi 2000; Rosenblum 2000; Clanton 2008), but also political activists. The Algerian feminist, Marie-Aimée Hélie-Lucas, for example, states,

...let us dream of secular states, let us dream of the separation of religion and the state, of ending with nationalism justifying all the crimes against oppressed groups – including women (1988: 186).

Robert Audi argues that although religion as a source of “human flourishing and as stimulus to citizenship,” has played an important role in the development of democracy, it can “...be a divisive force in democratic politics” (2000: 3). The reason for this because “The impulse to pursue the Ultimate Good, particularly in an authoritative institutional context and with support of others sharing the same religious outlook, can lead to a tendency, conscious or unconscious, to dominate others. *A holy cause can sanctify extreme measures*” (2000: 3-4) (emphasis added). There is ample evidence to substantiate this claim. The stoning to death of the thirteen year old, innocent girl, Aisha Ibrahim Duhulow, in Kismayo, southern Somalia, at the hands of the Islamic extremists, the al-Shabab militia, who control Kismayo town is one of the many cases in point.

According to Amnesty International:

Contrary to earlier news reports, the girl stoned to death in Somalia this week was 13, not 23, Amnesty International can reveal. Aisha Ibrahim Duhulow was killed on Monday, 27 October, by a group of 50 men who stoned her to death in a stadium in the southern port of Kismayu, in front of around 1,000 spectators. Some of the Somali journalists who had reported she was 23 have told Amnesty International that this age was based upon a judgement of her age from her physical appearance.

She was accused of adultery in breach of Islamic law but, her father and other sources told Amnesty International that she had in fact been raped by three men, and had attempted to report this rape to the al-Shabab militia who control Kismayo, and it was this act that resulted in her being accused of adultery and detained. None of [the] men she accused of rape were arrested. ‘This was not justice, nor was it an execution. This child suffered a horrendous death at the behest of the armed opposition groups who currently control Kismayo,’ said David Copeman, Amnesty International’s Somalia Campaigner. He further said, “This killing is yet another human rights abuse committed by the combatants to the conflict in Somalia, and again demonstrates the importance of international action to investigate and document such abuses, through an International Commission of Inquiry.”

Amnesty International has learnt that:

- Aisha Ibrahim Duhulow was reported as being 23, based upon a judgement on her physical appearance, according to one of the journalists who had reported the stoning. Her actual age was confirmed to Amnesty International by other sources, including her father.
- Her father said she had only travelled to Kismayo from Hagardeer refugee camp in north eastern Kenya three months earlier.
- She was detained by militia of the Kismayo authorities, a coalition of Al-shabab and clan militias. During this time, she was reportedly extremely distressed, with some individuals stating she had become mentally unstable.

- *A truckload of stones was brought into the stadium to be used in the stoning.*
- At one point during the stoning, Amnesty International has been told by numerous eyewitnesses that nurses were instructed to check whether Aisha Ibrahim Duhulow was still alive when buried in the ground. They removed her from the ground, declared that she was, and she was replaced in the hole where she had been buried for the stoning to continue.
- An individual calling himself Sheik Hayakalah, was quoted on Radio Shabelle saying: 'The evidence came from her side and she officially confirmed her guilt, while she told us that she is happy with the punishment under Islamic law.' *In contradiction to this claim, a number of eye witnesses have told Amnesty International she struggled with her captors and had to be forcibly carried into the stadium.*
- *Inside the stadium, militia members opened fire when some of the witnesses to the killing attempted to save her life, and shot dead a boy who was a bystander* (Amnesty International 2008) (emphasis added).

Not only does this senseless act of barbarity demonstrate the extent to which a blind commitment to 'a holy cause' can destroy human conscience and legitimise actions that would otherwise be regarded as monstrous and inhuman, but also underscores the indispensability of the need to put an iron wall between political power and religion. Only a group whose sense of humanity and morality are wiped out by extreme religious conviction would treat a victim of gang rape in this manner. Had there been separation between state and religion, the perpetrators of the gang rape rather than the victim would have been punished.

Robert Audi states that the two most important commitments of liberal democracy are to freedom of citizens and to their basic political equality. This dual commitment of liberal democracy was succinctly stated by Kant:

It is a fundamental principle of moral politics that in uniting itself into a nation a people ought to subscribe to freedom and equality as the sole constituents of its concept of right, and this is not a principle of prudence, but is founded on duty (quoted in Audi 2000: 4).

However, the dual commitments are inherently conflictual because the pursuit of the two – freedom and equality – “can produce conflicts in a democracy, and in practice they tend to pull a society in different directions” (Audi 2000: 5). That is the reason why freedom exercised disregarding the freedom of others is counterproductive and undermine equal treatment of citizens. Robert Audi among many other liberal thinkers identifies three principles that underpin the argument of separation of religious institutions and state. These are the libertarian principle, the equalitarian principle and the neutrality principle.

The libertarian principle states that within certain constraints, the state must allow its citizens or others who live within its jurisdiction to practice any religion. This is a principle of tolerance (Audi 2000: 32). This does not, however, imply that the state should approve or disapprove any particular religion. The principle is based on the recognition of citizens' freedom to practice their religion freely without state interference. It is equally important to recognise that this freedom is not without limitation. For example, government interference may be justifiable if certain religious practices constitute a threat to human health, e.g. if parents object to their children's inoculation and put their lives and other citizens' lives at risk or if

the freedom to practice religion violates the rights of others, e.g. the religious practice of human sacrifice (Audi 2000).

The equalitarian principle postulates that the state should give no preference to one religion over another. This is derived from the principle of impartiality. This principle rejects the idea of an established church as well as the exclusion from public office of citizens on the grounds that they are affiliated or not affiliated to a particular religion (Rawls 1993; Dworkin 1985; Audi 2000). In Eritrea the Jehovah's Witnesses and the different evangelical Christian churches are banned and therefore not only are their followers prohibited from practicing their religions, but the state also persecutes them actively and are excluded from public office, self-employment and cannot also occupy state-owned home. This policy and practice flagrantly violates the equalitarian principle and therefore the Eritrean government discriminates against those who are not followers of the state approved religions.

The neutrality principle postulates that the state "should neither favour nor disfavour religion (or the religious) *as such*, that is, give positive or negative preference to institutions or persons simply because they are religious (Audi 2000: 33; Dworkin 1986). The principle of neutrality applies both to religions, as well as to religious and non-religious citizens. This principle rejects government favouritism. In Eritrea, there are three state-approved religions – namely, mainstream Islam, Orthodox Christianity, Catholicism and Protestantism. The adherents of Islamic fundamentalism, Pentecostalism and other minority evangelical churches are banned.

Robert Audi argues that there are compelling reasons why a free and democratic society should endorse the three principles of separation of religious institution and state. The libertarian principle is indispensable because "a society without religious freedom" cannot be free (p. 36). A free and democratic society should also endorse the equalitarian principle because governmental religious preference of a particular religion will result in discrimination of citizens who profess other religions or who profess no religion. This is likely to lead to concentration of power and privileges in the hands of those who adhere to the preferred religion. For example, in Sudan, power is concentrated in the hands of Islamists.

Public policies and laws are also likely to reflect the normative values and world views of the preferred religion. Fair and equal treatment of citizens requires adoption of the equalitarian principle (Rawls 1971; Dworkin 1985, 1986; Audi 2000). Audi argues that in liberal democracy, differences in opportunity emanating from difference in effort and natural endowments may be unavoidable, but limitations in opportunity due to lack of preferred religious adherence violates "standards of basic liberty and basic equality" (Audi 2000: 36)

A free and democratic society should also endorse the principle of neutrality because the central idea of liberal political theory as Michael Sandel states is that "government should be neutral toward the moral and religious views its citizens espouse" (Sandel 1996: 4). Religious freedom includes the right to profess or reject any religion and if the state does not adopt a neutral stance, discrimination will be inevitable, as has been the case in Eritrea and Sudan. A society that discriminates or rewards citizens on the basis of their religious affiliation cannot be free and is

intrinsically incapable of treating its citizens fairly and equally. Therefore separation of religion and state is *sine qua non* for the protection of religious liberty. The latter is only achievable in the context of state neutrality. Ideally, not only the state but also “churches should be politically neutral in a liberal democracy” (Audi 2000: 41).

Two Models of Religious Citizenship

There are two models of religious citizenship – namely, secular neutralism and religious pluralism. However, opinions are divided with regard to which of the two is the best way to realise the goal of equality of all citizens. The secular model is based on the strict separation of religion and state. McConnell summarises the secular model as follows: all laws are based on secular not religious premises; all public policies and government activities are free of religious influence or conviction; citizens’ civil obligations are determined independent of religion; not only are public schools the dominant form of education and but also should be used to instil ideals of democratic citizenship, without being tainted by sectarian teaching or dogma; and religious practices are protected as long as they are limited within the confines of the private sphere of home and church (McConnell 2000) or mosque. The idea is ‘Be a man in the streets and a Muslim or Christian, Jew, Hindu or Buddhist at home.’ As McConnell states, “The effect is to force all citizens to put aside their sectarian loyalties and convictions in their capacities as citizen, but allow everyone complete freedom to practice religion in the private. ‘Don’t ask, don’t tell’” (2000: 100-1). The aim of the secular model of citizenship is to avoid religious divisiveness, religious warfare, sectarianism, discrimination and intolerance. At the heart of the secular reasoning lies the argument that the political or public sphere should be shielded from being polluted by religious citizens’ conception of basic justice and the common good.

As opposed to the secularist state, the objectives of the religious pluralist state are: to enable people of all religious convictions to be citizens of the same nation; a Muslim can be a Muslim not just in her house but also in the public sphere. So can the Jew and Christian. In a religious pluralist state, everyone is at home. As McConnell states to the Catholic, it is a Catholic country; to a Muslim, it is a Muslim country. McConnell argues that the pluralist model rejects the idea that a secularist position is neutral because in its adherents’ view, the secular reason is underpinned by “a deeply embedded ideological preference for some modes of reasoning and ways of life over others – rationalism and choice over tradition and conscience” (McConnell 2000). According this view, no specific law or public policy can be ‘neutral’ as all are based on ideological and philosophical positions. Pluralists argue that the function of a constitution is to provide a framework within which different perspectives and world views could compete freely without privileging religious or secular values. In the pluralist system, religious citizens should be entitled like everyone else to advocate laws and public policies that in their conviction will promote the public good notwithstanding the fact that the sources of their premises are religious teachings.

The exponents of the pluralist model argue that the result of the pluralist approach is 'neutral' toward religion. This is not because the laws or public policies concerned are "based on non-sectarian 'reason', but because all citizens are equally free to adopt or reject arguments without any limitation arising from their metaphysical, philosophical, epistemological, or theological foundations" (McConnell 2000: 1003) According to pluralists, to argue that to require citizens to bracket their conception of basic justice and the common good when acting in the public sphere amounts to being reduced to second class citizens (Erbele 2002; Clanton 2008; Stout 2004). Nevertheless, the problem which the exponents of religious pluralism overlook is the fact that if different politicians, policy-makers and legislators who adhere to different religions act in accordance with their religious convictions in the public sphere, as stated earlier, the latter is likely to be permeated by sectarian divisiveness and consequently turn into a battleground. That is why many liberal thinkers argue that the adoption of the pluralist approach may prompt balkanisation of already divided societies (McConnell 2000). The other danger of the pluralist approach is that laws, public policies and government activities are most likely to reflect the religious commitments of the majority and as Audi argues, "if this happens, the liberal aim is threatened and a mob rule may prevail – this is because decisions and policies based on religious reasons are not acceptable to all citizens" (2000: 8).

The role of Religion in Public Life

In a liberal democracy, citizens are not obliged to submit to any one particular religious, moral or philosophical doctrine. That is why religion is not a constitutive element of citizenship. Within limits, citizens are free to pursue various goods and ends in accordance with their individual choices and convictions (Audi 2000; Sandel 1996; Stout 2004; Clanton 2008). A democratic society also needs to seek political legitimacy based on the consent of the governed (Rawls 1985, 1993). This argument is underpinned by the assumption that citizens should govern themselves. However, the question is: how are citizens to govern themselves when they do not share fundamental religious, moral and philosophical commitments? Religiously committed citizens believe that their moral and social commitments – ranging from their views on women, morality, conception of right and wrong, morality, sexuality, divorce, child custody, alimony, inheritance, polygamy, child marriage, abortion, sexuality, blood transfusion, military service are derived directly or indirectly from these religious sources which are different and often incompatible with each other.

Political liberal theorists, such as John Rawls, Dworkin, Sandel, Ackerman and many others argue that the only way citizens in a religiously pluralistic society can harmoniously govern themselves is by keeping religion out of politics or the public sphere. Discussions on public policy should be conducted on the basis of public rather than religious reasoning (Rawls 1971; 1993; Rorty 1999) otherwise if citizens bring into the public sphere their sectarian political commitments, the public forum will turn into a battle ground rather than being a forum of mutual understanding

and effective communication. This is because as Richard Rorty in his 1994 essay argues, ‘religion is a conversation-stopper’ (1999). People who take a position on the grounds of God’s will are unable to change their mind even when confronted with evidence-based argument.

Therefore, in a religiously divided society, it is futile to base political arguments or public policy on sectarian religious premises because they are not acceptable to citizens outside that particular religion. Not only are political actions, public policies or arguments on fundamental political issues based on religious convictions unlikely to win the hearts and minds of citizens with different religious convictions, but they are also likely to cause offense or resentment. Religious reasoning in political discussion, legislation and public policy is disrespectful of citizens who do not accept the premises on which such arguments are based. Such reasoning is also undemocratic because it requires one to accept a particular set of religious premises to participate in a political debate, to join a political organisation or government office. That is why the most eminent political philosophers, such as John Rawls and many other political philosophers argue that religion should be kept in the private sphere and the public sphere should be governed by public reasoning that is accessible to all citizens regardless of their religious commitments.

The same logic equally applies to the exercise of political power of the state. Public policies when legislated in law are enforced by the coercive power of the state and therefore become binding on all citizens regardless of their religious, philosophical and moral doctrines (Rawls 1993). Rawls argues, “This raises the question of legitimacy of the general structure of authority with which the idea of public reason is intimately connected” (1993: 136). His argument in this regard is underpinned by the assumption that citizens are reasonable, rational, free and equal. He also views the diversity of reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines found in democratic societies as being permanent feature of such society. In view of the fact that the governed are deeply divided by incompatible religious, philosophical and moral doctrines, how could it be possible to have a politically stable society? Rawls asks, “...when is ... power appropriately exercised? That is, in the light of what principles and ideals must we, as free and equal citizens, be able to view ourselves as exercising that power if our exercise of it is to be justifiable to other citizens and to respect their being reasonable and rational? (1993: 137).

The exercise of political power “*is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy*” (1993: 137). In a later edition of *Political Liberalism* (1996: xlvi) he states, “*the exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification of those actions*” (Rawls 1996: xlvi) (emphasis added). This principle equally applies to all political actions, public policies, public discussions and to matters arising in the legislature “that concern or border on constitutional essentials, or basic questions of justice...” (1993: 137).

As in the theory of separation of religious institutions and state, at the heart of political legitimacy lies the principle of neutrality in which citizens and government officials deliberating public policy should remain neutral in terms of religious convictions. Instead all public policy and legislation should be justified by public rather than religious reason. In the course of public deliberation, legislation, voting, campaigning, lobbying, and interpretation of public policy, i.e. when entering the realm of the public sphere or what some theorists call the public square, citizens, government and municipal officials, politicians, as well as judges should bracket or leave behind their moral and religious convictions (Rawls 1985; Audi 2000; Rorty 1999).

What is public reason? According to Rawls:

Public reason is characteristic of a democratic people: it is the reason of its citizens, of those sharing the status of equal citizenship. The subject of their reason is the good of the public: what the exercise of the political conception of justice requires of society's basic structure of institutions, and of the purposes and ends they are to serve. *Public reason, then, is public in three ways: as the reason of citizens as such, it is the reason of the public; its subject is the good of the public and matters of fundamental justice; and its nature and content is public, being given by the ideals and principles expressed by society's conception of political justice, and conducted open to view on that basis.*" (1993: 213)

The requirement of public reason does not apply to all forms of political questions. It only applies to questions that involve 'constitutional essentials' as well as to matters of basic justice. The limitation of public reason does not apply to deliberation of political questions that are of lesser significance.

According to Rawls (1993: 214) religious, philosophical and moral considerations may play a role in many ways; however, the ideal of public reason applies to: citizens who engage in political advocacy in the public sphere, members of political parties, candidates in their campaigns, other groups who support such candidates and to political parties. The ideal of public reason equally applies to citizens who vote in elections. As Caleb Clanton (2008) states how politicians decide policy issues or citizens vote in an election should be decided on the basis of those reasons which can be recognised by all citizens as reasons, and not just according Islamic, Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox Christian reason. In short, the ideal of public reason applies whenever matters of constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice are at stake. Democratic citizens' behaviour in elections should be governed by public reason rather than religious reason (Rawls 1993: 215). Otherwise, the principle of democratic citizenship would be forfeited if they cast their votes in accordance with their religious convictions. This would be lethal in societies in which citizens adhere to two religions. For example, in Eritrea where 50 percent of the population are Muslims and the other 50 percent Christians, if people cast their votes according to their religious convictions rather than public reasons, the country would remain polarised along religious lines.

For the exercise of political power to be legitimate, democratic citizens should bracket their religious convictions when they lobby for a particular public policy, when they form or join a political party, when they campaign during an election and when casting their votes. Citizens who lobby for a public policy on the grounds of

their religious conviction, form or join faith-based political parties because they share the same religious conviction or who cast their votes on the basis of their religion clearly violate the principles of good and democratic citizenship. A good democratic citizen must be able to justify his or her actions and positions on the basis of the political values of public reason. One who lobbies in favour of a particular policy based on religious conviction or who casts his or her votes on the basis of their religion will be unable to explain in a manner that is acceptable to the other who does not share the same religious conviction.

Religious, philosophical and moral reasons are not universal values shared by all citizens and therefore are only accessible to those who profess the same religious convictions. If a government enacts a piece of legislation or adopts a particular social policy, it should justify it to all citizens in spite of their disagreement concerning religious, philosophical and moral doctrines. The central thrust of this ideal is that political decisions should be made in a manner that prevents one particular doctrine from dominating the public sphere. To be recognised as a free and equal citizen of a liberal democratic state means to be treated as a person to whom reasons must be offered, on request, when political questions are under consideration (Audi 2000; Clapton 2008; Rawls 1993; Dworkin 1985). The reasons that must be offered are not any reasons. They should be public reasons, not reasons based on religious conviction. Every citizen has the right to ask why she or he should consider a proposed legislation or public policy as legitimate. As John Rawls argues,

“And since the exercise of political power itself must be legitimate, the ideal of citizenship imposes a moral, not a legal, duty – the duty of civility – to be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason. This duty also involves a willingness to listen to others and fair-mindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made” (1993: 217).

Rawls states that the reasoning in the public forum should appeal strictly to ideals and principles that no reasonable person could reasonably reject.

Religion, Gender and Democracy

In liberal democracy, one of the functions of government is to protect religious liberty. Liberal democracy also protects other liberties, such as freedom of movement, the right to bodily integrity, the right to own and inherit property, the right to seek employment outside the home, the right to education and the right of association (Nussbaum 2000). In some societies, such rights are denied to women on the grounds of religious convictions. Societies that are in the process of democratisation find themselves faced with the dilemma posed on the one hand, by a constitutional form that prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, sex and religion and on the other that guarantees free exercise of religion.

If the state interferes in the free exercise of religion to protect women's rights in the above-stated realms, this is likely to be construed as constituting serious infringement-

ment of religious liberty. If the state does not interfere against women's subordination and institutional sexism, this would mean condoning or sanctioning violations of basic justice and equality. The contradictions between religious freedom and women's rights are obvious in the areas of inheritance, divorce, polygamous marriage for men, abortion, child custody, child marriage, property rights and post-divorce settlement and women's freedom of movement and employment outside the home. In societies where there is a wall of separation between religious institutions and state, the contradiction between religious freedom and gender equality has no impact on public policy. It is only in societies where there is lack of commitment to gender equality that the dilemma is apparent and more often than not, it is used as a pretext to perpetuate the status quo permeated by inequality between men and women.

The Role of Religion in Public Life: the Horn of Africa

The idea of the Horn of Africa is an abstract concept that only makes sense at a high level of generalisation. This is because although the countries in the Horn share certain common features, such as abject poverty, oppressive and incompetent and war-mongering regimes and adverse weather conditions, they differ widely in terms of their natural resource endowments, population and physical size as well as regime type. The role religion plays in public life is also different in all the countries in the Horn.

The 30 June 1989 coup which toppled the democratically elected Sadiq el Mahdi's government was engineered by the National Islamic Front (NIF) (Hamdi 1998; Gallab 2008). The Islamic government in Sudan derives nearly all its laws from Shari'a. This is in spite of the fact that the citizens of the country adhere to Islam, Christianity and traditional African religions. The imminent dangers the collapsing of religion and politics into one can cause is indisputably demonstrated by the bloodshed, displacement of millions of citizens and the suffering of the Sudanese people, especially in the southern and western parts of the country, including the Nuba Mountains. Though Sudan's Islamic path was institutionalised by Nimeiri's September 1983 Islamic laws, it was after the advent of the NIF-backed government that Sharia laws became deeply entrenched. Nimeiri introduced Shari'a laws as a means of forestalling the threat posed by the Muslim Brothers under the leadership of Hassan al-Turabi. As J. Esposito argues, "Nimeiri continued to be challenged by the National Front, an alliance of national Islamic organisations. He countered and pre-empted his Islamic critics in the National Front by himself harnessing religion to enhance his legitimacy" (Esposito 1995: 86).

In order to see one of the obvious negative impacts of the domination of public policy and legislation by religious convictions, let us briefly look at the situation of women in the Sudan. The fact that all laws and public policies are derived from the Qoran in the Sudan has had a dramatic impact on women's equality, dignity and basic human rights. In the Sudan, the inequality between women and men is codified

in law. According to the codified law – The Muslim Personal Status Act of 1991 (see Tonnessen: 2007:4):

- a man is allowed to marry up to 4 wives, but has to treat all his wives justly;
- a woman needs a guardian (*wali*) to validate the marriage;
- the bridegroom must pay the bride a dowry which is the property of the wife;
- the man is the financial provider of the family;
- a man can deny his wives to work outside the home, even though he fails his financial obligation;
- the husband has the unilateral right to divorce (*talaq*) while the wife has to obtain a divorce in court (*tatliq*);
- the mother has the custody (*hadana*) of the girl until she is nine years old and of the boy until he is seven years old; and
- a woman would inherit half of her brother(s) property (Qanun al-Ahwal Al-Shakhsiyya lil-Muslimin 1991 referred to in Tonnessen 2007: 3).

In Eritrea, the relationship between state and religion is bizarre and utterly confusing. Although the country's laws formally guarantee freedom of religion, it is the only country in the region, if not in the world, where religion is constitutive of citizenship. In post-independence Eritrea, citizenship is dependent on adherence to state-approved religion. The Jehovah's Witnesses were deprived of their citizenship by a Presidential Statement issued on 25 October 1994 (see Government of Eritrea 1995). The reason the Jehovah's Witnesses lost their citizenship rights was because they refused to participate in the national referendum of 1993 and in the national service.

The Eritrean Evangelical Christians who happily participated in the national referendum and have been participating in the national service like every other citizen in the country are also suffering from gruesome forms of persecution for no other reason than their unwillingness to denounce their religion in favour of the three state-approved religions – namely, mainstream Islam, the Orthodox Church, the Catholic and the traditional Protestant Church. Hundreds of Pentecostal Christians are languishing in unknown places throughout the country. The government also routinely tramples upon the autonomy of the state-approved religious institutions. For example, the aging Patriarch of the Orthodox Church has been incommunicado in detention since 13 January 2005 for no other reason but for protesting against the gross violations of human rights in the country and for demanding the release of the illegally detained priests.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Eritrean government claims to be secular, personal laws among Eritrean Muslims are governed by Shari'a law, notwithstanding the fact that the EPLF (later PFDJ) came to power promising to relegate the institutions that create and reproduce gender inequality to the dustbin of history. By recognising Shari'a law in personal status, the government has condoned discrimination of Muslim women in the country.

The same is true in Ethiopia. Although state and church were formally divorced after the Derg's ascendance to power (see Eide 2000), under the present government, personal laws among Muslims in the country are based on Shari'a law which as we saw earlier, discriminates against women. For any government committed to the principle of gender equality, the values of women's dignity, basic human rights and equality should outweigh any faith-based justification for oppression.

Conclusion

Based on the theories and analyses presented in the preceding pages, I would like to conclude by focusing on a few important questions.

- Religious liberty is one of the most important core values and deserves preservation and protection provided it is kept within the bounds of the private sphere.
- The state should maintain a neutral stance toward the religions adhered to by its citizens and others residing within its territories.
- Religion is not a constitutive element of citizenship, i.e. enjoyment of rights of citizenship is not a function of adherence to any religion or state-approved religion. A society in which citizenship rights depend on religious affiliation "has no conception of citizenship at all" (Rawls 1993: 241).
- In a religiously pluralistic society, it is not possible to develop and preserve a fair and just society based on freedom, equality and neutrality without the separation of state and religion. An iron wall of separation between state and religion is a *sine qua non* for the realisation of the lofty ideals of liberty and equality.
- Religion and religiously based moral convictions should never be allowed to influence legislation, public policy and political action. The only time religion and religiously-based convictions could be considered to play a role in the public sphere is when those who resort to religious rather than public reasoning in particular political matters recognise and accept "the risk of deliberative defeat" and are therefore "open to inquiry and deliberation" (Clanton 2008: 10). This is the minimum requirement of an ethical democratic citizenship. However, in view of the fact that those who act upon religious convictions are not open to public reasoning, the very idea of 'deliberative defeat' may be incompatible with their faith.
- Public policies based on religious convictions are likely to be divisive and discriminatory and therefore should not be allowed to influence development of public policies.
- No majority religion should enjoy a privileged status to shape public institutions, programs and policies.
- In religiously and morally pluralistic societies such as the horn of Africa, citizens who base their support or opposition to political parties, public policies and laws on sectarian religious reasons violate the ethics or moral duties of good democratic citizenship (see Wolterstorff 1997: 67-9; Rawls 1993; Dworkin 1985, 1985; Audi 2000; Clanton 2008).

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The Ethnic and Civic Basis of Citizenship in the Horn of Africa

Abstract

The paper describes and analyses forms of citizenship in the Horn of Africa. In that endeavour it identified two forms of citizenship, notably ethnic and civic. Since the 1990s the HOA has been witnessing three models of citizenship. The first pursued by Ethiopia and to some extent by Sudan is ethnic. The second pursued by Eritrea and Djibouti is civic. The third is the special case of Somalia. Selecting either the ethnic or the civic model has its advantages and disadvantages. Ethnic citizenship may guarantee ethnic minorities equal rights, self rule and self-fulfilment, while at the same time could be a cause of division and irredentism. Civic citizenship could create unity and cohesion in polyethnic societies, at the same time it could generate domination by majorities. Therefore it is suggested that both models have to be given due space. Yet, it is also suggested that the national or formal level should be reserved for the civic model, while the sub-national or informal (community) level should accommodate the ethnic. The politics of domination which is to be found in all states is the main obstacle to equal rights of citizens thus politics of domination should give way to politics of rights.

Keywords: Horn of Africa, ethnic, civic, citizenship, politics of rights, politics of domination, primordial, modern

Introduction

Broadly speaking the literature on citizenship identifies two bases of citizenship claims, notably ethnic and civic. While the first one is supposed to constitute the foundation of ethnically homogenous societies, the latter is ascribed to be the basis of citizenship of multiethnic heterogeneous societies. The reality on the ground, however, is much more complex than this ideal typical societal dichotomised setting. That is the typologies are rarely found in their pure forms, rather quite often, citizenship presupposes conflation of both.

Citizenship as a universal affiliation to a state in the Horn of Africa (HOA) is still in the process of evolution. As such a fully formed citizenship status is hard to

imagine. Hence, the evolving citizenship formation in the HOA is highly blurred. Although it seems possible to argue that the dominant form of citizenship at the formal sphere in the Horn of Africa is the civic type, in reality, however, the ethnic could be found within the civic and vice-versa.

The states in the HOA are pursuing varying types of citizenship formation. At least officially, Somalia, since, its inception as a sovereign state in 1960, was the only state that formally could claim an ethnic based citizenship formation. In reality, however, Somali citizenship is based on both ethnic and civic criteria. The ethnic foundation of Somali citizenship stems from the fact that, broadly speaking, Somali population is perceived to be ethnically homogenous. Yet the myth of the homogenous Somali nation was demystified by two interrelated developments. The first is the division of the Somali nation in different separate entities. The second is the emergence of Somaliland since 1991 whose identity claim stems from a colonially produced entity. Perhaps it could be also added that the internal narratives of genealogy of the genesis of the Somali nation draw a picture of a far from homogenous society. These two developments have demonstrated, even in Somalia's case, the predominance of the conception of the civic territorial foundation of Somali citizenship at the formal level.

The post-Dergue reconstitution and restructuring of the Ethiopian state has introduced, at a formal level, an ethnic based citizenship. The ethnic federation arrangement presupposes that Ethiopians secure their citizenry through their ethnic states. Therefore Ethiopia is pursuing two parallel levels of citizenship: ethnic (*kilil* – regional state) and civic at the federal level (national level). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 between Khartoum and the SPLM, in Sudan, could also be seen as an attempt at the inception of a mixed type of citizenship rights. Southern Sudanese are made to elicit their Sudanese citizenship on an ethnic basis through the membership of their ethnonation in the new Sudan. The rest of the Sudanese people find that their citizenship is being defined so far according to civic criteria. Eritrea and Djibouti are pursuing the civic route of citizenship.

The paper attempts to describe and analyse the forms of citizenship claims in the HOA. It addresses questions such as: What are the citizenship types prevailing in the Horn of Africa? What are the criteria defining citizenship? Which type of citizenship is appropriate to the social fabric of the state of the HOA? Could either ethnic or civic criteria of citizenship in separation adequately address the citizenship problem in the HOA? What are the cons and pros of defining citizenship on the basis of either the ethnic or civic criteria?

The paper consists of six sections. The first introduction section gives a general overview of the paper. The second section deals with the theoretical and conceptual discourse. Section three addresses the citizenship bases in the HOA. Section four discusses the pros and cons of framing citizenship along either ethnic or civic forms. Section five discusses the politics of rights versus politics of domination. The last section, in conclusion, summarises the paper.

The Ethnic and the Civic Bases of Citizenship: Theoretical Discussion

Overall, in the discourse of citizenry, often distinction is made between two bases of citizenship. In spite of the distinction, however, there is still a lot of heated debate and disagreement revolving around the concept of citizenship in Polyethnic societies. It is unsettling to observe that the philosophical and political debate pivoting around the subject casts heavy clouds on it, instead of giving clarity. The persistent acrimony between followers of the two persuasions renders the subject highly contested. Not only the lack of conceptual clarity but also dubious theoretical approaches and conceptual binaries, underlie the contestation about citizenship in Polyethnic societies. Concerning the conceptual framework, several sets of concepts permeate the discourse. The commonly referred binaries include: ethnic-civic, primordial-modern, essentialist-instrumentalist/constructivist, collectivist-individualist. These binaries follow familiar theoretical traditions that, broadly expressed, could be distinguished along individualistic-libertarianism and collectivist-authoritarianism (Greenfeld 1992; Seton-Watson 1977; Smith 1986, 1998; Gellner 1983). This taxonomy is not, however, without political consequences, that is beyond its usual academic controversy, the normative virtue endowed to it where ethnic (bad) and civic (good) (McCrone 1998: 8), it can make or break societies. The taxonomies are further reduced to two types of nationalisms that constitute the founding pillars of citizenship rights and claims. Nationalism is described as the most contentious, but also most potent tool in the formation of nations and identities (Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm 1990). This powerful tool distinguished itself by diverging, at least, into two species. Some scholars distinguish between two types of nationalism which in turn lay the foundation for two types of citizenship formations.

Liah Greenfeld (1992), for instance, discerns two types of nationalism, the individualistic-libertarian and the collectivist-authoritarian. While the individualistic-libertarian perception leads to membership criteria based on civic criteria, the collectivistic-authoritarian perception leads to ethnic criteria of citizenship. According to the individualistic-libertarian perception, citizenship is voluntary and acquired. In this model of citizenship individuals are taught and socialised by the various social mechanisms and institutions to acquire citizenship. Further they have the option of accepting or rejecting a particular type of citizenship, at least in theory. According to the collectivistic-authoritarian view, on the other hand, citizenship is deterministic and inherited, arising from the fact of belonging to a unique ethnicity, his or her citizenship is predetermined, it is not optional (Greenfeld 1992). Already blood genealogy has hermetically sealed the individual's citizenship. The markers of ethnic citizenship are common descent, language, persistent residence in a specific territory, specifically identifiable cultural traits (values, norms, special type of dress, food) related to ethnic commonality (nativity or indignity).

The profound premises of civic criteria of citizenship, on the other hand, are civic institutions that would include the legal (law, courts, judges, jury); political (parties, parliament, enfranchisement, elections); economic (market, bank, credit institutions, money and finance institutions); and civic cultural traits (values, norms,

symbols, music, theatre, cinemas, national holidays): emanating from an overarching political system, national life, residing in a common national territory, *Gessellschaft*) that stem from national institutions binding citizens together (Seton-Watson 1997, Smith 1986).

A politico-legalistic or formalistic definition of citizenship is provided as;

Citizenship may be defined as a formal status of individual membership in a national community subject to the sovereign institutions of rule of a state. The status confers upon the citizen equal protection of the laws, guarantees of a right to belonging, entitlement to participation, and full access to the social provisions of the state. Through the doctrine of popular sovereignty, the citizen is an integral member of the civil society from which the state derives its legitimacy (Young 2007: 254).

The other definition of citizenship, which I call sociological or non-formalistic, rests on the perception that it is “on basis of a community of descent, on ‘*jus sanguinis*’-the law of blood” (McCrone 1998: 9, Young 2007: 262). It is important to stress that my perception of citizenship is of its sociological dimension. The increasing move from the mere legal definition of citizenship to the sociological definition is also accentuated by Will Kymlicka when he notes,

most liberal theorists have recognized that citizenship is not just a legal status, defined by a set of rights and responsibilities, but also an identity, an expression of one’s membership in a political community (Kymlicka 1995: 192)

The following figure succinctly presents the conceptual and theoretical dichotomies that are deployed in the discourse of citizenship (Figure 1).

This discourse on the two types of citizenship foundations has given rise to two schools of thought, notably the primordialist school of thought and the modernist school of thought. The modernist school of thought more or less perceives the foundations of citizenship as being based on secular, territorial, political civic criteria (Hobsbawm 1990, Gellner 1983). Moreover, it prescribes to the view that civic citizenship is modern and variable. Its variability is presumably connected with the high geographical mobility of modern man that with great inevitability leads to the mixing of previously geographically confined people thereby diluting the ethnically pure pedigree of groups. But, moreover, the unlimited mobility of the civic citizen brings about a considerable change in the mental structure of the citizen that obliterates the ethnic, primordial and parochial proclivities within its mental structure.

On the other hand, the primordialist school of thought (Geertz 1963, Van den Berghe 1978) emphasises the perennality of ethnic citizenship. Ethnic citizenship is perceived as objective and natural and as such therefore as a fundamental, characterising feature of human cultural organisation. Primordality is fixed, invariable therefore authentic, reflecting nativity and indignity. The reification of primordial premises becomes the defining characteristic of ethnic citizenship.




Figure 1 Theoretical and Conceptual Dichotomies

The critical question here is what is the political implication of this debate to the politics of identity and politics of rights? These two types of citizenship are intrinsically related to two types of politics of rights, notably group/collective rights and individual rights. The group/collective rights are aligned with ethnic citizenship rights whereas individual rights are aligned with civic citizenship rights. This binary itself rests on the great Western philosophical tradition of liberalism and communitarianism. Liberal democracy that advocates individual rights inclines to civic citizenship premises where membership in a nation rests on the individual. The individual as

an atomic unit of society is connected with the nation. The communitarian, on the other hand, focuses on the group or collective citizenship membership (cf. Kymlicka 1995, Taylor 1994). Liberals have always perceived group rights as a nemesis to individual rights. For Kymlicka, however, the opposition between individual rights and collective rights as seemingly advocated by liberalism and communitarianism are not as sharp as we are led to believe. Kymlicka maintains not only that liberalism provides space for group rights, but also it must allow for group rights. He insists that individual rights of minority groups could only be adequately addressed through group rights,

Group-differentiated rights – such as territorial autonomy, veto power, guaranteed representation in central institutions, land claims, and language rights – can help rectify this disadvantage, by alleviating the vulnerability of minority cultures to majority decisions. These external protections ensure that members of the minority have the same opportunity to live and work in their own culture as members of the majority (Kymlicka 1995: 109).

Kymlicka continues, “Group-differentiated rights, in short, seem to reflect a collectivist or communitarian outlook, rather than the liberal belief in individual freedom and equality” (Kymlicka 1995: 34). Nevertheless, Kymlicka, calling this view misconception maintains that many forms of group-differentiated citizenships are consistent with liberal principles of freedom. Indeed Kymlicka insists on stating that group-specific rights certainly guarantee personal freedom. Indeed Kymlicka strongly believes that individual freedom in a polyethnic setting could not be achieved without community rights. This understanding takes us to the differential historical genesis of citizenship rights in a comparative historical perspective. Let’s take the example of the often-cited countries in this connection, notably France and Germany.

in France citizenship came to be defined as a territorial community based on ‘jus soli’ – the law of soil, that is on a territorial jurisdiction. Whatever one’s ethnic or geographical origin, all residents on French soil could in principle be citizens of the French state...in Germany...citizenship was formed on the basis of a community of descent, on ‘jus sanguinis’ – the law of blood (McCrone 1998: 9).

In other words a child receives German citizenship if the parents have it. The French model is state-centred and assimilationist, the German one is volk-centred and differentialist (McCrone 1998: 9). The French one epitomizes the model where the state precedes the nation; in the German case the nation preceded the state (ibid). In the French case residence determines citizenship rights, conversely in the German case blood, regardless of residence status, determines citizenship rights.

How does all this relate to Africa in general and HOA in particular? Undoubtedly, Africa would present a different history and narrative of citizenship claims and rights. One of the historicities that perhaps strongly brings out the specificity in the case of citizenship foundation in Africa would be the necessity to delineate African history to pre-colonial and post-colonial and the concomitant respective variant citizenship formations. The pre-colonial is often related with primordiality where ethnic mode of citizenship would be in preponderance, whereas the post-coloniality is related

with modernity that tends to afford the civic preponderance in the citizenship configurations.

The post-colonial citizenship formation could be represented by an act of constructivism where intentional social actions by the new African leaders were taken to give the civic preponderance in order to accommodate the two aspects of societal life prevailing in the colonially created post-colonial societies. The two aspects of social life: the traditional (primordial) and modern (civic) required a special approach to citizenship. For the new agents of nation state builders the choice became by necessity the French model 'state-centred', '*ius soli*'. On the other hand, the German model 'volk-centred' '*ius sanguinis*' is relegated to the sub-national or community level. In a hierarchically arranged plurality of citizenship the civic pertains to the national and formal, while the ethnic would refer to the sub-national and informal. In this sense the preceding discussion would have relevance to the HOA's citizenship debate.

Citizenship Basis in the Horn of Africa

The ontological origin of the current societies in the Horn of Africa (HOA) could be traced to the arrival of European colonialism to the region. The modern societal formation in the HOA is a product of the European colonial expansion in late 19th century. The primary objective of this colonial social engineering was to create submissive subjects that could easily be subordinated to the economic and political wishes and interest of the colonisers. The order of political and economic system in the colonial territories was therefore designed in a manner that not only was to serve the functional needs of colonial authorities, but also in a manner that engendered societies that morally, physically and psychologically became lame ducks, unable to extend resistance to the colonial yoke hanging on their necks. The colonial project, thus, brought forcibly together a variety of divergent groups that under normal circumstance might not have constituted political units called nations subsumed under a state. Or, in the case of Somalia, parts of communities were surgically removed and forced to join communities that they had nothing in common with. This configuration inevitably gave rise to a citizenship modality that by necessity had to accommodate numerous groups of various ethnic, linguistic and cultural pedigrees. This means that the post-colonial state is constructed in a way that pre-colonial and colonial are to be found infused in a polyethnic post-colonial society. This reality in turn demands recognition and celebration of duality of citizenship formation, notably ethnic and civic.

The traditional notion of citizenship in Africa is that "no matter where you are born, you are the son or daughter of the original soil or homeland of the parent through whom you trace your descent. Ethnic citizenship is therefore the foundation for national citizenship in Africa, although it is also possible to acquire citizenship by naturalisation" (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007: 71). This state of condition of citizenship could have served the pre-colonial societies. The colonial and post-colonial reality has brought about a different supra-ethnic configuration where a different citizen-

ship mode has become necessary. The contours of post-colonial citizenship have been altered so radically that the pre-colonial reality would not adequately define the post-colonial citizenship configuration.

Some of the mechanisms deployed to ensure the production of lame duck societies mentioned earlier that were amenable to colonial schemes were to make sure that they were mish-mashed. The process of mish-mashing involved, in the first place, cutting political boundaries arbitrarily, without taking any consideration to culture, religion, mode of life, topography, etc. (Clapham 1985: 7, Lewis 1983) This resulted into the creation of political entities devoid of common culture, language, identity, values and norms, coherent political and economic systems, indigenous institutions; elements that are essential for national unity and cohesion creating ideal situation for ruling. In the second place, indigenous norms and values, structures and institutions were fatally undermined, paving the way for societal pathology where the post-colonial society contained, at birth, anti-bodies that rendered the society chronically infected with multiple diseases.

The very social fabric of the post-colonial societies necessarily became a centre of agonising mixture of ethnicity, religion, language, culture, landscape that were artificially and forcibly grafted into each other rendering them susceptible to all sorts of pathologies. This susceptibility to social malaise made the nation building enterprise fraught with all sorts of problems, but also necessitated carefully designed citizenship models and strategies. Arguably, for the purpose of this paper, it is plausible to distinguish between two clearly identifiable citizenship formations in HOA, notably ethnic and civic. While the first (ethnic) relates to a ethno-linguistic constellation, the latter refer to the supra-ethnic constellation characterising the post-colonial societies. Cognisant of this societal reality embedded in the social fabric of the post-colonial societies, understandably, the states opted for a citizenship formula that exceeded ethno-primordial formation, and instead emphasised supra-ethnic civic citizenship formation. Somalia, where the political was presumed to be congruent with the cultural, that is a state representing a homogenous community was in practice based on civic citizenship formation for a number of reasons. Here it is of great significance to stress the distinction between what is known as official or state citizenship and unofficial community citizenship. The latter refers to the community's understanding of citizenship. This distinction usually ends up in the binary of ethnic, which conforms with the community's understanding of itself, and civic which conforms with the official or state understanding of citizenship.

Since the 1990s the HOA is experiencing two types of citizenship models at the official level. One model rests on civic citizenship criteria and the other on ethnic citizenship ones. The ethnic citizenship model has been rigorously advanced by the new power holders in Ethiopia since 1991 where the country is reconstituted on an ethnic basis. In a radical departure from the previous era, the post-Dergue state power holders undertook profound measures that rearranged state structure in Ethiopia. The new scheme could appropriately be described as a move from a civic to ethnic citizenship formation, at least in theory. Yet the new political endeavour is permeated with contradictions. While the new constitution gives far-reaching rights

of autonomy to the nations, nationalities and peoples in reality, however, the centre remains near to absolute power leading some observers to infer that the current Ethiopian state is highly centralised (Merera 2003: 146-8).

Sudan has also increasingly moved toward this model, particularly since the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Khartoum government and Southern Sudanese rebels in 2005, whose central provision gives autonomy to the Southerners. Therefore the post-CPA state arrangement in Sudan could be described as a move from civic citizenship to ethnic citizenship dispensation. Sudan is, of course, not pursuing an outright ethnicist citizenship model. So far Sudan's federal state dispensation is displaying a blend. If the two foci of centrifugal movement – Darfur and Eastern Sudan – are able to extract the same deal as their Southern compatriots, perhaps the Sudan state dispensation could come to a full circle of the ethnic model.

The second modality of citizenship practiced in the HOA is the civic model. The civic model of citizenship, at a formal level, the constitutional state dispensation, is being pursued by other two HOA countries – Djibouti and Eritrea. Although both countries consist of polyethnic communities, state power holders have opted for a unitary, civic dispensation of citizenship. In Djibouti there has been tension relating to power sharing between the two ethnic groups since independence leading to intermittent wars (e.g., Abdallah 2008). The unitary state is dominated by the majority (ca 70 percent) Issa where the minority Afars feel marginalised. The Eritrean government has taken a stand that rigorously rejects and even inserted it in the ratified constitution that any association based on ethnicity and religion is illegal. Hence, it is pursuing a unitary centralised state structure founded on civic citizenship dispensation. Yet, in both countries there are tendencies seeking for an ethnic basis of citizenship. Some ethnic groups are challenging the centrist dominant state dispensation and would like to reconfigure the state along the Ethiopian line of ethnic federalism. Recently there have emerged small groups like the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation (RSADO) and the Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Kunama (DMLK) (Bereketeab 2004: 228) in Eritrea that are demanding ethnic autonomies. That they derive their inspiration from Ethiopia is demonstrated by the fact that these groups are not only supported by the Ethiopian government but also that they are based in Ethiopia.

A third is the Somali case. Somalia represents a special case. The Somali situation provides a mixed picture. Somalia is the only country in the region that has been widely perceived as an entity of homogeneity. Based on this perception the leaders of post-colonial Somalia embarked on a state building enterprise that would be profoundly based on ethnic criteria of citizenship.

This ethnically driven Somali dispensation of nation state building led to the ambition of incorporating ethnic Somalis that were left out when the post-colonial Somali state was constituted (Möller 2008: 97). Yet, the perception of a homogenous Somali state has increasingly come under pressure. Two challenges are provided to this homogeneity perception and its drive for an ethnic basis of citizenship. The first refers to the territorially divided existence of the Somalis – Republic

of Somalia, North Eastern Province (Kenya), Somali Ethiopia (popularly known as Ogaden region) and Djibouti; but also the emergence of a self-declared independent Somaliland in 1991 has further demonstrated otherwise. Following the demise of the Siyad Barre regime, Somaliland declared its independence that was based on the re-definition of its identity as founded on colonially created territory that is *ius soli*. The second challenge comes from the realisation that, after all, the Somali nation is not a homogenous entity as the commonsense perception had led us to believe (Kusow 2004: 2-3). The Somali genealogical narrative provides diverse pedigree of not only the emergence but also the current existence of the Somali nation (cf. Kusow 2004). As Abdi Kusow (2004) expounds, a genealogical narrative excludes groups such as *Jar'er* from the *Maandeeq* (Somaliness). From the preceding discussion we might deduce that there exist three modalities of citizenship in the HOA, notably the ethnic model as pursued by Ethiopia; the civic model as pursued by Eritrea and Djibouti; and the special case of Somalia.

The Pros and Cons of the Adoption of Either the Ethnic or the Civic Forms of Citizenship

I have argued in the previous section that the states of the HOA were born containing profoundly within their wombs multiple ethnic entities that essentially make them civic and will remain so, unless they are to be dissected into their component ethnic elements (in whatever form ethnic is defined) and build their own ethnic states. The underlying assumption is that states consisting of polyethnic communities could by necessity display civic citizenship at the national or official level. Therefore the states of the HOA, in their current form could only provide civic citizenship. But this is true only at the national or official level. There is the unofficial or sub-national level. The diversity of the societies presupposes two levels of citizenship – duality of citizenship. This reality demands at the political level the recognition and perhaps also the celebration of this duality of citizenship. Yet, it is proposed here that the relation of the duality should not be placed at a parallel level. that is their relation should be vertical rather than horizontal. The nation building project presupposes this verticality of political relationship. A society that is in the process of formation and active transformation is precarious and vulnerable. Therefore nurturing the duality of citizenship is of utmost significance. The crucial question that needs answering is what are or will be the consequences of simply emphasising one of the citizenship forms and neglecting the other? I briefly now discuss the pros and cons of adopting one or the other forms of citizenship.

A logic that departs from the polyethnic ontology or existentiality of the current states in the HOA, may lead us to the conclusion that the logical foundation of citizenship should be ethnic. But let us assume for a moment the plausibility of ethnic states in HOA, and an earnest endeavour being made toward reconfiguration of the states so that they fit perfectly in the ethnically determined citizenship constellation. What would the political landscape then look like? What would the security and

stability of the region be? One scenario would probably be, since there would not be perfectly delineated ethnic entities, a chaos where the Hobbesian adage of “war of everyman against everyman” (Fukuyama 2005: 2) would reign. One of the challenges, as the current Ethiopian experience demonstrates, stems from the difficulty to delineate ethnic boundaries (Fischa 2006, Cohen 2006). The war of everyman against everyman has been unequivocally demonstrated by the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 where the feuding units were reduced to clans and sub-clans, that is the atoms of the Somali nation.

The cons of ethnic claims of citizenship could also be seen from two points of view. The first is exogenous and the second endogenous. In terms of the second, ethnicisation of socio-political life could lead to autochthonic and nativist claims that in their extreme forms produce ethnic cleansing and genocide (Marshall-Fratani 2007: 32). The examples of Rwanda and Sierra Leone make it not easy to miss what hostility and hatred filled ethnic mobilisation and strife could lead to. In addition to this endogenous situation, another exogenous implication of ethnicisation of politics is the growth of the tendencies that aim at uniting ethnic entities across political boundaries that is it gives rise to irredentism with the potential of it developing into interstate conflict. The Somali incorporation of five stars into its flag representing unity of the five entities and the subsequent conflict that followed an attempt at acting upon that desire represents one of the negativities of an ethnic claim of citizenship (Möller 2008: 98). The intermittent demand to form a Pan-Afar state is also another example of the consequence of ethnicisation of citizenship. The post-Dergue reconstitution of the Ethiopian state on an ethnicity basis is also believed to have brought to the forefront the need of realignment of ethnic citizenship. The TPLF’s definition of its struggle in the earlier days as aiming at building a Tigray sovereign nation state founded on the unity of divided ethnies: Afar, Kunama, Tigrinya, Saho, etc. that brought it into direct confrontation with the Eritrean movements (Bereketeab 2009) is another example of the negativity of ethnicisation of socio-polity in the HOA.

In its irredentist version the critical implication of the ethnic basis of citizenship is its transgression of political borders. The artificiality of the current national geoterritoriality in the HOA that has given rise to social reality where ethnic groups are to be found divided across national states, where kins are to be found spread across a natural geographic contiguity that is divided by political lines, may rightly invoke rights of commonality of citizenship that could easily spill over into cross border conflict. This commonality of citizenship rights and efforts to realise it may constitute elements of interstate conflicts.

The pros of ethnic citizenship are often presented as creating favourable milieu for ethnic groups quite often subjected to majority dominance in a unitary state structure and civic citizenship models. As alluded to earlier in a divided and conflict-ridden polyethnic societies it is presumed that endowing ethnic minorities ethnic citizenship rights that extend to self-rule not only addresses ethnic grievances but also diffuses conflicts (Kymlicka 2006: 46, 1995: 186). This understanding of interethnic relationships stems from the equality and justice principle. Further, it stems also from the social contract theory where it is presumed that a contract entered

voluntarily lasts longer, as well as guaranteeing peace and stability. It also stems from the conviction that individual liberty could only be realised through the achievement of group rights. The merit of this understanding, in a societal setting such as that of the HOA is however put into question, because it presupposes a prevalence of shared universal common values of liberal democracy and human rights (cf. Kymlicka 2006: 40). The absence of these shared common values may certainly render the arrangement dysfunctional in the HOA.

The cons and pros of civic citizenship, on the other hand, seem to be much more straightforward, taking into consideration the precarious and vulnerable nature of the societies in the HOA. The cons will be described as relating to the very unitary and centralised nature of civic citizenship which often give privileges to majority groups. Most of the time minority ethnic groups in civic citizenship are treated as underdogs where their languages, cultures, religions and socio-economic mode of life are neglected. This may necessitate ethnic mobilisation and resistance, quite often leading to internecine wars that destabilise and may eventually break the polyethnic state.

On the side of the pros, certainly, there are many advantages. Transitional polyethnic societies where the nation formation project (here I am not referring to the narrow meaning of nation, but rather to the notion of polyethnic nation) is still in an evolutionary process, as a result of which societies are weak and vulnerable due to the absence of shared common values that transcend ethnic boundaries, giving rise to overarching shared identity, may benefit a lot from the civic citizenship arrangement. Here it should be stressed that my argument throughout the paper is that underneath the national political structure there is the sub-national or ethnic structure that the civic citizenship arrangement should accommodate. I argue that civic citizenship presupposes not only the recognition but also a genuine accommodation of ethnic citizenship as a sub-national identity formation, hence the notion of duality of citizenship. It is this recognition of duality of citizenship that could thrust forward, as painlessly as possible, the nation formation project in the HOA, which is the prerequisite, par excellence, for facing the multidimensional challenges in the region.

The Politics of Rights versus the Politics of Domination in the HOA

The reconstitution of the Ethiopian state along the lines of ethnic citizenship in 1991 was both highly praised and highly criticized. The praise came from those who saw it as a bold experiment in search of a solution to a national malignancy Ethiopia has been suffering from for a long time (Fiseha 2006: 135, Gudina 2003: 144). Proponents of this view were elated by the bold measure taken to radically redefine citizenship. The assumption was that as Samatar (2005: 45) notes, “dividing the country into ethnic regions would recognize the country’s primordial reality and bring past injustices to rapid end”. The support was embedded in justice and equality arguments (cf. Gudina 2006: 119f).

Opponents of the experiment, on the other hand, point out that organising Ethiopian society on the basis of ethnic citizenship would endanger the unity of the country (cf. Cohen 2006: 169, Kymlicka 2006: 55). Yet others stress that organising the state on the principles of ethnicity and adoption of the principle of self-determination was radical and pioneering (Turton 2006: 1). Nevertheless, though the risk of outright war, at least temporarily, seems to have ebbed, the deep-rooted social conflicts within the society have not received a durable solution. This could be explained by two contesting if not outright contradicting claims, notably represented by the politics of rights and politics of domination.

The Ethiopian post-Dergue evolution could be perceived as climbing down from equal dignity to equal respect. While the former appeals to commonality, the latter celebrates differences (Modood 2008: 47-48). The emphasis on commonality in Ethiopia has always tended to be assimilationist where the citizenship norm has been defined by the Abyssinian culture whose markers were the Amharic language, the Monarchy and the Orthodox Church (Cf. Hameso 2006: 216-218). This equal dignity notion usually upheld the politics of domination – the entrenched status quo. The equal respect notion driven by the politics of rights and raising the torch of difference challenged the status quo, and finally, albeit temporarily, defeated the politics of domination in 1991. Nevertheless, unfortunately for the politics of rights it proved difficult to uproot the deeply entrenched politics of domination.

What earned the Constitution of 1995 admiration was its bold declaration that politics would be organised on an ethnic citizenship basis. But as Fiseha (2006) explains, constitutional proclamation and practice diverged greatly. The contradictory nature of the constitutionally guaranteed rights for autonomy of ethno-national entities is visibly manifested in the attempt to violently suppress the struggles of various groups in Ethiopia. While Art 39 of the Constitution confers the right of self-determination up to and including secession on the nations, nationalities and peoples (Fiseha 2006: 132), those movements that preferred to exercise that right are violently confronted. The post-Dergue rulers of Ethiopia, in an identical vein with their predecessors (the Monarchy and the Marxist-military junta) responded with excessive violence to any aspiration of autonomy. What identifies the current rulers with their predecessors is the institutionalisation of violence perpetuating the culture of intolerance that has been the yardstick of the Ethiopian state (Gudina 2003: 145).

The EPRDF, though it claims to be founded, constitutionally, on a devolutionist constitutional and political arrangement, involving an ethnic-based federal arrangement of ethnic regional state self-rule, with provisions of shared power at the central (national) level, in reality, however, it could not emancipate itself from the culture of violence, a sign of centralist political practices. The ethnic federal arrangement was supposed to reconcile the deeply rooted disgruntlement of ethnic groups and their claim for recognition rights, on the one hand, and the need for national unity on the other.

In spite of the enshrining of autonomy and ethnicisation of politics in the national constitution, yet the constitutional re-structuring of the state on the basis of

ethnicity was not followed by a devolution of power that genuinely empowers the ethnic groups that were organized into kilils (ethnic states) (see Fiseha 2006, Gudina 2003). A true ethnic federalism presupposes decentralisation of state power. And a true decentralization should lead to devolution of power. What could have been a daring innovative experiment was therefore aborted half-way because of fear of disintegration. The architects of the innovative experiment seem to have relapsed to the perennial fear that haunted their predecessors that if genuine ethnic federalism is introduced, with all its accompanying entitlements, it will lead to the disintegration of the Ethiopian state.

This fear, however, seems unwarranted. This assumption could be demonstrated by the fact that the largest ethnonationalist group, the Oromo, so far has not succeeded in creating a strong coherent ethnonationalism capable of threatening the unity and integrity of the Ethiopian state. Further there are Oromos who question the wisdom of the separation of a majority ethnic group, which seems to have a broad support among the Oromo population (Gudina 2006: 125). It is suggested that two plausible reasons would explain this. The first is that unlike the widely accepted perception that the prevalence of ethnonational groups leads to division,

it is not ethnicity itself which makes ethnic federalism prone to conflict and violence, but the failure to implement the federal model in a way that responds to the expressed needs and interests of ordinary people. Put differently, ethnic federations are most likely to fail, not because they are too 'ethnic', but because they are not sufficiently federal (Turton 2006: 22).

The 2008 Failed States Index ranks Ethiopia 16th indicating that the country faces a real risk of disintegration. Apparently this is not because the country adopted ethnic federalism, but rather that ethnic federalism was not translated into devolution of power where all the ethnic groups would be able to feel equal and because of the contradictions between constitutionally granted rights, and political exercise that denies those rights. Hence the statistical probability of disintegration is deemed to be as equal as it was during the unitary state. Community autonomy, running one's daily business, is deemed by many to be capable of fostering a sense of ownership of and belonging to the central state, which in turn reduces the tendency of break up. Nevertheless, there are those who suggest that endowing genuine autonomy on ethnic groups could only minimise or diffuse conflict; it could never resolve the inherent contradiction. Autonomy makes ethnic groups crave more (cf. Kymlicka 2006).

Ethiopia seems to have reached the limit of its experiment. Realising this some suggest ways out: "two factors are critical if we are to move off the present political impasse: the abandoning of hegemonic aspirations and zero-sum politics by the ruling elite and of extravagant claims to the right of secession by certain other elites" (Gudina 2006: 129). This suggests that it is necessary that the politics of domination is replaced by the politics of equal rights. The politics of equal rights celebrates duality of citizenship: the ethnic citizenship that relates to ethnic sub-national citizenship formation and the civic citizenship that refers to supra-ethnic overarching national citizenship formation. Most societies in the HOA would prefer the latter citizenship formation, and corroborating this assumption Kymlicka (2006: 47) takes note,

“To be sure, most African states are interested in developing a common identity, common public institutions and a common public sphere, operating in a common language”. What seems the fundamental problem in Ethiopia today is the inability to transcend from the politics of domination to the politics of rights.

The inability to transcend the line that separates politics of domination from the politics of rights is also besetting the other states of the HOA. In spite of embarking on the route to moving from civic citizenship to ethnic citizenship in 2005, Sudan is also still demonstrating too much inflexibility to have a smooth transition. Not only Khartoum is dragging its feet in the negotiations with the rebels in the eastern and western Sudan, but also the CPA seems to be failing. This is attributed to the northern elites’ inability or unwillingness to relinquish their domination (Harir 1994). The accords signed between the Khartoum regime and the SPLM, and between the Eastern Sudan movements and Khartoum were perceived as a step toward opening a new chapter in the history of Sudan. But as always is the case, the litmus test lies in the implementation. All efforts of peace negotiation with the rebels in Darfur also, so far, have not born fruit because of the contradiction between the two principles. The problem of adjustment the Northern elites seem to be incapable of making is only one of the obstacles that the duality of citizenship is facing in Sudan. So Sudan is also plagued of the politics of domination.

Our other two cases – Eritrea and Djibouti – by adhering to the civic citizenship formation have preferred not make the transcendence from the politics of domination to the politics of rights. The civic citizenship through its tendency to give privileges to the majority has so far entrenched the politics of domination in the two countries.

Conclusion

This paper set out to examine the basis of citizenship in the HOA. To that end it has highlighted two bases of citizenship formation, notably ethnic and civic. It has discussed the theoretical and conceptual frame informing the debate. The HOA, being a constellation of hundreds of ethnic groups collectively as a region, or separately as single states, seems to be destined, at a national level, to display civic citizenship formation. This display of civic citizenship arises from the reality that polyethnic societies by necessity are based on civic citizenship. Yet, underneath this level, undeniably, there is another, at the sub-national level, citizenship formation. The latter is embodied in the diverse ethno-linguistic formations encapsulated under the national state. The challenge for the HOA states is therefore striking a balance between the two modalities of citizenship.

Nevertheless states of the HOA have opted for different models of citizenship. Broadly, three models of citizenship are to be found being exercised in the HOA since the 1990s. These are: the one pursued by Ethiopia and to certain extent by Sudan, that is the ethnic model; the second is the one pursued by Eritrea and Djibouti that is

civic; and the third is the special case of Somalia. The first represents a shift or move from a model that has been dominant for a long time to a new experiment.

The most striking shift took place when the new power holder in Ethiopia radically restructured the Ethiopian state on the basis of ethnic citizenship. This new state dispensation, theoretically, introduced provisions that gave constitutional rights to the various ethnic groups with far-reaching autonomy and self-rule. But clear discrepancies between constitutional discretion and reality that in a way heralded simply a continuation of the civic model whose features were the politics of domination, mitigated the impact and meaning of the new bold experiment. The failure of transcendence from the politics of domination to the politics of rights hindered both Ethiopia and Sudan from having a real innovative citizenship dispensation, while Eritrea and Djibouti simply continue with the politics of domination.

The paper also discussed the cons and pros of selecting either the civic or the ethnic model of citizenship. There are obviously advantages and disadvantages with each model. Selecting the ethnic model, for instance, on the advantage side one could refer to ethnic rights and self-fulfilment, on the disadvantage side it could create internal division within the society, and irredentism without. The civic also, on the advantage side could create societal unity and cohesion of the polyethnic society, while, on the disadvantage side by inclining to the politics of domination it could discriminate ethnic minorities. Taking into consideration all the diversities, commonalities, and complexity and plurality of the polyethnic societies, the paper concluded that the proper solution to the citizenship problematic in the Horn of Africa is to adopt the civic citizenship model at the national or formal level, while giving due space and respect to the ethnic citizenship at the sub-national or informal (community) level.

In concluding I will propose some points that should be taken into consideration in order to create an environment where the multiplicity and diversity of societies in the HOA would be a source of enrichment in their daily life instead of a source of division and conflict.

Firstly, celebrate diversity in all its dimensions. But above all recognise the duality of citizenship that is the hallmark of the societies. And subsequently design a genuine political arrangement that both reflects the diversity and replaces the politics of domination with the politics of rights and equality.

Secondly, avoid political parallelism in locating the dual citizenship formations. That is, keep them apart at the national level. Their relation should be hierarchical, the national should be represented by civic citizenship, and ethnic citizenship should be relegated to the sub-national.

Thirdly, citizenship modalities should correlate with the nation building project. The fundamental problem of the region is the incompleteness of the project of nation formation. Therefore, citizenship modalities should serve the process of nation formation. Nation is not conceptualised here in its narrow meaning of congruence of the cultural and the political, but rather in its polyethnic conception.

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Making peace, sustaining peace: A few observations on the role of values, of social inclusion and social cohesion and, of moral leadership in crisis-wracked societies

It is of course facile and gratuitous for outsiders to dispense advice in lofty terms about how those directly involved in the arduous search for peace and stability should go about their work in societies shattered by violence and enduring divisions. Perhaps one safe assertion, from the perspective of a society that was on the brink for decades in recent years, is that individuals matter, and that against all the odds men and women of high moral stature can indeed make a difference. My own limited experience of the crisis in the Horn of Africa in recent years has brought me into contact with precisely such men and women, people whose very lives are testimony to the impact of integrity, courage and involvement in situations which go beyond the difficult to the seemingly totally intractable.

At the darkest hours of the crisis in South Africa, it often seemed to the more faint-hearted that nothing worked, that nothing individuals could do would change the dire course of events, and that a resigned fatalism was the only course. Let the intransigents fight it out, and a pox on both your houses. In fact matters developed in an entirely different direction, in part due to the extraordinary role of a few key leaders, Nelson Mandela being only the most prominent. But in addition, underneath the turmoil of the second half of the 1980s, a more or less coherent state apparatus remained intact; a faltering economy still delivered enough to maintain the vast majority of the population above absolute poverty, and a set of cross-cutting allegiances in an ethnically divided society maintained a minimum of social glue.

Under the circumstances, it is not clear that South Africans have the experience or background to do anything more than extend a deep appreciation to all those seeking to rescue Somalia from being, in the words of a recent overview, 'A Country in Peril, A Policy Nightmare' (Menkhaus, September 2008). It is also with some guilt that any South African must appear at a forum of this kind, coming from a society

where people of Somali extraction have been targeted for assassination and indeed ethnic cleansing in recent months and years.

Due above all to their remarkable diligence and astute business ability, several hundred Somalis and their families have established themselves as a significant trading element in South Africa's towns and cities. Here they have set new standards of a work ethic and of service to their clients by means of bringing everyday commodities to poorer communities at lower prices. The local response has been deplorable. Local Somali organizations reckon that over 200 Somali businesspeople have been killed in the last five years in South Africa, very possibly in part through an organized campaign by rival traders unable or unwilling to compete on the same level as their Somali counterparts. And of late, mob attacks have forced Somali residents into refugee camps; or to consider a return to their own homeland, hazardous as that might be. In this predicament, the response of the South African government has been at best palliative, at worst altogether callous.

Somali success, Somali values

The very success of the Somali population in South Africa does provoke one to ask: what are the values and background of people who having arrived with so little, have achieved in relative terms so much? How is it that these characteristics – necessarily present too in their homeland – have still not obviated the current tragedy of this little country in the Horn of Africa? No one single answer obviously will satisfy the inquirer, and many no doubt will point out that the Somali people have not been left alone to work out their own salvation, but have become victims in a much broader interregional and indeed global conflict. But should – as seems unlikely – the malign outside forces at work within Somalia suddenly disappear overnight, what kind of society could arise from the ashes? What social forces and cultural and social glue would then weld this industrious and disciplined social group together?

In a recent article Abdi Samatar (October 2008) has suggested that the success of the Union of Islamic Courts rested not just on their ability to restore order in the areas under their control, but on the appeal of 'nationalist ideas'. More important, the Courts 'demonstrated that civic life can be rejuvenated using foundational Islamic principles of justice and inclusive community' (p.163), and that 'an Islamic/civic alternative is possible'. In short, there are deeply-seated values among the population of Somalia that transcend the notoriously divisive forces of 'clanism' and of traditional enmities.

It is here that a sympathetic outsider, bewildered by the plethora of Islamic groupings both inside and outside Somalia, would be intrigued to hear more. Just what would the nature of a Somali Islamic republic turn out to be in terms of Samatar's vision? What, more specifically, are the values that would underlie a new Somali state whose constitution would presumably incorporate these values? Westerners in particular, but also surely the far-flung Somali diaspora would be interested to know

more about such matters as religious toleration (including of secularism), the status of women, and the orientation of education.

On simple power political grounds, how would such a state accommodate itself in a region where the area's hegemon, Ethiopia, is likely to be suspicious if not actively hostile – not to speak of the paranoia of the US? Of more critical importance, how can the large numbers of young men who are the product of a classic demographic bulge in recent Somali history be reintegrated in a peaceful productive fashion? Can the generation tutored in violence be brought to abandon the power of the gun? We in South Africa struggle with this same question, as our current crime regime shows, so far with only very limited success. The question is all the more germane as South Africa is a 'middle-income country', with economic resources that far outstrip any likely to be available to a new state in the Horn of Africa. And yet it still battles to overcome the strikingly visible gap between affluence and destitution, so potent a rallying cry for the disaffected youth. The rise of piracy off the shores of Puntland in recent years is testimony to the attractions of predatory crime to those who have otherwise little or nothing to offer.

South Africa – From Non-Racialism to Economic Division

No society can exist without sufficient consensus around key values, especially among the society's elites. If peace and order in society is largely determined by coercion it follows that it is extremely vulnerable. South Africa was fortunate that when the tide of conflict twenty years ago seemed at its highest, there was an emergent elite consensus over a national ethos that could underpin any new democratic order. That consensus sprang from an old tradition: the commitment of the African National Congress to the values of 'non-racialism'. It is perhaps little recognised that influential figures in the South African government, at the time apparent mortal enemies of the ANC, were coming to recognise that South Africa's future lay precisely in persuading the white population that the days of racial discrimination were over and that it was in the ANC's non-racial approach that the country's future lay.

As the years since democracy have gone by, 'non-racialism' as a quasi-official national ethos may well reflect a papering over of a lot more underlying diversity and conflict than is clear to the superficial eye. It was in the interests of many South Africans both white and black that non-racialism be seen as a foundational and uniform value of the 'new' society. But this elite consensus has been over-stretched and cannot hide the fact that the dominant white business classes in South Africa retain and grow their wealth in this light. The growing black business class also benefits significantly from the policy of *Black Economic Empowerment* (BEE -- a government policy that requires business to meet minimum ownership requirements with regard to previously disadvantaged South Africans). The rise of BEE in turn erodes the façade of a 'colour-blind' society, as do other measures taken to redress the balance in favour of the hitherto suppressed and indigent African masses. But as of yet, no new

dominant ethos has replaced that of the ‘miraculous’ transition based on visions of non-racialism and the rainbow nation, now wearing more than a little thin.

Social Cohesion

New forces of social cohesion are needed to move South Africa forward. The concept of social cohesion defines and expresses society ‘... as an integrated and inclusive entity, a community where individualistic interests and social confrontation constitute abnormal, negative situations’ (Helly, 2003: 20). Helly argues that in order for social cohesion to exist in society, ‘...social interactions based on trust and reciprocity between members of a society ...’ need to be regenerated and, secondly, that the enhancement ‘... of the ideas of common good, sharing of values, feelings of commonality and of social solidarity amongst members of a society ...’ must come about (Helly, 2003: 20).

In South Africa the weak and torn social fabric of our society is obvious to all. We do not anymore seem to have the necessary social *glue* to hold it together. The popular notion of ‘social capital’ has been harnessed in recent South African debates in an attempt to isolate what our society lacks in terms of interpersonal trust, leading inter alia to the growing ‘enclave-ization’ of our residential patterns. This does not mean (see for example Chipkin and Ngqulungu 2008: 62-65) that socially diverse societies are necessarily inimical to the ideals of societal peace and stability, or that such societies are by definition conflict-generating. Rather that it makes the point that an understanding of social cohesion as an effective force where citizens are tied to one another creates the necessary social solidarity and social fabric to keep society in equilibrium. ‘It is far more likely’, write Chipkin and Ngqulungu, ‘that government is effective, transparent and democratic when social cohesion between citizens is high’.

Leadership, Moral and Otherwise

Finally, a few words on the positive impact of individuals and the role that moral leadership has played in South Africa, together with an expression of belief that such phenomena are by no means lacking in Somalia either.

Leadership has to do with power. In his seminal writings on power and social stratification, Max Weber defined power as the ability to influence society, collectivities or groups of people and individuals *even* against their own will. According to him power is the fundamental concept that moulds societal stratification or inequality of opportunity. Stratification is itself made up of three analytically separate dimensions: the economic, social and political. Leadership, and the power it carries with it when rooted in legitimacy is according to Weber a social relationship. He goes on to argue that there are three forms of legitimate leadership or, types of authority: charismatic, traditional and rational-legal.

However, the power of leaders in formal colonial as well as the apartheid state over the subordinated majority was almost altogether lacking in legitimacy. In an attempt to maintain their policies of discrimination and exploitation, white leaders were led overall to the ever increasing application of more and more force. Whilst the process of establishing a rigorous racial order was a complex and long-drawn out one, and not simple or determined, finally the general trajectory of the processes ended in the almost total exclusion and marginalization of the great majority of South Africans by the application of coercive power. Black South Africans were systematically relegated over hundreds of years to subordination and the illusionary citizenship rights of the 'Bantu Homelands'. The weight of the large literature dealing with South Africa before 1990 abounds with analyses that suggest that South African society and the Apartheid state was rapidly on its way to implosion and, that a social revolution of black against white was imminent. Such indeed was the de facto situation in the country in the 1980s. How was the conflict brought to an end? One reason is that in South Africa ongoing crises and conflict generated exceptional moral leadership over time. Among these leaders were those whose authority, in Weberian terms, could be viewed as including all three of the components he put forward – charismatic, traditional, and rational-legal. Such at least can be argued to have been the position of Nelson Mandela with his installation as President of the Republic of South Africa on 10 May 1994.

Mandela was exceptional in that by birth he commanded a considerable measure of traditional authority as a member of the Thembu Royal House in the Eastern Cape. His very demeanour led some to describe him as an 'African Prince'. His de facto leadership of the African National Congress from the late-1950s onwards, his invisible but palpable presence as a prisoner of the apartheid state for 27 years, and his re-appearance to the masses in 1991 bestowed upon him a charisma that few could deny. And as democratically-elected President he was the embodiment of rational-legal authority who continued to exert the other dimensions of leadership simultaneously. More than any other single figure, he was responsible for the success of the transition from white settler colonialism to the inclusively-orientated democracy of the 1990s.

The kind of moral leadership provided by Mandela was exceptional; it was not however unique in the South Africa of the time. Permit me to make a few remarks about another figure whose leadership could be argued to have been largely charismatic, although also cloaked in the not inconsiderable traditional and rational legal authority of the Anglican Church. I refer of course to Archbishop Desmond Tutu, with whom I had the privilege of working when I was seconded from my University to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the 1990s. The latter was itself a *forward looking* attempt decided upon by South Africa's leadership to build social cohesion rather than further division as the country entered into a phase of transitional justice.

I worked in the Johannesburg Regional Office of the SATRC from March 1996 to February of 1998. From my point of view this was my second stint of *national service* towards a *new* and democratic South Africa. I and all of us who worked for the

Commission were greatly honoured to be there at this momentous moment in South African history. It was a time of hope – a time for *closing the books* on Apartheid and a time and opportunity for healing and forgiving. It was all the more so for the poverty-stricken *little* people of South Africa, who, in contrast to the leadership of the liberation movements and the negotiators of the transition who were destined to pick the fruits of the new regime, needed a vision of a better life for all. Desmond Tutu proved to be one of the great leaders in South Africa in his role of the chairperson of the SATRC. Our torn and tatty social fabric needed mending – people needed one another as people more than ever if democracy were to have the chance of success.

Whilst the ‘Arch’ (one of the affectionate names by which Desmond Tutu was known to those who worked with him – another being the ‘Pink Panther’ which was coined by the working class people of Cape Town in the 1980s, given the purple robes that archbishops of the Anglican church wear and clothed in which he led innumerable marches in the mother city in protest against the regime’s actions) worked mostly from the TRC’s national head office in Cape Town, he visited the Johannesburg office regularly and took the trouble to make contact with the staff notwithstanding the ever increasing demands made on him within the TRC. As the emeritus head of the Anglican Church of South Africa as well as a Nobel laureate the ‘Arch’ wielded substantial and significant power and enormous moral authority both inside as well as outside of South Africa. The position of chairperson of the TRC served not only to enhance this man’s remarkable ability to make and remake events and history as he battled to build his *Rainbow Nation* but also to bind ordinary South Africans together. His very deep-rooted values of inclusivity, of tolerance and in particular of humanity – his love for his fellow human beings is quite remarkable – commanded from all of us not only respect but thankfulness and pride that our tormented country was blessed with such people.

I watched him tell those around him at public hearings to allow the *men and women in the street deponents, the little people of South Africa* who came to the commission to tell their stories of suffering and loss to talk to him personally if they so desired. I saw him spontaneously invite all who were present at special hearings to enjoy lunch with him as if he were at home and he could get his wife to feed them all from her kitchen. I heard him hold the strained and often conflicted commission meetings together when the diverse and competing political interest groups that made up the TRC would take issue with one another and I heard many of them being stopped in their tracks by his soothing mien – his stories and his enormous ability to push on and ahead towards building an inclusive commission by forcing them to see and recognise their common humanity. He knew that if the necessary social cohesion and solidarity was not built and rebuilt South Africa would flounder in its project of democracy. I too was a recipient of his concern for the individual’s human condition and fears of all those around him when he phoned me out of the blue in hospital while I was waiting to enter an operating theatre for surgery to joke and to pray for me. I watched him contain the heroes of the struggle for South Africa and their political divides and rivalry, their persecutors and the little people who did their

bidding and were in jail as a result. The TRC offices became a required destination for leaders from all over the world. Royalty, heads of government and senior government ministers as well as ordinary South Africans came to pay their respects to the Arch and the South African democracy's attempt to officially lay our conflict-ridden past to rest.

The 'Arch' understood that only communication would lead to trust and never hesitated to meet with the 'enemy' in his tireless search for peace. On one memorable occasion in 1981 when lines of communication were at least publicly almost non-existent, he travelled to the then whites-only University of Stellenbosch to tell the assembled students that the current apartheid impasse was not eternally foreordained, that a free and colour blind South Africa was by no means an impossibility in their own life-times. Ten years later his sceptical and wary audience were to witness that the impossible was indeed possible as former enemies began to sit down to negotiate the outlines of the new South Africa. It had taken ten years of bloodshed, brutality and repression, but the vision that Tutu spelt out that evening in Stellenbosch had never wavered for this doughty priest.

Networks and Interdependence

The outward face of South Africa in the 1980s was one of political tumult and daily street confrontations between a rebellious population and a police force in armoured vehicles carrying automatic weapons which were to inflict many casualties. While force levels and casualties were never to attain anything like those of Somalia in recent years, the country was in a state of low intensity civil war that threatened to escalate with every new incident of violence. In hindsight the most ominous sign of incipient general breakdown was the increasing phenomenon of internecine violence between factions within each of the warring camps: the so-called 'black-on-black' violence on Natal and on the Rand extending into the post-1990 period, and the rallying of white extremists against their moderate white counterparts for whom a negotiated settlement had become not only a desirable but at last also a feasible option. Fortunately, adroit leadership and a measure of cool-headedness even amongst the 'hard men' in both camps brought this prospect to an end – although only just in time.

Violence is relational, and interdependence can be forged even as the fighting goes on in the streets. Under the surface of apparent breakdown, both old and new networks were being activated in order to seek ways out of full-scale civil war. As has been already emphasized, the role of key leaders was indispensable. But there were layers of networks taking their lead from them and starting in however faltering a way to meet and to wrangle because on the far side of the conflict the outlines of an 'ordinary politics' were becoming clearer. Decades of ideological polarisation and of self-assured centres of power were crumbling; monolithic domination could not disguise the actuality of a deep interdependence. It is perhaps fortunate that although the 'international community' was deeply involved in various ways, the in-

digenous power blocs were resilient and powerful enough to dictate the outlines of a final settlement. But even this could not have happened had not incessant meetings, dialogues and even intrigues brought the personnel of the various groupings into a closer human contact than ever before. In this respect these annual meetings here in Scandinavia of those involved in the search for the resolution of the crisis in the Horn of Africa bear more than a fleeting resemblance to the pre-1994 confabulations in my own country that saw former enemies speaking to each other for the first, but not the last, time in order to iron out or just temper deep-going differences.

The result in South Africa was the start of formal negotiations at the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park in the early 1990s. There thus existed already in South Africa some covert social fabric, some knowledge about one another that somehow enabled the Kempton Park elites to work with one another at times. Any reading of the unfolding of this negotiated democracy will show that while there were many crises and many moments when serious breakdown occurred, Kempton Park somehow held together and a realization of the structural interdependence between black and white in South Africa seemed to grow.

Any society, or nation-state if you will, is a system of 'structured interdependence'. In Somalia for too long this interdependence has been turned almost wholly negative, as the one faction depends on the other to provide the necessary opponent against whom to unleash the means of violence. But the structures of ordinary life, the beneficent interdependence of human sociality, have not been entirely destroyed. The Somali diaspora has shown the world something of the character of the Somali people when allowed to pursue their everyday endeavours in peaceable circumstances. As outsiders, and in the spirit of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, we can only say that the impossible is indeed possible, and that beyond the immediacy of atrocity, brutality and immense humanitarian crisis the shape of peace and reconciliation is there to be glimpsed.

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Dealing with Religious Diversity in Ethiopia

Introduction

Ethiopia is a country of many ethnic groups, with diverse cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds. Religious and cultural diversity is a reality on the ground for the masses of Ethiopia, which if addressed can create a mosaic country with substantial diversity. However, the fact of the matter is, most often the political face and image of Ethiopia presented to the international community is framed as an Ethiopia that is traditionally only Orthodox Christian. Little is known about the fact that Ethiopia is not only ethnically diverse but it also a country with religious diversity. The population of Ethiopia is 45 – 50 % Muslims; while 35 – 40% is Christian; and 12% are animists; and others constitute 3%¹. Ethiopian national identity was constructed by Abyssinian Christian rulers, who imposed their own particular historical narrative that legitimized an Ethiopian national image which portrayed and promoted a Christian Ethiopianess dominated by Abyssinian cultural identity².

This paper aims to provide an assessment of how the Ethiopian national identity is based on one particular group. The ruling class, historical narrative, and in a process imperial state building have excluded and marginalized millions of Ethiopians from the governance structures of the country.

The paper starts with a section on historical context; followed by a brief overview of the backgrounds of various religion in Ethiopia and the prominent role the Orthodox Church has in the country. The third section highlights some of the ethnic and religion cleavages within Ethiopia, followed by a brief discussion on some of the challenges that need to be addressed to shift our discourse from ethnic, cultural and religious hierarchies in Ethiopia; and concluding remarks.

Ethiopia's historical context

In an attempt to shed light on some underlying reasons for the manner in which Ethiopianess or the Ethiopian national identity was/ is constructed, it is important to look into this country's complex history; a history of empire nation state building as it pertains to how religious and cultural diversity were never addressed in a equitable manner.

Ethiopia has a long standing history which is contested by many groups. According to S. Hameso and M. Hassan, Ethiopia's empire state, historically was built on a scheme of conquest and domination, where systematic exclusion of certain groups was always visible³. Ethiopian history although contested, it is still a source of pride for some, i.e., the Abyssinians or highlanders. Taking stock of Ethiopian history one comes across its ancient written languages, Solomon and Sheba mythology and an empire state which was promoted as a progressive symbol of Africa by the ruling elite. However, in recent years, scholars have unveiled, to use Charles Gesheker's words 'a dialectic modern Ethiopian' historical analysis that underlines the expansionist policies of the Abyssinian rulers; and their domination and subjugation of neighbouring peoples such as the Somalis, Sidamo and Oromo people⁴. Although, Ethiopia or the ruling elite of Ethiopia have managed to sell the image of anti-colonialist, Pan-Africanist sentiments, scholars and the people of the Horn actually knew this was a fabricated myth, and the inside situation and reality on the ground in Ethiopia were always ones of subjugation and state institutions that were very oppressive to non-Abyssinian Ethiopians. "Abyssinia" is the central highlands, occupied by Amhara and Tigre ethnic groups who have dominated the Ethiopian political scene and were the ruling class; culturally and religiously they are Semitic speaking Orthodox Christians⁵.

Moreover, historically it was always stated that Ethiopia was the only African country which remained free during the scramble for Africa by European powers. What is often omitted from such historical perspectives, promoted by the ruling elite, is the fact that Ethiopia essentially survived the European colonial partition of Africa by becoming an active participant in the imperialist division of Africa⁶.

As Menelik stated in his 1891 memo to the European colonizers, "*Ethiopia (sic) has been for fourteen centuries a Christian island in a sea of pagans. If the Powers at a distance come forward to partition between them, I do not intend to remain an indifferent spectator*" (Gesheker, C. L. 1985:8)

The Ethiopian empire state building story is always told from the perspective of how they survived a period of internal conflicts and the development of new centralizing monarchs covering what is termed as Ethiopia's modern period (1855 – early 1900s); represented by the reigns of Tseodros II (1855 – 68) and Yohannis IV, (1871 – 89); and Menelik II (1889 – 1913), who is known as the architect of the modern Ethiopian empire state⁷, Zawditu (1916 – 1930), and Haile Selassie I (1930 to 1974). Continuing the history of the heads of states in Ethiopia, after Haile Selassie I, the Marxist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam took power (1974 to 1991). Then the Transitional Government of Ethiopia under Meles Zenawi came into power, which has been labelled by nation-building and state sponsored violence⁸. Tewodros II started the process which was aimed at the creation of a cohesive Ethiopian state and he incorporated Shewa into his state by forcefully suppressing revolts in the country's other provinces. Yhannis IV bitterly fought Menelik II who was then the Shewan king. Events have evolved in favour of Menelik II, who then became the emperor and used brutal military force to expand Ethiopia to double its size⁹.

What is interesting to note is that the Menelik era was followed by a short reign by Lij Iyasu 1913 to 1916, grandson of Menelik II. The brief period of Lij Iyasu is interesting in so far as it demonstrates how powerful the Orthodox Church was in the Ethiopian political scene. Lij Iyasu was characterized as an impulsive and creative ruler because of his dealings and interactions with Muslim Oromos and Somalis in the province of Harar¹⁰. Lij Iyasu was deposed and excommunicated by the church after he was accused of converting to Islam; simply he entered into communications with Sayyid Mohammed Abdullah Hassan¹¹, and other Muslims in Harar.

However, there are the stories of other Ethiopians that remain untold, these are the stories of non-Abyssinian nations and nationalities of Ethiopia, who not only helped build this state, but have been brutally displaced and suffered discrimination at the hands of ruling elite¹². These other Ethiopians have always lived in the periphery of the Ethiopian political landscape; they were turned into common peasants, landless tenants and slaves in the wake of Menelik's southward expansions¹³. Scholars, such as Gesheker, Markakis, Samatar and others wrote about the relations that Somalis have had with Ethiopian rulers from the highlands. Turton and Donham, James to name a few, have written about the relationships between those at the periphery of the Empire State and those at the centre, at times detailing the plight of non-Abyssinian peoples of the frontiers of Ethiopia.

This complex historical context of Ethiopia has set the stage for a hierarchical relationship between the centre, occupied by ruling elites of highlanders and the masses of Ethiopians. Before looking into the divisions of Ethiopia's ethnic and religion hierarchy, let us look at an equally complex history on religion in this country.

Religion in Ethiopia

As Ethiopia is a country of ethnic and linguistic diversity, it is also a country with religious diversity. In the beginning Ethiopia was occupied mainly by pagan Kushites, however its geographical closeness to the Middle East, where the three monolithic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam were born, has resulted in these religions influencing the religious composition of Ethiopia¹⁴. Hence there are Jewish Ethiopians, who were the least known group until their recent emigration to Israel; Christian Ethiopians, who occupy the centre of the political stage of the country, and Muslim Ethiopians, who although larger in numbers are marginalized from the political arena; and animists or pagans who are also the most marginalized group in Ethiopia.

Paganism in Ethiopia

According to J. S. Trimingham, in Ethiopia and the North East African region, one can observe a degree of residual paganism in how the three major religions are practiced. As cited by Trimingham, D'Almeida, 1620 wrote about Agao paganism, and how

they have been converted to Judaism early on, then to Christianity; and then to Islam. The author points out the fact that very little is known about pagan religious practices because they are looked down upon by both Christians and Muslims¹⁵. Trimingham also states that “Besides the Kushitic peoples who remain pagan, all the Negroid tribes called Shanqla by the Abyssinians are pagans” (Trimingham, 1965: 18)

Judaism in Ethiopia

There was a settlement of Semites from overseas into Abyssinia which had transformed the culture of the people of Abyssinia. Therefore, dominant languages of Abyssinia are Semitic¹⁶. Judaism was first introduced to the Agao, and according to Trimingham, the Jewish people of Abyssinia trace their ancestors to Menelik I, son of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. These groups, who are called Flasha by the Abyssinians, are pure Kushites. The Falasha are sedentary agriculturalists mostly in the provinces of Dambya, Wogar, and Armachchaho; however, after their independent kingdoms were defeated, they have dispersed into many urban towns¹⁷.

Christianity in Ethiopia

Given that Christianity is the officially recognized religion in Ethiopia, there is more complete historical documentation about Christianity. It became the official religion of the Axumite kingdom in Abyssinia about A.D. 350¹⁸. According to Trimingham, Christianity had been dominant in the highlands of Abyssinia, even though Islam was in persistent progress outside of the highlands. Since Christianity was the official religion, the dominant groups have enforced a level of conformity which was demanded from the conquered southern regions. The Abyssinian form of Christianity is similar to the Coptic Church of Egypt originally. Although the Abyssinian Church is linked to the Coptic Church of Egypt, it is a unique national Church where the spirit of Ethiopian empire state has been expressed¹⁹. Trimingham, 1965, points out that there are Pagan and Jewish elements in Ethiopian Christianity. For instance, some Jewish practices which can be observed in the Ethiopian Christianity are the differentiation of clean animals and unclean ones, and the tradition of the duty of a man to marry his deceased brother's wife.

Islam in Ethiopia

The presence of the Islamic religion in Ethiopia dates back to the days of Prophet Mohammed, and today half of the population are Muslims. There are Muslims in parts of Tigrina and parts of the highland Ethiopia. And although these highland Muslims are the same race as the Abyssinians, they are mainly merchants and artisans with some peasants²⁰. Moreover, there are large Muslim communities in the highlands

consisting of Oromo groups known as Raya, Yajju, and Wallo²¹. In addition, according to Trimingham, the hunting people who live on the southern and western shores of Lake Tana are Muslims. Also in the extreme western regions there are Muslims in the Bani Shangul region where most of the Berta and some of the western Oromos are Muslims. In the east the Afar and Somalis are entirely Muslim; in the south there are Muslims in Hawash and south of Addis Ababa through Gurag country to Gore; and in Harar in the south-east there is a strong Muslim centre which influenced most of the Oromo tribes; almost half of the Oromos in the provinces of Arusi and Baki are Muslims as well. To sum up, Muslims live throughout Ethiopia, and large concentrations can be found in Bale, Harerge, and Welo. Muslims belong to many ethnic groups, a factor that may prevent them from exerting political influence commensurate with their numbers.

The dominant Role of the Orthodox Church

Islam, just like Christianity has a long standing history in Abyssinia going back to the time of Prophet Mohammed, when it was brought into the Horn of Africa. It is interesting that many people do not know the fact that half of Ethiopia's population is Muslim. This I would contend is because Christianity became the official state religion and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was established as the national Church²². The Church has provided ideological support for the aristocracy, state control over its conquests; and promoting its famous line of "an Island of Christianity in an Ocean of Pagans" the ruling aristocracy of the empire state, over time, became inseparable from the Orthodox Church. The Church and Abyssinian monarchy continued to support each other until the military regime of Dergu, led by Mengistu Haile Mariam took power in 1974²³.

Gebre Tareke (1991:15) as cited in Abbas Haji Gnamo's article, best captures the fundamental role occupied by the Church: "*By extolling the virtue of social hierarchy, the Orthodox Church helped to stabilize the Abyssinian social formation; it was the continuing edge of relations of exploitation ... Central to the Church's code of morality was the belief in divine omnipotence, the sanctity of royal authority, the justness of overlordship. Supported by a tradition of awesome antiquity, enjoying direct access to land and produce from the peasants, and exercising a virtual monopoly in education, the Church affected every facet of life*".

In addition, the Church excused and validated the conquest and alienation of the conquered peoples since the Church was allotted 30% of the land in the country, land that was mostly expropriated from conquered regions²⁴. Hence, expansions of the empire state, and the incorporation of more land and human resources served the best interests of the Church, the ruling monarchy and in turn the feudal system²⁵. The Orthodox Church has always occupied an ideologically supportive position which legitimized imperial policies of the Ethiopian state; a prominent position that it occupied even after the 1974 Marxist Revolution, which promoted formal separation of church and state²⁶.

Ethnic and Religion Divisions within Ethiopia

Ethiopia's ethnic, cultural and religious diversity has resulted in divided social relations. On the one hand, most lowland people are not only culturally different but they geographically and socially isolated from the highlanders. Moreover, those who live in rural areas, who constitute 89 percent of the entire population, live their lives in geographical isolation, not coming into contact with outsiders²⁷. Encounters and exposure to other ethnic groups were relatively limited to contacts with administrators, tax collectors and retail merchants. On the other hand, the towns are diverse in social, ethnic and religious contexts. Since the early 1940s, towns were the setting for administrative and economic functions and many town centres have emerged²⁸. In Addis Ababa, one can observe families and groups from different religions, and disparate social and economic classes living side by side. Smaller town centres would be fairly homogenous in ethnic and religious make up. But with increased urbanization, towns have had the potential of becoming the scene of increased interactions among different ethnic, religion and social groups²⁹.

Historically, one of the most important factors in social relations in Ethiopia has been religion. Ethiopian monarchs, with the support of the Church, cultivated the country's identity with Christianity, although there were equally many, if not more, Muslims as Christians in the country³⁰. Although the imperial state government did not overtly impose Orthodox Christianity on Muslims and pagans, very few non-Christians held high positions in the government of the military institutions. Oftentimes, Muslims went into commerce and trade, occupations that were not touch by religious discrimination³¹.

The Dergue regime of Mengistu tried to minimize the role of religion in the state's life and attempted to render the Ethiopian Orthodox Church somewhat powerless, but still it was considered to be the base support for imperial ideology³². In theory, after the revolution of 1974, all religions were to have equal status in relation to the state.

The fact that there are more than seventy languages can be looked upon as a barrier to social communication and national integration³³. The imperial state government, realizing the importance of a national language, imposed Amharic as the official language of Ethiopia. The use of Amharic became mandatory in government, education, radio broadcasts, and newspapers. But the government's promotion of Amharic resulted in the suppression of other major languages, which created resistance to cultural imperialism. Some language policy changes were made by the Dergue regime, attempting to address the imposition of the Amhara language on every ethnic group. So, Mengistu's regime dropped Amharic as a requirement in schools for non-Amharic speakers. The new policy recognized several languages widely spoken in specific areas, such as Oromo, Somali, Tigrinya, and Welamo, for use in schools at the lower levels. Addis Ababa also allowed the use of the five languages mentioned above, as well as Afar, in radio broadcasts. Nevertheless, Amharic has always remained the language for government procedures, and anyone who wanted to participate at the national level had to learn to read, speak and write Amharic³⁴.

Holding a government position has traditionally been the most preferred occupation together with being in the military, the clergy, and being a farmer. However, being in trade and commerce were less prestigious and were left to Muslims and foreigners³⁵. It is important to highlight that social status in Ethiopia during the centuries of imperial rule depended on one's landholdings, which provided the basis for ethnic and class hierarchy formation and social stratification. The emperor, the nobility and landlords, mostly Abyssinians, occupied the highest social positions. Under them were small scale framers, then there were the millions of landless peasants who worked and rented land³⁶. After the Ethiopian empire state expansions were completed in the twentieth century, most of those who formed the southern landlords' class were Christian settlers from the north, whereas the tenants were almost always non-Christians and natives of the area³⁷. Thus, ethnic and cultural and religious differences intensified class differences, which, in turn, adversely affected social relations according to Marcus (2002).

The military regime changed the imperial system and nationalized urban and rural land, resulting in social stratification and community relations based on landholdings largely disappearing. The military regime intended to create a classless society, but the social hierarchy based on landholdings was transformed into one based on political power and influence³⁸. The Dergue party members at the national and regional offices, cabinet ministers, officers of the Ethiopian army, and senior civil servants had enormous political influence and enjoyed economic privileges similar to the ones that nobility and landlords used to have³⁹.

When the Ethiopians defeated Italy in 1941, education became important in setting the stage for social relations through the creation of a middle class and "new nobility" who had an independent position and status from landownership, Marcus posited 2002. However, it is important to underline the fact that this group was the educated children of the nobility, some people who achieved higher social status for their loyalty to the emperor, and others who possessed education skills that were necessary for modernizing the bureaucracy and military⁴⁰. The post-Italian war education system, the newly developed government bureaucracy, and the modern sector of the economy have supported the growth of a middle class who created the workforce for the public and private sectors.

It is important to note that the same members of the small educated class were employed as the bureaucracy in various professions under Mengistu's military regime, although many left the country because of disenchantment with his regime⁴¹.

The educated group, in the cities, was less connected to religion and tradition compared to the rest of Ethiopian society. According to Marcus, 2002, people's education, income, occupation, and urban life-style put them into a separate class. They had more in common with educated people of other ethnic groups and at times married from another ethnic group, although interestingly they rarely married across religious lines, Marcus points out. Marcus also posits, that, in the last decade or so before the 1974 revolution, there were younger and better-educated non-Amhara who expressed heightened ethnic awareness through membership in urban-based associations, which the Mengistu regime later banned. Although this educated group

played a vital role in the emperor's downfall, it had little influence on the military government, Marcus argues.

In July 1991, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) came into power and reached out to various Ethiopian groups, an initiative that was welcomed by many who resisted the repressive Mengistu regime. However, in setting the agenda for the transitional period of consultations, the TPLF, which later transformed itself into the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF), a party dominated by Tigray, introduced the concept of ethnic-based federalism. It is important to note, as J. Young (1989) pointed out, when EPRDF forces were holding consultation talks with various nationalities in Ethiopia, the class-based student movement was denied participation in the 1991 conference, because this regime adopted an ethnic-based organizing principle and rejected any class-based groups⁴².

Addressing cultural and religious inequality in Ethiopia

Given that Ethiopia was initially built on a very narrowly defined imperial state nation building agenda with exclusive autocratic Abyssinian monarchs; and later on was ruled by dictatorship both under the current regime and its predecessor the military regime; there is need to find a holistic approach to address this history of exclusion and discrimination that has perpetuated an ethnic and religious hierarchy in Ethiopia, marginalizing millions of non-Christian, and non-Abyssinian groups from the governance structures of the country and leading to some of the protracted ethnic conflicts that plague this country.

For instance, one of the things that need to be addressed is that historically Ethiopian rulers have used their Christian identity to build alliances with European powers. They had used these alliances to subjugate their neighbours and have incorporated them by force into Ethiopia. As much as these rulers have legitimized their superiority over their neighbours, they have also legitimized a Euro-centric discourse, which assumes, to use Dugassa's words "to be known, one should be known to Europeans". In positing this Dugassa, 2006, builds on the implication that Europe is the subject to know and the rest of the world becomes the others that need to be known by Europe⁴³. This has led to the design of hierarchies of ethnic identities where the Abyssinian Ethiopian identity became the 'norm' at the centre of national Ethiopian identity, and all other ethnic groups were defined as the other 'deviant', constructing a process that defined those to be included and those to be excluded⁴⁴.

Another major issue to be addressed in Ethiopia is the lack of community economic development. Successive Ethiopian regimes have suppressed creative thinking in its subjects. Groups, or subjects, were prohibited from developing their talents, especially when these talents promoted their ethnic, cultural and religious identity. Many non-Abyssinian communities were denied the right to determine their desired governance structures and community economic development processes that would have worked for them. According to Hameso and Hassan, it is time that we provide a voice to the 'silent majority' in Ethiopia; with growing realization that the Abyssinian

historical narrative has not only distorted this country's history, it also contributed to what they term as 'paradoxical developments' in modern Ethiopia⁴⁵. The authors posit that it is critical to unravel these paradoxes; and quote Alex Waal: "a new set of paradigms ... which includes the recognition that the political symbolism used to interpret Ethiopia in the past was in fact founded more on obscurant myth than on social and economic reality" (De Waal 1994:39)⁴⁶.

In addition to all the discrimination and exclusion on the basis of ethnicity and religion, the Somali Regional State, also known as the Ogaden, is the least developed region in Ethiopia. Moreover, historically the Somali region was enclosed within Ethiopia as a result of British colonial administration ceding this land to Menelik. According to Gesheker, 1985, the Ogaden was encroached upon by Ethiopian armed forces; this further complicates the history of the Somali region and its relationship with successive Ethiopian regimes.

The Somalis in Ethiopia are the most oppressed group even under the current regime. United States Senator Leahy made a passionate statement on August 3, 2007 on the floor of the US Senate speaking of continuous state sponsored violence, which is the reality on the ground for Somalis in Ethiopia. After citing election fraud, illegal imprisonment of civilians, documented Human Rights abuses, the current government's role of inciting violence, Senator Leahy finished in part with these words:

"It is no excuse that the Ethiopian military has impeded access to the Ogaden, as it has done. In fact, this should give rise to a sense of urgency. If we cannot properly investigate these reports, and if the Leahy law, which prohibits U.S. assistance to units of foreign security forces that violate human rights is not being applied because the U.S. Embassy cannot determine the facts, then we should not be supporting these forces."

To conclude, it is important to emphasize the need for genuine efforts of reconciliation in Ethiopia, efforts that reach out to all the various ethnic groups in this country. And Ethiopia particularly needs a comprehensive political solution to various ethnic conflicts. Evidence abounds in the literature that lasting peace cannot come until ethnic, cultural and religious diversity in Ethiopia is addressed and dealt with in an equitable manner.

Setting the context for democracy and the process of democratization in Ethiopia, and putting into place some mechanisms addressing some pre-conditions for a viable democracy in Ethiopia is very important. Furthermore, it is important to underline the facts about democracy as a universal principle of governance; it is a moral imperative, a social process, and particularly the kind of political system which is applied to multicultural societies like Ethiopia⁴⁷. I would contend that internal weak leadership and narrow minded dictatorship have derailed the democratic process in Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is a country with ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity. Hence, Ethiopians need to find a way out of the trap which many African countries have fallen into. The traps of narrowly defined nation-building ideologies are summarized by Womb's formula cited by Shivji: "One people, one nation, one political party and one supreme leader" (Shivji, 2000:30)⁴⁸.

Ethiopia needs a substantive dialogue among its different ethnic and religious groups; a dialogue that would lead to conflict resolution processes and substantive equity.

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- 43 Dugassa, Begna F. (2006) "Knowledge, Identity and Power: The Case of Ethiopia and Ethiopianess" *The Journal of Oromo Studies*; Vol 13, No. 1&2, July 2006
- 44 ibid
- 45 Hameso, S. and Hassan, M. (2006), ed. "Arrested Development in Ethiopia: Essays on Underdevelopment, Democracy and Self-Determination", The Red Sea press Inc.
- 46 ibid
- 47 George Nzongloa-Ntalaja & Margaret C. Lee (1998) "Democracy in Africa", published by Africa World Press Inc. 1998
- 48 Haroub Othman, (2000) ed, *Reflections on Leadership in Africa: Forty Years After Independence*", Published by VUB University press, 2000, p.30

Sudan: Between Unity and Disintegration

Like all African countries, Sudan as a nation state, is an imposition of the colonial imagination; a process that gathered diverse ethnic groups, often with little in common among themselves, under the banner of one unity. The diversity of Sudan's population is highlighted by the sheer number of languages, 160 or so, spoken within its national boundaries.

Diversity within a nation need not be a death sentence for its unity. After all, history is replete with countries whose very homogeneity failed to guarantee the unity of their people. Somalia and Rwanda are perfect examples of the illusion of the promise of homogeneity. Having said that, Sudanese people, or rather their leaders, must stop blaming the country's colonial history for its misfortunes. Since becoming independent in 1956, Sudanese leaders have had ample time to harness that diversity and turn it into a catalyst for enrichment and cultural harmony. Instead, successive governments – democratic, dictatorial, socialist and theocratic alike – did exactly the opposite, and in fact, competed to do so. In the process, they almost destroyed that diversity and entrenched the hegemony of a minority culture of the northern region over the rest of the country.

In as much as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 has put an end to civil war in the south of Sudan, it has also posed an imminent threat to the unity of the country. The CPA gave the south of Sudan the right of self-determination, a gain which southerners will surely use for secession. As recently as December 2008, Vuni wrote:

“The Speaker of Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) James Wani Igga told a religious celebration in Juba that the Sudan People's Liberation Movement is committed to achieve an independent state in southern Sudan”, Vuni 2008).

There is nothing wrong with the right of self-determination as such. It is a legitimate right for ill-treated minorities. Nonetheless, self-determination can be problematic in the sense that it often stifles the search for commonalities and the effort to end discrimination, thus leading people to contemplate secession. This is the trap in which Sudan finds itself.

Sudan had a brief moment of hope with the accession to power of the late John Garang as part of the CPA. His reception at Khartoum, which attracted no less than four million attendees, bolstered hope that his dream of New Sudan, a Sudan that can accommodate all its diverse groups, was soon to be realised and under the

leadership of none other than Garang himself. Some Sudanese who are steeped in traditional lore think that Sudan is a bewitched country and that nothing good will come its way. Well, Garang who was the only hope and author of New Sudan died in a tragic air crash soon after his inauguration. He left an agreement (the CPA) which only he could have kept afloat. Richard Williamson, George W. Bush's Special Envoy to Sudan described the CPA, to which his government acts as a major guarantor, as "a leaky boat" (Van Oudenaren 2008).

The CPA gave what I dare to describe as an illusory hope that it would put an end to the nation's endemic disease of marginalisation that underpins the hegemony of three tiny ethnic groups over the rest of the country. This is what I outline as the domination of a tripartite coalition of the Shaigya, the Jaalyeen and the Danagla over the nation. In the language of the widely read Black Book of Sudan, this underscores the "five-ninety five" thesis; a situation whereby five per cent of Sudan's population are in control of the remaining ninety five percent at all levels: cultural, economic, political and military (see El-Tom 2003, 2006 and 2008).

The Sudanese people were justified in their overall celebration of the signing of the CPA (January 2005). The agreement promised an end to marginalisation and a New Sudan that would accord equal opportunity to all, irrespective of ethnic, religious, regional or cultural origin; a dream that is cherished in every African country and beyond. Little did the Sudanese people know that the CPA is ill suited to deliver its promised New Sudan. Far from it, the CPA curbs excesses of the northern elite in the south but at the same time enables a life line for the continuing domination of the tri-partite coalition over the rest of the population. The tri-partite coalition operates under the Jallaba institution that enacts control over the whole of Sudan. The term Jallaba means procurers of slaves in Sudan's history, and later, legitimate traders after abolition of slavery. It is used across Sudan to describe traders from the northern region of Sudan who come to dominate the economy of the country, but equally, who orchestrate national government politics. The Jallaba metamorphosed into a system that defines everything in the country from style of dress to culture and political ideology (see El-Tom 2006). Hence, it is legitimate to talk about the Jallaba as an institution rather than a simple network of traders.

Despite their undoubted goodwill, engineers of the CPA committed a grave error that later came to pose a continuous threat to the agreement. Throughout negotiation of the agreement, two major assumptions were taken for granted, bolstered by military prowess on either side of the divide as well. The Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM) were dominant in the Christian south of the Sudan while the National Congress Party, the ruling power of Khartoum took full charge of the other side. The corollary was simple, at least for those who did not bother to tax their minds. Sudan was taken to divide neatly into a predominantly Christian south represented by the SPLM, while the greater, northern part of the country was to be represented by the NCP of Al-Bashir. Ironically, Al-Bashir's delegation to the negotiation became the guardians of the interests of all non-south Sudan, including Darfur.

As far as the Darfuris are concerned, their vindication took some time to materialise. The premature loss of Dr Garang pushed the CPA off course for a while, thus dampening but still allowing the CPA euphoria to continue until September 2005 when the so-called government of national unity (GNU) was formed. The composition of the GNU proved beyond doubt that the tripartite coalition is agreement proof (see Table 1).

Table 1 Old habits die hard: Formation of the GNU- Sept 05

Region	No. of Positions	% population
Southern	16	16
Northern	20*	5.4
Kordofan	6	12
Darfur	6	20
Eastern	0	11
Central	0	26.5

*Shaigiya 3, Jaalyeen 12 and Danagla 5.

The formation of the GNU has certainly proven that south Sudan has come of age. However, in so far as the hegemony of the northern region over other marginalised parts of the Sudan is concerned, the CPA is no more than a benign pussy cat that can easily be pushed aside when necessary.

Like religion, nationalism is an ideology that underpins important values but often stifles debate and suffocates thinking. Thus the composition of the GNU did not alert many of our fellow marginalised people about the power naively accorded to the CPA. Those who failed to board the CPA were simply discredited as separatist, tribalist, racist or simply agents for malicious foreign circles. But the addiction of the Jallaba institution to power and their unflinching belief in the divine right of the northern elite to rule Sudan exposed further cracks in the national CPA promise. While the CPA continues to deliver, though unsatisfactorily for the south, its national dimensions received another blow later on. CPA allies in non-southern regions were stunned by the constitution of the re-election of the political bureau of the National Congress Party (NCP). As its name suggests, the NCP conjures an image of a modern party that draws its support, membership and leadership from all over the Sudan. In accordance with that profile, the NCP acted as a guardian of all non-southerners in the negotiations that produced the CPA. In January 2006, while the Darfur peace talks were going on, the NCP announced its new political bureau members, computed by the author as below.


Table 2 How National is the National Congress Party? Political Bureau of the NCP, January 2006.

Region	No of members	% Population of region
Northern	14	5.4
Kordofan	4	12
Darfur	1	20
Central + Khartoum	6	26.5
Southern	2	16
Unknown	3	NA
Total	30	NA

As Table 2 shows, the composition is simply farcical when read in the light of the NCP’s claim to be a national party. Membership affirms that the NCP is no more than a Trojan horse for the northern region and its three elite ethnic groups. With membership of eight for the Jalyeen, seven for the Shaigya and two for the Danagla, the northern region, homeland of these ethnic groups is assured a blatant majority in Sudan’s ruling party.

Throughout the recent history of the Sudan, wealth has been deliberately diverted to the otherwise economically impoverished northern region. As a result, the northern region is far more developed than other parts of the Sudan. This is the marginalisation thesis well articulated in the Black Book (see the Black Book). But the diversion of Sudan’s wealth to the northern region is not accidental. Rather it is a result of well-planned and orchestrated actions of the NCP. In its party convention, September 2005, Hamdi, economic guru and Al-Bashir’s ex-Minister for Economy and Finance, advised that future investment and development in the Sudan should by-pass Darfur and focus on the northern Dongola-Sennar-Kordofan axis. Hamdi concluded that this triangle represents the hard-core of historic and future Arab-Islamic Sudan. Following segregation of the south, taken as given by Hamdi, this triangle guarantees power for the National Congress party of Al-Bashir in future democratic Sudan. Darfur Arabs who took sides with Khartoum in the Darfur conflict have a lot to contemplate about their fateful alliance with the riverine people of Sudan. Hamdi conceded that the south will depart and form its own separate country and deprive the nation of 65% of public revenue and 25% of Gross National Product. To add insult to injury, new western investment accruing from the CPA is well guarded and cannot be transferred to the northern region:

“these investment funds will be supervised by commissions which ensure that they go to the specified zone only [south and Nuba Mountains]. Due to these facts, foreign investment will remain out of our hands and will not benefit the north much” (Hamdi 2005:12).



Graph 1 Hamdi's Dongola-Sennar- Kordofan Triangle:

If Hamdi's revelation proves anything, it is the very fact that the CPA has failed to dismantle the Jallaba hegemony. Hamdi is right in concluding that the south will secede. It will take SPLM leaders a miracle to reverse that trend. Far from it, the statement of Mr Igga, the Speaker of Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly stands as testimony to that (quoted earlier in the text). Similar statements have been uttered before by many SPLM top leaders. Surprisingly, the majority of the SPLM leaders including Chairman Kiir claim to campaign for a united Sudan. It is difficult not to conclude that these leaders are either out of touch with their grassroots' opinion or are simply being deceptive to their government coalition partners in their insistence on the unity of Sudan.

Hamdi's proposition that Darfur may also go for separation is simply not correct. Compared to the south of Sudan, Darfur is more integrated by far into the country. Huge pockets of Darfurians are living in Khartoum, the Gezira area, Gadarif and Port Sudan in Eastern Sudan and many other parts far away from Darfur. These populations make separation too painful to even contemplate.

While the south has given up the capital Khartoum mentally, the situation is different when it comes to Darfur. Frankly speaking, Darfur people will not leave the capital to the Riverine Sudanese and many of them believe that their stake in Khartoum is at least as strong as that of the Sudanese from the northern region who dominate the capital.

The Abuja talks that ended with the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) fiasco is also telling in this regard. During the talks, separation never entered upon the agenda of Darfur Movements. The Sudan Liberation of Darfur (SLM) unsuccessfully demanded the right to self determination for Darfur, but for tactical reasons. Self determination can also be used as a red card to precipitate a guarantee that full implementation of the agreement is reached. From its very name, the SLM is a national movement and can never be reduced to a regional organisation.

As far as JEM is concerned with respect to representation, JEM is a national institution by any measure. That is clear from its well-articulated philosophy in general and throughout its deliberations at the Abuja talks. Many senior JEM leaders are not from Darfur. At the moment, both the Legislative Assembly and General Congress of JEM are headed by personnel from outside Darfur.

Having said that, we must concede that Azrag, the head of a small JEM splinter group calls for self-determination and the possible future separation of Darfur. But Azrag's proposition is hollow, lacking credibility and support in Darfur. Surprisingly, Azrag's separation idea came from me, the author of this article. In a general discussion between Ibrahim, the President of JEM, and myself, we wondered whether the brutal way the Darfur war was conducted by the Khartoum government had diminished the faith of the Darfur people in a united Sudan. Due to our position, it was not possible for us to conduct a serious research investigation into this issue. Instead, I implemented a short questionnaire on the internet through a third party. The result was startling: 62% of those who responded favoured self-determination for Darfur. But don't hold your breath. Our investigation does not stand as a serious research project capable of ascertaining Darfur public opinion. The sample is very small, self-selected, confined to internet users and with no guarantee that respondents are Darfurians. As such, we opted to discard the result but equally take note of it for future investigations.

At the time of the questionnaire, Azrag had just left JEM and was desperate for a separate agenda that distinguished him from the organisation he left behind. Our work provided him with one, and self-determination became a catch phrase in the literature of his organisation. Despite this, we have to acknowledge that supporters of a united Sudan are now besieged, both in the south and to a lesser extent in Darfur.

SPML and Darfur

Despite similarities between the problems of the south and those of Darfur, the latter has remained low in SPLM priorities. To date, Mr Kiir has not been able to visit Darfur. This embarrassing flaw has been exposed elsewhere in an article aptly entitled "Alfashir is nearer than Kampala" (El-Tom 2007). Rather than seeing his seat as that of the First Vice President for the whole of Sudan, Kiir has remained firmly focussed only on the south. His peace mediation efforts have been squarely lodged in reconciling the Ugandan government with the notorious rebels, the Lord's Resistance Army.

While Kiir's peace work in Uganda should be commended, his failure to pay similar attention to Darfur is deplorable.

Kiir's contribution to Darfur, or rather the lack of it, is further complicated by his botched effort to unify Darfur Movements. Instead of unifying Darfur Movements under one to two units, the attempt led to the initiation of many Movements, some of which are hatched by the Khartoum government at the expense of the SPLM. At the moment, the SPLM is facing another problem with the Darfur people. Siddiq Abdel Kareem/ Masaleet, a Chief Commander of SLM unity was assassinated while attending Kiir's unification mediation. Some members of the SLM are now implicating the SPLM in Commander Abdel Kareem's death. Both the SPLM and the SLM are conducting their investigation in the case which is a clear embarrassment for the government of southern Sudan.

Given the nature of the Darfur rebellion and the history of the SPLM, it is bewildering that the two organisations have not been able to enter into a strategic alliance against the Khartoum government. Indeed, such an alliance has always been a dream for JEM long before the tragic loss of Dr Garang. However, Kiir has consistently distanced himself from JEM while continuing to woo its rival Movement, the SLM. While this is difficult to explain, given the profile of JEM, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Kiir has fallen into the trap of Khartoum propaganda. In its effort to undermine JEM's international profile, Khartoum's media has laboured hard to stamp JEM as an Islamist Movement and a military wing of the (Islamist) Popular Congress Party of Turabi. Thus, on his visit to Cairo, February 2008, Kiir declared that JEM have an agenda "similar to those who want to implement Sharia Islamic law in Sudan" and that "other Darfur rebel Movements have different views from JEM and that they (SPLM) are trying to unify them". Kiir's unfortunate conclusion about JEM is perplexing to say the least and displays a flawed understanding of JEM. There can be no doubt that Dr Ibrahim, the president of JEM and many other JEM leaders were part of Turabi's party. It is also true that JEM enjoins within its ranks, many leaders who were active members of other Sudanese parties, including the Communist party. By the same token, many of SPLM's peace and government coalition partners were also part of Turabi's party. Both Al-Bashir and Taha, the darling of the west, were close confidants of Turabi. Kiir's take on this issue is indeed difficult to justify. The political scene in Sudan and across the world is replete with politicians who have changed and switched political parties and JEM is no exception in this regard.

JEM has declared many times that it is committed to a united Sudan. Much more than that, JEM is ready to work to remove all reasons that tempt the south to secede; for these are the same causes that made JEM raise arms against the government of Khartoum. But JEM also has to be realistic in its dreams. JEM, as well as all other stake holders, must realise that the departure of the south is only a matter of time and there is nothing much that can reverse that course of events. However, there is one thing that JEM and others can do. They can work to make that separation amicable and peaceful. The international community must move fast from now on and work to realise that objective. Unfortunately, indications are not encouraging. The govern-

ments of both Khartoum and southern Sudan are preparing for war. In September 2008, we learnt that a ship pirated off the coast of Somalia which was loaded with army tanks, was destined for the government of south Sudan (GSS). Needless to say, that was against the CPA. A month later, Khartoum complained that an Ethiopian Antonov plane loaded with arms landed at Juba airport as part of that military build up.

The Khartoum government has also been preparing for the imminent violent separation. In December, 2008, Khartoum deployed six army battalions in south Kordofan. The deployment came afoot of thousands of other members of a force stationed in and around the disputed oil rich zone of Abeyei. GOSS, which hailed this military build up as incompatible with the CPA, is not convinced that the deployment is undertaken to protect the oil installations against JEM. Either way, these signs are clear reminders that all partners have to start as early as today, working for the peaceful but regretfully unavoidable departure of the south.

Back to Darfur

That the Darfur problem is political and so is its solution, is a dictum that JEM has repeated and pursued for many years. Barring political suicide, JEM can only sign into a peace deal that is fair and dignified. For years Khartoum has been able to out-manoeuvre the international community with its incessant addiction to what the eminent Darfur expert Eric Reeves described as “pusillanimous” Darfur initiatives that are hardly worth the ink in which they are written. In the same week (October 2008) in which Khartoum received with praise and boosted the Qatari mediation, Al-Bashir launched his own so-called Sudan People Initiative (SPI) presumably to work either in tandem or parallel to the Qatari initiative. The SPI was to be headed by a committee of five prominent figures of Al-Bashir, Nafee, Almahdi, Swar Eldahab and Kiir. Leaving Kiir aside – who had to be there in lieu of the CPA – the rest of the committee are carefully drawn from the northern region. The very composition of the chairing board of the SPI indicates that the interests of the northern region weigh more than the entire population of Darfur. Surprisingly, neither Mini Minnawi, the sole signatory to the DPA, nor representatives of Non-DPA signatories were included in the headship of SPI. As usual, the SPI turned out to be worth nothing at all. It came out with a unilateral cease fire which Al-Bashir destroyed within 72 hours by attacking SLM in Muhagaria, JEM in Kulbus and a main IDP camp at Nertete in South Darfur.

The discovery of oil in Sudan was widely celebrated by the Sudanese people as ushering their way into development. Little did many of them know that under callous governments, such a discovery would be anything but a blessing to the nation. Ex-Darfur governor Sese has computed that in at least one year, Sudan spent 60% of its oil revenue on defence. Thus, oil has become a tool for further destruction and not as hoped, a catalyst for development. It took JEM a few years to learn the simple lesson that with the steady increase in the flow of oil, Al-Bashir can sustain a low

intensity war for good. Darfur will soon end up with second generation IDPs and refugees just as is the case in the south of the country. The international community, particularly with US attention focussed on its legitimate war against terror, can only do so much. At least they have kept Darfur IDPs and refugees alive since the onset of the Darfur war. For those very reasons, JEM has decided that there is neither any point in fighting in the desert of Darfur, nor in expecting the international community to do any more in Darfur. There is a consensus in JEM leadership, that for better or for worse, the battle has to be moved to where the decision is made – and that is the capital, Khartoum.

In May 2008, JEM boldly invaded Khartoum under what was code-named Operation Long Arm (OLA). The aims of OLA were centred on four objectives: to forcibly depose Al-Bashir, reduce his hostile military capabilities, prove that he is incapable of defending Khartoum, let alone Darfur, and to engender life and momentum into the Darfur peace talks. It is obvious that JEM has failed to realise its first and prime objective and that is to dislodge the government of Khartoum. In so far as other objectives are concerned, JEM has been successful and has achieved further unintended gains. To begin with, Al-Bashir was forced to sideline the Sudan National Defence Forces (SNDF) and was reduced to reliance on an ethnic-based militia to defend the capital. The daring operation catapulted JEM into a regional force and a mover and shaker within Sudan's political arena. Growth of membership of JEM has been on the increase ever since.

Conclusion

Let me borrow a phrase from Cramer and state that civil war is not necessarily “a stupid thing” particularly when it comes to securing seminal and fundamental rights such as those the Darfuris are fighting for (Cramer 2006). While we affirm that Sudan's problem is political and that recourse to violence is an inferior way of tackling such an impasse, we also have to acknowledge the legitimacy of that road. History abounds with the likes of Mugabe, Idi Amin, Hitler and Al-Bashir, with whom political reasoning is simply futile. JEM is still hopeful that Al-Bashir, particularly in light of the International Criminal Court (ICC) threat, may come to his senses and heed the international appeal for a negotiated settlement of the Darfur problem. But JEM's patience is not infinite.

As I argued earlier, the departure of the south is a foregone conclusion. The rest of the Sudan will however hold. Looking at the political map of the Sudan, all major parties are pro-unity. One may even optimistically add almost all of the top leaders of the SPLM to that. Leaving south Sudan aside, the threat to the unity does not come from Darfur. Rather, it dwells in the very fact that all marginalised parts of Sudan have genuine grievances which have to have to be tackled to deliver unity of the country.

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Reconciling Africa's Fragmented Institutions of Governance: Is Somaliland charting a new path?

Introduction: Institutional duality and Social Instability

Institutions, as an enduring collection of formal laws and informal rules, customs, codes of conduct, and organized practices, shape human interaction. As institutional scholars inform us, when formal and informal institutions complement each other they promote stability and consistency in collective life by creating definite, continuous, and organized patterns of basic activities of human society (Eisenstadt, 1968:409; North, 1990; March and Olsen, 1984; Helmke and Levitsky, 2003; Olsen, 2007). When formal and informal institutions are incompatible with each other, however, social instability is likely to increase, due to increasing uncertainty and disorientation, which necessitate increased incentives or coercion to make people follow prescribed rules (Olsen, 2007).

Most African countries suffer from a duality of and clashes between formal and informal institutions of governance. The duality is manifested in the adherence of rural populations, the overwhelming majority in most African countries, primarily to traditional institutions while the post-colonial state operates on institutions of governance, which are largely imported and often transplanted outside their cultural and socioeconomic milieus. The state sanctioned (formal) institutions are also often at odds with African socioeconomic realities and traditional cultural values. By failing to engage the institutions adhered to by large segments of the population, the formal institutions have also remained ineffective, especially in coordinating policy and resources with broad social interests, in preventing conflicts, as well as in promoting synergy in state-society relations. Under such conditions, they have been unable to facilitate a peaceful process of state-building or to promote democratic governance.

Supplanted by imported institutions at the state level, African traditional institutions have also remained essentially relegated to local interactions. Consequently, their development has essentially been blocked. The relevance and sometimes even the authenticity of some of their aspects have also been questioned. Institutions, like cultural values, are rarely static as they change with changes in their socioeconomic context. African traditional institutions are no exception. The socioeconomic rup-

ture that the African continent experienced during its colonial subjugation has left some enduring marks on various aspects of African traditional institutions. Needless to say, these institutions no longer exist in an unadulterated form as they did in Africa's pre-colonial past. Yet, a body of institutions of decision-making, allocation of resources, and conflict management, that is adhered to principally, although not exclusively, by the population in the traditional sectors of the economy, still exists in the continent. This body of institutions, which has largely maintained its indigenous characteristics, continues to shape societal interaction, including economic activity, and, to the extent that it does, its relevance cannot be denied, regardless of how much it has diverged from its pre-colonial form. It also cannot be wished away, as a vast segment of the population adheres to it.

Institutional duality often forces individuals and communities to negotiate the two spaces in their daily lives. Clashes between the parallel institutions are, however, common and they have contributed to the chronic problems of governance and violent conflicts that have ravaged many African countries. A good example of institutional clashes is the growing rate of compulsory acquisitions of communal land that the state in many African countries has engaged in with little regard for the traditional institutions of land rights. One of the reasons why the state engages in land-takings is to stimulate expansion of extractive industries and large scale commercial farming by awarding land concessions to firms in these sectors. From the point of view of the state and the formal economic institutions, land-takings are necessitated by the logic of attracting investments and promoting development. From the point of view of traditional institutions, however, land-takings, which often are undertaken with little or no compensation, violate the property rights of customary holders and users of land. Large scale land-takings at a time when little non-farm employment opportunities exist to absorb the dispossessed, also destroy the livelihood of rural communities (peasant farmers and pastoralists) and, along with rising population density and environmental degradation, exacerbate land shortages and poverty. Furthermore, land-takings undermine traditional institutions of governance and mechanisms of conflict resolution, which are based on the traditional land tenure systems, when the state is rarely able to take over and effectively operate the roles that these institutions play. Under these circumstances, there is little doubt that land policies that are based on the logic of the formal institutions have the potential to lead to growing poverty, widespread social unrest, and various types of resource-based conflicts, that already have destabilized several countries.

African countries, thus, face a major challenge of how to deal with the institutional dichotomy that has become a major source of social instability. A small number of African countries have taken some measures to reconcile the dual systems. A more comprehensive approach, by far, is initiated by Somaliland. The principal goal of this paper is to examine why the Somaliland model of fusing traditional and modern institutions is different from other approaches and to identify any lessons that might be learned from it. The paper is organized into five parts. The first part briefly sketches the literature on African traditional and informal institutions in order to point out some important gaps. The second discusses the origins of institutional duality in

Africa. The third part examines how institutional duality creates conditions for social conflicts and impedes democratization and a peaceful process of state building. The fourth part explores why reconciling institutions can serve as a venue for reconciling divided political spaces and promote synergy in state-society relations. The last part interrogates Somaliland's model of fusing the parallel institutions to determine what lessons might be learned from it.

1. Gaps in the Literature

The problems associated with institutional duality and the potential of African traditional institutions to contribute to peaceful state-building and democratic governance are largely understudied. Scholars, who examine the impact of African informal institutions, often limit their analyses to the issues of clientelism, corruption, and neo-patrimony, which characterize the functionaries of the African state (Bratton, 2007; Hyden, 2006; Lindberg, 2003; Lemarchand, 1972). It is debatable if these characteristics constitute institutions or if they are merely illicit activities. They are also hardly limited to the African state, although their severity may be greater to a large part due to the institutional duality. The impacts of corruption may also be greater in Africa due to the magnitude of poverty in the continent. More importantly, this literature ignores the traditional institutions that govern a vast segment of the African population. A second group of literature deals with traditional institutions but concentrates on chieftaincy systems while neglecting the institutions within the decentralized communal systems. Four broad strands can be identified in the chieftaincy-centered discourse on traditional institutions. One pessimistic strand contends that chieftaincy is anachronistic, a hindrance to the development and transformation of the continent, undemocratic, divisive, and costly. The arguments advanced by this view include the following: (1) chieftaincy has been corrupted by the colonial state and by the clientelism of the despotic post-colonial state and is, thus, no longer subject to accountability to the populace (Zack-Williams, 2002; Kilson, 1966); (2) the populations under traditional authorities, as in South Africa, live as "subjects" rather than as citizens of the state, and democratic governance would not be achieved while such systems continue to exist (Mamdani, 1996; Ntsebeza, 2005); (3) chieftaincy heightens primordial loyalties as chiefs constitute foci of ethnic identities (Simwinga quoted in van Binsberger, 1987:156); (4) chieftaincy impedes the pace of development as it reduces the relevance of the state in the areas of social services (Tom Mboya, in Osaghae, 1987); and (5) that the hereditary nature of chieftaincy renders it incompatible with democratic governance, which requires competitive elections as one of its cornerstones (Ntsebeza, 2005).

In line with this discourse, several countries including, Uganda, Guinea, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Zambia, and Zimbabwe attempted either to strip chiefs of most of their authority or to abolish chieftaincy altogether. These efforts have, however, proved largely unsuccessful. Abolishing chieftaincy does not eradicate its underlying broader institutions and chiefs have been reinstated in most of those countries. The

resilience of these institutions, when chiefs do not have formal powers to sustain their authority, poses a serious challenge to critics of chieftaincy. Chiefs must either be providing services at lower transaction costs than the state to the members of their communities or they must be providing services in a manner that their communities identify with for them to continue to command the allegiance of large segments of the rural population. Moreover, the critical view of chieftaincy fails to differentiate between different types of chieftaincies and the different hierarchies within the same types.

A second view asserts that traditional institutions are indispensable for political transformation in Africa, as they represent a major part of the continent's history, culture, and political and governance systems. This view attributes the ineffectiveness of the African state in bringing about sustained socioeconomic development to its neglect of traditional institutions and its failure to restore Africa's own history (Basil Davidson, 1992). Englebert (2000) also makes a forceful argument that institutional dichotomy has undermined the legitimacy of the African state. Unfortunately, the studies that view traditional institutions to be relevant provide little detail on the specific dynamics of these institutions and how they might be incorporated or reconciled with the formal institutions.

A third, and more balanced view of traditional institutions, acknowledges their limitations. It notes that the colonial state largely transformed chieftaincy into its intermediate administrative institution, and that the post-colonial state often co-opts chiefs to facilitate the extension of despotic control over its citizens. This view, nonetheless, contends that traditional institutions constitute crucial resources that have the potential to promote democratic governance and to facilitate access of rural communities to public service. This perspective makes the following arguments: (1) chieftaincy can provide the bedrock upon which to construct new mixed governance structures since chiefs serve as custodians of and advocates for the interests of local communities within the broader political structure (Sklar, 1994; Skalnik, 2004); (2) the conception of traditional institutions that the source and *raison d'être* of power is the collective good, enables them to provide a strong philosophical basis for establishing accountable governance, (Osaghae, 1987); and (3) given that over-centralization of power in the hands of predatory states often obfuscates community-based initiatives and democratic practices at the grassroots, good governance can materialize only through the articulation of indigenous political values and practices and their harmonization with modern democratic practices (AJID, 1996; Ayittey, 1992; Ake, 1987).

A fourth view on the relevance of traditional institutions is provided by legal pluralists. This view acknowledges that African traditional legal systems, customary courts, and customary property rights are an empirical reality and need to be recognized and respected (McAuslan, 1998). This view does not, however, provide mechanisms for integrating the two sets of institutional systems to correct the problems of institutional duality and conflicts.

In sum, a major void in the literature on African traditional institutions is that institutions in non-chieftaincy systems are essentially left out. The differences in the

nature of chieftaincy systems across space and the role and relationships of chiefs at different levels with the population are also largely masked. Little distinction is drawn between the role and behavior of chiefs and the broader underlying institutions. How the duality and clashes between the two institutional systems contribute to conflicts, why reconciling the dual institutional systems can facilitate a peaceful process of state-building and democratic governance, and how the relevant aspects of traditional institutions can be integrated with those of the modern institutions are also sorely unavailable. This paper does not aspire to fill all the identified gaps. Rather its modest goal is to analyze how the duality and clashes between the two institutional systems contribute to conflicts and why reconciling the dual institutional systems would foster a more peaceful process of state-building and democratic governance.

2. Origins of Institutional Duality

From the African experience, institutional duality seems to emerge when alien institutions are imposed upon a society without completely replacing the existing indigenous institutions. Present day African traditional institutions largely originate from formal and informal institutions of governance that existed before colonialism. With the introduction of alien institutions of governance by the colonial state, the African traditional formal institutions, ranging from centralized monarchical systems to decentralized governance through villages or kinship assemblies, were displaced and relegated to the sphere of informality. In conjunction with the traditional informal institutions, the displaced formal institutions continued to operate as informal institutions, in large part due to the colonial practice of indirect rule. In the countries where colonial rule was characterized by more direct rule the assault on African traditional institutions was more severe and these institutions were left relatively weaker than those in the areas where indirect rule was practiced. Traditional institutions, such as the *Heer* of the Somalis, for example, are said to be stronger in the former British Somaliland, where indirect rule was practiced, than in the rest of Somalia, where colonial rule was more direct. The role of Hausa *emirs* in northern Nigeria were also weakened far less than that of Hausa *emirs* in Niger (Miles, 1987).

Institutional duality can also emerge without direct colonialism in countries that occupy a lower position in the global division of labor and attempt to emulate the institutions of the advanced countries. Ethiopia, for example, escaped direct colonialism but not institutional duality. The Ethiopian state imposed Abyssinian institutions on its southern provinces, which were incorporated by conquest in the late 19th century. In these newly incorporated areas a duality of Abyssinian and local institutions emerged while the state simultaneously facilitated the emergence of a duality of Abyssinian and Western institutions by imitating the institutions of the western world in the name of modernization. The non-Abyssinian entities within Ethiopia, such as the Somalis and the Oromo, face a complex triad of institutions comprising of Western, Abyssinian, and local systems.

Institutional duality represents a duality of socioeconomic spaces. Moreover, since the relations between the two systems are hierarchical, it also represents the subordination of the traditional sector to the imported one. Many African communities were, thus, subjected to alienation of land for various purposes, especially in the countries that had significant European settlements, such as South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Mozambique, Angola, the Congo, and the Maghreb countries of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia (Potekhin, 1963; Adams and Turner, 2005). The colonial state as well as colonial settlers expropriated communal land from natives for purposes of mining, farming, logging, as well as for game parks and reserves to be held as state lands. In many cases, the colonial state simply declared state ownership of all land in order to give "...colonial authorities the 'legal' basis for expropriating any land at any time" (Potekhin, 1963:46). The communities displaced by land expropriation were simply either absorbed by their neighbors, often leading to overcrowding, or crammed into areas designated as reserves for natives. The labor of African peasants was also exploited through various mechanisms, including forced labor, taxation, and compulsory cash crop production that the colonial state required and paid for with prices dictated by it (Crowder, 1987). Expansion of mining and plantations as well as public and private works, and in some cases even military service also extracted labor away from the traditional sector. The colonial introduction of institutional duality and dual socioeconomic systems, thus, essentially served to reduce African societies into a reservoir of land that is to be alienated and labor to be exploited as needed by the colonial state.

The two broad socioeconomic spaces created by colonialism represent different modes of production with the traditional sector mostly characterized by a non-capitalist system while the modern sector operated on a capitalist system. The two broad spaces were fragmented further by the colonial state's ethnic policies. Ethnic classifications, along with practices of divide and rule politicized ethnicity fragmenting African societies into disparate socioeconomic spaces, which have made state building a daunting task.

The Post-Colonial State

While institutional duality is a legacy of colonialism, its continued prevalence is attributable to the failure of the post-colonial state. The leadership of the post-colonial state has done little to forge a fundamental break from the colonial system of institutions or to reconcile the parallel institutions of governance and the fragmented socioeconomic spaces. As a result, African societies remain fragmented into various political spaces along institutional systems that encompass different modes of production and ethnic entities. Since the state operates on the basis of imported institutions, policy also remains disassociated from broad social interests of the segments of society who dwell in the traditional institutional space.

Following in the footsteps of the colonial state, the post-colonial state also uses the traditional sector as a reservoir of exploitable resources. It often passes laws that vest

ownership and control of all land in the state. Eritrea's 1997 (ratified but unimplemented) constitution and its 1994 land reform proclamation, for example, declare state ownership of all land. According to Sudan's laws also all unregistered land belongs to the state, which can allocate leases without reference to who is actually living on the land (Alex de Waal, 2006). Kenya's Land Act also empowers the President to allocate land to anyone, irrespective of whether the land is occupied or not (Alao, 2007:87). The 1998 Land Act of Uganda gave recognition to customary ownership of land reversing the previous law. The Act, however, allows the state to retain rights to subterranean resources. Land holders can thus be evicted in the event that mineral resources are discovered in the land. Ethiopia's 1994 constitution also vests the right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, exclusively in the state. However, in a contradictory manner the constitution provides Ethiopian peasants and pastoralists the right to free land for cultivation and grazing as well as the right not to be displaced from their own lands.

The identified examples demonstrate that the post-colonial state has maintained the institutional duality that it inherited. By operating under a system of institutions alien to the population, the state has also largely maintained the colonial roots of poverty of populations in the marginalized traditional institutional space. As a result, state legitimacy is undermined as the population in the traditional institutional space cannot identify with the state, unless they have ethnic ties with the elite that dominate state power.

3. Institutional Duality and Social conflicts

Continued prevalence of institutional duality reveals that, unlike the state, African societies continue to cling to their traditional institutions. One reason may be that societies do not abandon their institutions in favor of alien institutions, although gradual adjustments take place both through internal changes and through borrowing from outside. A more compelling reason may be that institutions do not undergo substantial change without a simultaneous change in the mode of production. In other words, peasants and nomads cannot abandon their institutions and adopt institutions that operate in advanced capitalist countries as long as their mode of production remains unchanged. Africa's institutional duality is, thus, likely to persist, creating conditions that make African countries prone to conflict.

One of the conflict-engendering conditions institutional duality creates is a rift between state and society. When the state operates on the basis of institutions that are incompatible with those adhered to by large segments of its constituency, it fails to coordinate policy and resources with broad social interests. This was evident from our land policy example. The state appropriates communal land in order to offer concessionary land grants to corporations purportedly in order to encourage investments and to promote development. But in so doing it disregards traditional institutions and violates the customary property rights of peasants and pastoralists. Financial compensation is rarely given to those evicted from their lands. Even when

it is offered, however, financial compensation does not provide sustained relief to the victims, since such groups cannot easily exit from the mode of production they are accustomed to. Much of Africa's resource-based conflicts, especially in areas where there is oil or valuable minerals, are related to the problem of institutional duality and the state's failure to respect traditional institutions, especially those that relate to property rights.

Another conflict-generating condition created by institutional duality is the emergence of different political spaces. Different systems of institutions with different modes of production and different resource allocation and conflict resolution mechanisms essentially constitute different political spaces even when they are in one state. These political spaces, in turn, create competing citizenships in each of the two institutional spaces, although citizenship loyalties may fragment further along ethnic lines. The strength of these competing citizenship loyalties depends on how state policies conform to ethnic interests. Depending on how state policies impact the interests of different ethnic entities, institutional duality can lead to conflicts between the state and ethnic groups or among ethnic groups, especially if an ethnic group sides with the state when others rebel.

The combination of hostile state-society relations and parallel existence of separate political spaces, with conflicting citizenships, undermines the state's legitimacy and increases its vulnerability to inter-elite and ethnic conflicts. Resource-based conflicts, such as those of the Niger Delta in Nigeria and the Darfur in the Sudan, tend to be exploited by counter-elites who often incite ethnic tensions or exploit existing tensions in order to challenge the elite in power. The state's neglect of traditional institutions along with policies of land takings and privatization of communal land also undermine the traditional mechanisms of governance and lead to general social disorder. Chiefs, for example, could not adjudicate disputes without their custodianship of land. The Eritrean village *baito* (assembly) also would not be able to self-govern without control of the village's land (Mengisteab, 2003).

Institutional duality and the conflicts it generates also lead to economic disruptions worsening the already excruciating poverty. Economic hardship, in turn, leads to further conflicts and undermines the process of state building. The conflicts and the failure of the state to respect the institutions that govern the livelihoods of large segments of society also undermine any process of democratization. Our land policy example makes it clear that a state with policies that violate the property rights of a vast segment of its citizens lacks any credibility and legitimacy to spearhead a democratization process, even when it conducts regular elections. The recent post-election crisis in Kenya was a clear warning in this respect.

4. Relevance of Reconciling Dual Institutions

It seems abundantly clear that the existing duality of institutions cannot be ignored if the goals of peaceful state-building and democratic governance are to be attained in Africa. It is highly unlikely that the crisis of state building, which is a major source

of most of the conflicts that have ravaged many countries in the African continent, can be brought under control without simultaneously putting in place a coherent system of institutions, which reflect the socio-cultural values and institutions of the conflicting entities. Peaceful state-building, for example, cannot be expected to take place under conditions when traditional institutions of property rights are trampled. Majority-based election systems also cannot be expected to promote democratic governance before arrangements are made to reconcile ethnic tensions. Given the tendency of people to vote along ethnic lines, majority-based electoral systems may become a means of legitimizing a system of majority domination. This is not to suggest that modern institutions are irrelevant and that reverting to the traditional institutions would be the solution for Africa's institutional crisis. Indigenesness, by itself, is not a sufficient condition to enable institutions to facilitate transformation of social systems. Depending on their nature, traditional institutions may facilitate or hinder development and democratic transformation; although it is more likely that political and economic development would be more successful when rooted upon deeply held institutions and cultural values (Fallers, 1955). African traditional institutions, whose development has been arrested by colonial and post-colonial rule, have too many shortcomings to be effective in dealing with the complexities of modern day socioeconomic systems. The modern institutions have also taken too many roots to be easily dismissed. Under the circumstances a transitional arrangement of reconciling and or fusing the relevant aspects of the two parallel institutional systems is a more realistic option available to African countries.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to detail the strengths and limitations of traditional institutions. We only briefly sketch some of the principles that traditional institutions bring to the table that would be relevant in constructing a transformative and coherent system of institutions in Africa. One general characteristic of traditional institutions is a decentralized participatory decision-making system, which allows the empowerment of local communities to control local decisions and matters of their self-governance. Even the relatively centralized chieftaincy systems are generally more decentralized than the often autocratic post-colonial state.

Another characteristic is the non-adversarial resolution of conflicts by narrowing differences through negotiations. This principle can be valuable in dealing with ethnic conflicts that hamper the process of state-building. It can also be applied to mitigate conflicts among political parties.

Accountability in dispensing justice through customary courts is another relevant principle. Traditional courts, which are open to public participation, may serve to reduce corruption and build confidence on the legal system. The consensus-based system of decision-making, which allows respect for dissent and protection of minority interests and views by requiring consensus on key decisions instead of winner-take-all majority-based decision systems can also apply, perhaps with some modification, to resolve conflicts, especially ethnic conflicts and to promote the culture of dialogue among political parties. Finally, the mechanisms of ensuring equitable access to land would be valuable in the protection of property rights, especially in rural areas, and in moderating inequality.

The identified general principles of traditional institutions can help in mending state-society relations and in bridging the fragmented socioeconomic spaces. The fusion of traditional and modern institutions is also likely to lead to a democratic system that is more compatible with African socioeconomic realities by integrating the parallel socioeconomic spaces. Such a democratic system is likely to be a transitional democracy that differs in some respects from the strand of liberal democracy that emphasizes the virtues of a limited state. While the specific characteristics of a transitional democracy cannot be determined *a priori*, the goals of conflict resolution and state building, which may require addressing gross inequalities, are likely to entail a more engaged state. The forms of transitional democracy may also vary within African countries since institutions have to reflect existing realities to be effective. Furthermore, political arrangements, such as power-sharing and federal systems, which are consistent with the values of traditional institutions, may be essential for successful state-building in cases where ethnic tensions are high and violent inter-ethnic or state-identity conflicts are of recent memory. Once the traditional and modern institutions are fully reconciled and state building is more developed, however, the institutions of democracy are also likely to evolve.

5. Lessons from Somaliland

As noted, the post-colonial state in most African countries has exerted little effort in reconciling the parallel institutions, despite the various problems associated with institutional incompatibilities. Some countries, including Ghana, Zambia, and Uganda have attempted to incorporate traditional authorities into their governance structure by creating a House of Chiefs, as a second chamber of parliament. These efforts, however, are largely designed to win political support from the upper echelons of chiefs. They also tend to be largely symbolic since the role of the House of Chiefs has remained merely advisory and limited in scope. This approach of integrating traditional authorities, thus, avoids the task of melding the parallel institutions of governance into a coherent whole. It has also done little to bridge the disparate political spaces or protect the customary land rights of peasants.

A second approach is initiated by Post-Apartheid South Africa which incorporated traditional authorities into regional and local governance partly to avert conflicts between the new state and traditional authorities. The role given to traditional authorities is greater in this approach than in the first approach. However, this approach also fails to address the duality of institutions. Like the first approach, it reduces traditional institutions into the role of chiefs. It also has done little to address apartheid's legacy of cramming natives into reservations or the duality of political spaces.

A third approach is undertaken by Botswana and it is by far more successful than the previous two approaches. In addition to creating a House of Chiefs, Botswana utilizes traditional leaders in various capacities, including in its judiciary. The government also utilizes the traditional *kgotla* system, at least in consultative manner.

Perhaps one of the reasons for Botswana's relative success is attributable to an overlap between traditional leaders and the leaders of the state from the early years of independence. If this hypothesis is correct, it makes it doubtful that Botswana's approach, which is reasonably successful in a country with a small population, would be applicable in large countries, where the sheer number of traditional authorities would preclude an overlap between state leaders and traditional leaders.

A fourth and more comprehensive approach has been initiated by Somaliland. Somaliland's approach attempts to fuse the traditional community-based consensual system of decision making with the modern institutions of democracy. In this approach, the country's House of Elders (the *Guurti*), a representative body of all of Somaliland's clans, reviews the laws passed by the House of Representatives (elected through a competitive three-party electoral system), and acts as a constraint on the powers of the executive. The *Guurti* also applies traditional mechanisms of conflict avoidance and resolution to carry out part of its broad mandate of conflict resolution. The modern judicial system and the traditional court of clan (*tol*) elders also complement each other. The governance structure at the center is replicated at the regional level, where representatives selected through multi-party municipal elections operate in tandem with traditional regional councils, which function on the basis of the traditional consensus-based system of decision-making.

The Somaliland model appears to have made notable progress in reconciling inter-clan conflicts and in fostering synergy between the state and society. Community policing and conflict management through reconciliation have, for example, managed to keep peace in a country where clan identities have been politicized and over 70% of the male population is said to be armed with light weapons. Although it may be too early to declare the Somaliland model a success, it has already rendered promising results. For over a decade now Somaliland has been an island of relative peace in the volatile Horn of Africa region. The model, of course, faces many challenges. There are voices in Somaliland that view the role of the *Guurti* to be incompatible with democratic governance and they see it merely as a temporary conflict resolution arrangement. To the extent that the *Guurti* provides better representation of the population at the state level and empowers communities to control local decisions, it is not clear why it would be regarded as undemocratic, unless democracy is conceived in its Western form only. Another serious challenge is if local communities would be organized enough to devise mechanisms to ensure that their representatives at the *Guurti* remain accountable and corruption free and that it does not degenerate into operating like a House of Chiefs. Regardless, the Somaliland model deserves to be studied carefully. Given that conflicts have become the scourge of many countries in the continent, what the Somaliland model has achieved so far with respect to conflict mitigation is not something to sneeze at. The model, at the very least, suggests that African countries need to engage in the search for innovative arrangements to overcome the institutional paralysis that characterize them.

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Faith and Education – A Case Study on Qur’anic Education in Somalia

In the seven years since 9/11, religion has taken a more central stage in defining world politics. Global security issues and many conflicts are now seen through the prism of religion: with the view that they are about religious groups fighting each other. To many, the conflict in Somalia is now also seen through this lens. A newspaper headline was most telling – ‘The Christian Government in Ethiopia fears Somalia will become an Islamic State!’ – interpreting the motivation for Ethiopia’s invasion in Somalia as a clash of faiths. Such a perspective has significant implications not just in understanding the nature of the conflict, but also in conceptualizing nation-building, recovery and development in Somalia.

After 9/11, education became central to the debate over whether religion mitigates or perpetuates conflict. Qur’anic schools became seen as a breeding ground for religious radicalism. Yet in the context of Somali society, the Qur’anic education system cannot be ignored for the enormous potential it holds for change and development in the lives of Somalis. Some 80 – 90% of all children in Somalia attend Qur’anic schools. However, the issue is an extremely sensitive one for all stakeholders in education.

Though education is understood as a basic right for all children, identifying the type of schools that can be supported to deliver it has become entangled in the battle of religious ideologies. But when Somalia can only boast an overall level of school enrolment of 30 percent nationally, it becomes apparent that without new approaches and significantly greater gains, the country will never make any significant progress to achieve the education-related Millennium Development Goals.

This presentation will make the case for the integration of formal primary education into Qur’anic schools in Somalia based on the knowledge and experience gained from an ongoing pilot initiative now being undertaken in Northeast and Northwest Somalia⁵¹.

As long-standing cultural and community institutions, Qur’anic schools have been the nucleus of the Somali education system. Throughout its turbulent history, they have often been the only form of education available to Somali children.

51 Integrated Qur’anic Schools – Pilot Initiative supported by the Strategic Partnership for Recovery and Development in Education in Somalia – DFID, UNESCO and UNICEF

Since Qur'anic schools in Somalia have survived by adapting to the country's culture, tradition and changing conditions, it begs the question of whether the existing deep-rooted tradition of Qur'anic education can adapt to and integrate with a modern formal education system? If so, how? And how do we address the vexing question of whether Qur'anic schools help to promote religious radicalism and extremism in Somalia?

To a large extent, the formal basic education system in Somalia has been non-existent since the collapse of central government in the early 1990s. Formal basic education has been eroded and undermined by years of conflict, under-funding and neglect, even in Somaliland and Puntland, where there has been relative peace, stability, and government presence for more than a decade.

The kind of basic education provided to Somali children during these protracted years of turmoil has been driven by local community initiatives with fees and school development costs paid by parents themselves.

The many years of civil war in Somalia have created serious problems in the education sector, ranging from limited and unequal access to the exclusion of children from poor rural communities, particularly girls⁵². The indicators of education quality (such as levels of teacher education and drop-out rates) are also extremely poor when compared to other similar conflict/complex emergency countries. Indeed, the whole education system in Somalia is characterized by 'lack': the absence of a national school curriculum, non-existent standards for learning outcomes and an ineffective quality control system.

The fact that – in spite of this – we can document an increased enrolment of more than 200,000 children (an average 3 percent increase) over the last 6 years, is largely because Somalis have shown a commitment to sending their children to school; as a result of increased remittances from Somalis in Diaspora and renewed interest in education from the UN and international partners.

Even as the government-funded formal education system in Somalia remains paralysed, Qur'anic Schools continue to thrive, providing educational opportunities to most Somali children – particularly in rural and nomadic communities, and with near-equal representation of boys and girls.

This means that while almost seven out of every ten children are not enrolled in formal primary education; eight out of ten children are attending some form of a Qur'anic school. Parents send their children to Qur'anic schools not only to meet religious and cultural obligations, but because they also value education itself.

The Qur'anic education system provides a flexible and sustainable form of Islamic education to young and old⁵³. Deeply rooted in local Somali culture and traditions, it has had an enormous influence on how most Somalis conceive the concept and value of education and knowledge in general. Unlike the formal education system, it

52 See attached tables showing disaggregated primary school enrolment across Somalia by gender and by region.

53 Qur'anic education first came to Somalia during the 7th century AC. These traditional schools or "Dugsi" began to mushroom between the 10th and 13th century following the mass Islamization of the Somali Peninsula. Today these schools represent the first cycle of the traditional Qur'anic education system (Warsame, 2007).

encourages a relationship between the child and his or her environment to create an equilibrium in which each respects their role and contribution to family livelihood practices such as animal rearing and farming.

In Somalia, a country which has long been impacted by conflict and environmental disasters, the adaptive nature of its culture and institutions has been critical for their survival. The institution of Qur'anic education is no exception. The most notable change over the last decade has been the emergence of what has been called a hybrid or an integrated form of the Qur'anic school.

The Qur'anic school system in Somalia has never operated as a unified structure. Instead, each school has evolved and functioned as an autonomous unit. Though both the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs have in the past claimed that their mandates extended to the Qur'anic schools system, in reality, neither Ministry appears to have taken its responsibilities very seriously.

Recently, however, education authorities in both Somaliland and Puntland have taken steps towards recognizing their roles within a policy framework for Qur'anic education. The Somaliland National Policy of Education of 2005 and the 2004 Puntland Education Policy Paper provide clear policy guidelines to be adopted. Though both policies include Qur'anic education under 'non-formal education', the Somaliland document articulates clear government guidelines to promote and assist in upgrading Qur'anic education⁵⁴ and the Puntland policy identifies the integration of basic education into the Qur'anic schools curriculum as part of the government's overall strategy to develop an alternative path for basic formal education.

These two policy documents demonstrate that the education authorities in the two northern zones of Somalia recognise the need to uphold the original mission of Qur'anic education while at the same time upgrading the system in order to increase the much-needed service provision of formal basic education⁵⁵.

It is within these policy frameworks that the Integrated Qur'anic School Pilot Initiative (supported by the Strategic Partnership for Recovery and Development in Education) provided an opportunity to explore the contemporary Qur'anic school system in Somalia, to test and affirm the changes that had already begun to take place in the system, to investigate its potential to contribute to improving access to formal basic education, and to establish sustainable linkages with the wider formal system.

The initiative was both an immediate response to the needs of these struggling educational institutions and a platform to undertake evidence-based research by documenting the process. The outcomes will, in turn, be used to inform policy decisions

54 The Somaliland government is committed to assessing, promoting and upgrading Qur'anic and religious study...The Somaliland government is also committed to supplementing and complementing efforts made by the formal school system and developing NFE programmes as alternatives to basic education provision. To achieve this, the Somaliland MoE will pursue a strategy to expand the scope of Qur'anic education to include literacy, numeracy and life skills training (SNPE, 2005:27-28).

55 The Puntland government recognizes the existence of Qur'anic schools that focus on teaching basic Islamic values and early literacy in Arabic to young children...The Puntland government, however, also recognizes the limitations of these establishments and is committed to improving teaching and learning in them as well as to widening their curriculum and quality....The government will ensure that Koranic schools are regularly supervised and supported (PEPP, 2004:8).

by Ministries of Education on ways to integrate basic formal education into a range of alternative pathways towards universal primary education.

The study showed us that across Somalia, Qur'anic schools are currently undergoing a silent transformation on their own – without prompting from any formal education authority or institution. Integrated Qur'anic schools are teaching the Somali language, mathematics and Arabic in addition to religious instruction.

Integrated learning is widely supported by Qur'anic school decision-makers and other key stakeholders in the community and school administrators have no objection to an enhanced curriculum as long as it does not undermine the schools' religious mission.

As such, these schools present Somali Ministries of Education with an enormous opportunity to boost the enrolment rate and gender ratio for primary education in Somalia and provide evidence that they can make a tremendous contribution to the attainment of the goal of 'Education for All.'

By providing much-needed documentation on these institutions, the research is making it possible to provide donors and development agencies with more accurate information on the potential these schools hold are helping to facilitate the design of relevant and appropriate assistance packages.

Following the study, a pilot project has begun in eight Qur'anic schools in Somaliland and Puntland. The fifteen month project will support local communities to improve the quality of teaching and increase school capacity in order to expand enrolment. Following a baseline study to identify the educational priorities of each school, a support package has been designed to enhance the quality of teaching and learning and the school environment. This support will include teacher training and supervision, the provision of textbooks and school supplies, basic structural rehabilitation (including water and sanitation) along with assistance to establish Community Education Committees aimed at improving the management of these hybrid schools.

On this foundation, it is intended to build a strategic partnership between authorities in Somaliland and Puntland and interested development partners to expand universal basic education by integrating formal basic education into the Qur'anic education system. Here is an opportunity to ride on the self-driven momentum within the Qur'anic schools to become an integrated partner in the delivery of formal education. The chance to mainstream Qur'anic education within modern Somali society is a chance that should neither be missed nor mishandled.

This optimism does not blind us to the challenging and sensitive issue of religious radicalism and extremism. In the global context of the 'war on terror' there are very real concerns about supporting Islamic institutions like Qur'anic schools.

External partners and international donors are often wary of – if not downright opposed to – assisting or supporting Qur'anic schools. One donor country has made it clear that it will not fund Qur'anic educational programmes because of the fear of Islamic influence. One government minister from a donor country even warned, "Do not mention Qur'anic education: in doing so, Parliament in my country will immediately stop funding to Somalia!" In view of this, at the very most, some donor

governments are only prepared to support the water and sanitation component of projects for schools.

Challenges exist within Somalia too. The Transitional Federal Government has expressed concerns that it has no formal policy to integrate the formal education curriculum into Qur'anic schools and over the past four years successive Ministers of Education have expressed opposing perspectives on this issue: one fearing the potential for religious extremism; another proposing a system as exists in Malaysia where Qur'anic schools are fully integrated into the formal education system.

As Somalia's indigenous Qur'anic system of education takes its own steps towards incorporating a formal education curriculum, development agencies need to see this as an opportunity to engage with religious leaders and authorities, communities and parents, and as a way to halt extremism. This may present the chance the world needs to impact positively on the quality of both the secular and moral education for the majority of Somalia children.

The success of this initiative will very much depend on our ability and willingness to understand faith and religion not just as causes of political discord and conflict, but as a means of harnessing the best of our traditions and values, without which there cannot be a sense of citizenship. For that, we may have to deconstruct our present global understanding of Islamic schools and take a new look at the religion in the context of faith and its aspirations for children – not just in the context of politics.

Comparative Law and Methods in Legal Education – legal dialogue in a hot political environment?

The international community has been heavily involved in eastern parts of Africa and my experiences from work done in Ethiopia and Somalia will be presented. I will concentrate on my experiences from Somalia (at least in this paper) and reflect on the dialogue and ideological and comparative melting point along activities when actors and experts from different countries meet domestic actors and nationals in the effort to build, strengthen and develop the legal system, laws and legal institutions and some instruments for securing implementation. I will discuss the general effort to develop the legal education system towards a higher standard – of rule of law and democracy – in a society with a special situation.

I will examine and pay particular attention to work for the <http://www.undp.org/United Nations Development Programme> (UNDP) last summer in Puntland, northern Somalia delivering a proposal on a 4 year law study program to be established at Puntland State University, Garowe.

I will analyse the conditions, the needs and some crucial points that I have experienced and also from a more theoretical and critical point of view discuss the possibilities, weaknesses and negative impact that legal transplants could have in developing a society and its legal structure and building conditions for transformation in a society demanding new dynamics for developing justice – taking into account traditions and the need to establish systems and realities in line with international standards of human rights. The legal dialogue and comparative law issues have to be developed – otherwise the development of a legal system with partners from supporting countries and internationals will have problems and in the worst case also create problems.

My intention is to give examples of assistance in legal education development. This experience can give issues for courses/seminars within study programs and promote the importance of law and development as part of knowledge and also skills in the developing countries.

When supporting legal education in developing countries and developing legal education in more developed systems, there is a need for mutual understanding and exchange of ideas and we must try to not just transport ideas and solutions. It needs assisting missions and exchange possibilities and also critical reflexions.

Some experiences and reflections on legal education in the Northern part of Somalia

Örebro University has previously as a consultant conducted some missions in Puntland: a workshop on Comparative law and legal development and a Feasibility study concerning the establishment of a law school in Puntland State of Somalia in January 2004.

Last summer – June 2007 – I did a concrete elaboration on the settings of Higher Legal education with the aim of developing a proposal for a curriculum, structuring of the education and investigating some of the financial needs and possibilities.

The mission was planned to examine the possibility of using technical expertise with support from the international community and also neighbouring experiences, from the Law Faculty, Hargeisa University, Hargeisa, Somaliland in order to pick up some good examples of designs of Law programmes also suitable for Garowe and Puntland.

The proposal was to start intense preparatory steps after necessary formal decisions on establishment as early as August 2007 – with the students coming in September 2008. Up to this date – July 2008 – no information is available on progress.

In relation to the initial phase it was important for me to stress the necessary but time consuming work on the content and, in order to prepare the best possible teachers, on updated knowledge on legal issues and on teaching methods. This has obviously been a big problem. The reasons for the problem are well known.

The decision-making task seems to be a hot issue for UNDP, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Education in conjunction. The necessary questions have to be dealt with by the governmental and institutional structure in Puntland and the relevant donors. The coordination of this task has faced some difficulties.

Some links and examples from foreign experiences have been developed that could have been a part of the curriculum. The Law School has to – from the very beginning – include a strong practical element in the education. This could be achieved by integrating a “new” Legal Clinic (in the proposal a vital part of the third year of the programme).

In my proposal I stated that it could be an option to link the Law School to the existing Puntland State University (PSU) as the most favourable possibility and integrate the Law School into the culture of PSU. I presented a proposal with a tentative schedule for the first year of an action plan – in order to secure the maximum possible quality of the activities – and the method was based on including the actors in the structure and providing possibilities to take and share responsibilities for the formulation of the content in order to get a maximum of participatory (internal and external) elements in developing and implementing the Law School.

The Law School has an important role to play in all education reforms (overall) and also in order to try to find ways to make the legal system more transparent and communicable. Already the description itself of different elements as part of the educational content – secular law, customary law and Shari’a law – will have an effect on

trying to find necessary methods of harmonization and integration – in the course content.

Role of Law and Security/ROLS program (UNDP) and its activities have contributed considerably to adding to this particular task and it must be possible, within the development of a new Law School, to take advantage of such a process.

The autonomy of the university in Puntland to address, understand and respond to the demands and requirements from the society is also valuable. One special problem is the difficult situation for legal education in a country in a developing and transitional stage. During a period of transition, uncertainty in legislations and legal practices and its implementations is a fact and must be clarified. The legal education faces an extremely problematic and challenging position.

Teaching on the legal position of today makes the method of finding, understanding and applying norms in a changing legal structure the core problematic element. The law program must add and make a difference in creating creative capacity, knowledge and skills to act and react in a changing society with professionalism in a new international context and with demands for change in the transitional environment of Puntland.

What kind of market can a student after his/her education from a Puntland Law School meet? The demand to fill the gap left by the older generation of lawyers, located in Puntland and educated in Mogadishu many years ago, is immense. The need to develop the concept of “Access to justice” and make that concept a reality in Puntland is also of great importance. The Ministry of Justice and the existing institutions – e. g. the judiciary and law enforcement – are in need of a new generation of lawyers. But how is it possible to compete with more attractive salaries and other opportunities offered by national and international NGOs? The governmental structure has to take these competitive situations seriously and develop adequate counter activities to meet the need for renewal of the staff of judges and lawyers.

The attitude from the leading part of the university towards a Law School integrated into the university is positive. The existing programmes – Business Administration, Public Administration and ITC-program (all four-years) – also include some elements of legal subjects. Business law and Administrative law is part of PSU teaching already and with additional law teachers on board it can be seen as providing future possibilities for joint assisting projects. Common multi-scientific projects could find a platform. Teachers in business and administration can be good teaching partners for law school staff members in the effort to open the areas outside legal issues to a broader field of knowledge also for law students.

Concerning the infrastructure, the existing library at the PSU includes some law material but must be complemented with more law books and electronic journals. The university already has a rather well equipped ICT-structure. It makes it possible to create linkages to other experienced law programmes and contacts and exchange possibilities for staff members with an ambition to establish strong and sustainable links with higher education in law in other countries and links to the international community support. It can be done by promoting study visits and Internet connections.

All work seems to demand a strong collaboration with stakeholders in general and the administration of the judiciary in particular. It is possible that some of the practitioners and relevant experts in the legal practice are not being given enough chances to take up responsibilities for concrete work on reforms of and actively teach in the legal education. It will be a basic task to elaborate on demands regarding the teacher's competences, especially to contribute to necessary changes and create relevant materials for law studies. Active knowledge of legislative needs and possibilities is also important for law students. These links and need of information could stimulate the development and flow of input to the content in the law programme elements.

The legal clinic (as a teaching tool and a combined aid service) at the Faculty of Law in Hargeisa was established to provide free legal aid to poor people who cannot afford to pay a fee for legal professionals, as there is a need for justice, morality, law and equal protection.

The situation in Somaliland – still fragile – needs to be strengthened and give the judiciary and law enforcement institutions training and educate the citizen in rights and obligations. A legal clinic can have an important role in this effort – to bring the rule of law and human rights on the agenda. It must be the case also for Puntland, in the effort to meet the challenges of transformation to acceptable applications of criminal and civil law.

Law programmes in countries in transition and a developmental phase focus often on theoretical content, i.e., legal history, law and philosophy, sociology, economics (while waiting for the clarifications and changes). This means that the content of the curriculum could (in the best scenario) focus on comparative legal aspects and building a good general capacity to argue on rule of law-based, human rights oriented positions. The analysis can be made on an interdisciplinary basis and combine studies in substantial law with consequences related to procedural law and give a broader understanding of the connection to law in books, law in action and law in function.

In Puntland the law program must probably be designed with a combination of secular law, customary law and Shari'a law. How these different parts and elements will or can be melted together is quite a challenge. In light of the necessity to secure local ownership this can and must be done in well-functioning links with structured methods for respectful dialogue-based collaborations with the assistance of international experts and donors.

The possibilities to address, discuss and elaborate on problems in a constructive dialogue with the students cannot be done with the traditional teaching method of one-way communication but by a strong focus on seminars and group work.

It ought to be investigated if it would be possible to organize a strong support through a network of Somalis in Diaspora with experiences in law and legal sciences. In Sweden we could take the opportunity to try to get some information in this regards.

It must also be examined how networking with the Hargeisa law faculty and building on an already established group to organize the consultation could be used.

Capacity building – with a life-long learning model – is one of the preconditions that in the long run has to be addressed – and even in the short run in order to establish an environment attractive for professors and assistants to join development/research programmes and build the base for the next generation of law school professors in Somalia. The opportunity for a young student of law to have a chance to broaden the perspective and get access to an international context is vital.

The challenge to transform the system from teaching as a model to a learning-based model must have priority. Students themselves are an important resource in education and in the dialogue for a developing society. A special computer room has been set up at PSU to give the possibility to access Internet and databases – all important resources to be able to promote access to information and knowledge.

The task of establishing the Law School could need some active consultations in the beginning. It could also be a possibility with UNDP assisting in more details and/or with support from Hargesia and international experts to work through Internet/e-mail and the on-line tool Blackboard (previously WebCT) and the new technical possibilities.

The existence of Interdisciplinary Master programmes in Law and Human Rights run in for EU countries could be a way to strengthen the links to the international community. In terms of research experience it ought to be discussed if the Puntland Developmental Research Centre (PDRC) could be a resource centre also for the Law School and the theoretical part of methods of investigation and field research contacts.

To discuss further

The “law and development movement” had an ethnocentric and imperialistic style in the effort of trying to ‘export’ legal concepts. This has also been the case concerning legal education reform. Nevertheless it must be a task for a state in progress to build an adequate and up to date higher legal education in the effort to educate cadres of legal professionals and combat the deficit in human resource capacity in positions responsible for Administration, Judiciary, international relations. There is also the need for development of Civic Society and, of course, business and economic activists. This could not be sustainable without connection to the globalization trends of law and taking into account the demands of reforms of the legal structure in order to establish the rule of law and human rights. But we have to be careful in distributing “the same medicine to all patients”.

International assistance in the field of rule of law promotion includes all kinds of different activities:

- law reform programmes designed to draft new laws and revise old laws;
- institutional building, meaning the strengthening or establishment of legal institution such as the judiciary, ombudsman institutions and human rights commission;

- access creation strategies aimed at increasing ‘access to justice’ and improve public information and ‘legal literacy’ and
- capacity building policies with the objective of enhancing the capacity of legislators, police, judges, attorneys, notaries, and other legal professionals and public officials;
- strong and healthy legal education is relevant for these activities and can serve as a critical channel in all law reforms;

My final question that I hope we can examine together during the workshop is;


– In what way can a Swedish university take part in developing the conditions in Somalia and what kind of lessons learned must we take on board to develop the dialogue and exchange methods to further realistic development?

Economic resources as a mechanism for resolving or perpetuating conflict

“[T]he economist’s stock in trade – his tool – lies in his ability to and proclivity to think about all questions in terms of alternatives. The truth judgment of the moralist, which says that something is either wholly right or wholly wrong, is foreign to him. The win-lose, yes-no discussion of politics is not within his purview. He does not recognize the either-or, the all or nothing situation as his own. His is not the world of the mutually exclusive. Instead, his is the world of adjustment, of coordinated conflict, of mutual gain.” James M. Buchanan.

Production versus distribution of wealth

- There are two ways of accumulating wealth.
- **1. Taking it from someone through distributive activities.** This causes:



- Distributive activities are inherently a transfer of wealth rather than a generation of wealth. It is a negative sum game, as it merely involves special interest groups

squabbling among themselves for their clans at the expense of greater losses for their country. This type of wealth distribution polarizes people, engages population in rent seeking and perpetuates conflict.

- Tollison (1997) explains rent seeking as a socially costly endeavor of wealth redistribution. He further notes that rent seeking might be even more costly in a society where government ownership characterizes all aspects of economic activities. In Somalia, people are highly fragmented; different clan groups vie for their share of wealth redistribution and rent-seeking activities become an especially costly pursuit.

- **2. Creating wealth by investing in a country's productive capacity and the efficient use of scarce resources.** The creation of wealth forces individuals to make hard choices and to be responsive to changing economic conditions and make any necessary adjustments. This method of creating wealth enhances:
 1. Harmony
 2. Promotes competition
 3. Utilizes Human capital
 4. Augments Social Capital
 5. Prosperity and Economic development

Economic resources as a mechanism for resolving or perpetuating conflict

Where we are

- Caught in conflict and continual warfare
- Persistent poverty
- Avoid responsibilities
- Death and destruction
- Blame game and Little ambition
- We are all to blame
- Everyone loses

Where we want to be

- Make security #1 priority
- Enforce property right and rule law
- Respect God's law
- Emphasize health and education
- Exercise self-control
- Rehabilitate the population

So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosity, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflict.” James Madison, *Federalist Paper No.10*.

We must examine the relationship between the politics of clan group and a country's economic resources, economic policies, and the institutional infrastructure available that might alleviate or exacerbate a country's unfriendly passions.

1. Lack of proper institutions
2. Foreign aid.
3. Trade restrictions.
4. Corruption
5. Polarized Warlords
6. War

- **Lack of proper institutions:** "Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it, misdiagnosing it, and then misapplying the wrong remedies." Groucho Marx
- Government officials are simply humans who respond to incentives. The institutional structure available to them determines whether they will engage in promoting economic development for their citizens or exacerbating clan divisions and growth-killing activities. The legal system, property rights, and the rule of law of many less developed countries are clogged with corrupt public officials, who become increasingly at variance with the basic objective of developing needed infrastructure and reducing poverty.
- Public policy can have well-intentioned leaders who are not fully informed or policies that are designed simply to reward the politically powerful. Establishing the rule of law and clearly defined property rights bolsters peace, security, and clan harmony.
- **Foreign Aid or "loans with no influence:"** Why some countries have remained poor, while others have progressed at a remarkable pace remains an age-old question. A unique social, political, and cultural setting may affect a country's institutions and economic organization. Notwithstanding their unique historical backgrounds, one important factor that potentially affects a country's progress or failure and perpetuates conflict is quality of governance and reliance on foreign aid.
- The institutional infrastructure of foreign aid calls for central planning, barriers to trade, and distributive rent-seeking. Foreign aid retards economic growth because foreign aid is not productive capital. Foreign aid also distorts incentives as entrepreneurs or a country's residents engage in transferring wealth in the form of foreign aid, rather than creating wealth. Moreover, foreign aid increases unproductive government consumption.
- Foreign aid might hinder positive externalities that come from hard work and self-reliance.
- Since exclusive proprietorship is absent, there is an incentive to exploit the foreign aid dollar in a way that not only eliminates future profitability, but also brings socially and economically wasteful activities.

- We characterize foreign aid as communally owned resources that greatly suffer from the classical phenomenon of the “Tragedy of the Commons.” Rulers do not take account of the present value and the productivity of foreign aid resources, due to an inherent lack of incentives, well-established institutions of property rights, and the rule of law. Ruling parties with no residual claimants will use foreign aid dollars in selfish and destructive manners and rational individuals will squander the foreign aid money as soon as it is given.

Growth-killing policies that exacerbate clan division

- **Trade restrictions:** Policy distortions, such as trade restrictions or import substitutions, can promote clan divisions and increase the strategic behavior of interest groups.
- For example, aid-induced tax policy has increased the cost of capital and thus reduced the number of potential investments undertaken. Further, high taxes reduce the cash flow of entrepreneurs. In such a setting, it is likely that rich individuals and large firms will seek protection from the government.
- These trade impediments are prone to rent-seeking, which increases the strategic behavior of entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, and politicians and consequently diminishes efficiency. Moreover, people employ large amounts of economic resources to influence government officials to pass and retain protections laws. But this rent-seeking diverts resources away from more socially desirable activities.
- Somalia has enjoyed more economic freedom after the Siad Barre regime, though political freedom did not exist. Trade, business, private giving and communication dramatically increased in every region of Somalia during this period. This was due to the lack of government impediment or intervention and due to rational private individuals’ self-motivated profit seeking endeavor to establish local rule based on religion, traditional ruling and other means.

Economic freedom facilitates political freedom

- While economic freedom facilitates political freedom, political freedom, once established, has a tendency to destroy economic freedom.
- The most fascinating example is India few decades ago. After given its freedom by Britain, it has continued with rare exceptions, to be a political democracy. It has continued to be a country where people are governed by representatives chosen at the ballot box, but it has very little economic freedom and very limited human freedom.
- On the economic side, it has had extensive controls over exports and imports, over foreign exchange, over prices, over prices. There have been some reforms in

the past few years or so, but until recently you could not establish any kind of enterprise without getting a license from the government.

- The situation is more extreme if you consider that Hong Kong got zero foreign aid during its growth. India has been a major recipient; it has received some \$55 billion of foreign aid over the past forty years. It is tempting to say that India failed to grow despite foreign aid. I believe that it was the other way: in part, India failed to grow because of foreign aid. Foreign aid provided the resources that enabled the government to impose the kind of economic resources policies it did. Foreign aid has done far more harm to the countries given it to than it has done good.

Economic resources as a mechanism for resolving or perpetuating conflict

- Corruption: “There is no distinctly American criminal class, except Congress.” Mark Twain.
- Corruption adversely distorts incentives and creates uncertainties about the expected benefits of productive activities, forcing entrepreneurs to undertake costly and inefficient loss-avoiding behaviors.
- Somalia experience two different kinds of corruption:
 1. *Decentralized*: Various clan groups impose road blocks to appropriate wealth from the weak. These impositions are not coordinated. The problem is that warlords will not give up their ill-gotten proceeds and will perpetually engage in keeping the country in its current precarious situation. Thus decentralized corruption imposed by warlords imposes large economic losses and creates more clan division than experienced with centralized corruption.
 2. *Centralized*: This existed during the Siad Barre regime. Given the fact that economic resources are commonly owned resources and the government assigns the rights to these resources, powerful individuals and state heads would, in essence, establish a property rights system that benefits themselves.
- **Polarized Warlords**: Warlords replaced a corrupt military regime in Somalia. Nonetheless, most of the so-called warlords were just the remaining powerful individuals who were part of the fallen regime. The method by which the warlords appropriated the country’s wealth simply changed from centralized to decentralized.
- In some parts of Somalia, there were more resources to squabble over and steal, and more rents for a few privileged and powerful warlords to collect. Given the lack of government, rule of law, and property rights, these warlords created rights in those regions and the region’s resources. That increased conflict and polarization.

- For any government to succeed, Somalia needs to abandon tribal and ethnic allegiances and take steps to discontinue clan membership and establish allegiance to a national identity. In any given society, the individual's self-interest motivates their actions, which leads to either a pattern of mutual hostility or mutual cooperation.
- According to Adam Smith..." it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." People face different tradeoffs and the classic example is between butter and guns. The more guns we have, the fewer resources we have to raise our standard of living and lift our people from poverty.
- Human capital is a scarce resource and the current 4.5 clan allocation or clan division creates further polarization and brings about inefficient allocation of scarce resources, such as human capital. Warring tribes will not elect the most qualified individuals among the 4.5 clan allocation, but rather will elect the powerful groups who might not have the necessary experience or education.
- The current system allows labor to be allocated to occupations on the basis of clan, rather than experience or merit. This represents a cost in terms of foregone opportunity and resources, both physical and human that are instead employed in rent-seeking and rent-dissipating activities, and will involve misallocation of scarce human resources. It is this multiplicity that leads to the perpetual conflict that has no foreseeable solution.

Final notes

- In passing, while the specter of economic and social disaster is looking the people, government, the international community and concerned intellectuals of Somalia in the face, the opportunities to reverse and learn from past mistakes are plenty.
- The future could be brighter and hope could be nearer, but the people of Somalia must realize that without peace, there is no security and without security, there is no development, and without development, poverty, hunger, and internal displacement will characterize the social and economic landscape of Somalia.
- The future of Somalia and all of Africa will be one of their own design. Remedies are possible if the people and governments are willing and able to adopt the institutions and policies necessary for increased well-being and sustainable economic development for all.

Implications

- Good governance is the mantra for economic freedom
- Free trade or openness of economy

- Recognize individual differences and resolve conflict in a peaceful and civilized manner
- Promote democracy and participatory power sharing as this method is less prone to state failure
- Create incentives: People respond to incentives
- Help people become healthy, literate and able to work
- Fight poverty through fighting despair and hopelessness
- Ensure that goals are perceived as attainable
- Create jobs that offer skill variety, task identity and significance, autonomy, and feedback
- Individualize rewards and link rewards to performance
- Check the system for equity and efficiency
- Prepare the country for elections and its way to nationhood
- Stop enticing hate and clan conflict. Promote peace and open dialogue
- Somaliyey toosoo

No one can help Somalia unless they help themselves

A modern version of the quest story is the movie *The Wizard of Oz*. A tornado blows Dorothy into the Land of Oz. She is desperate to get back home, and the inhabitants inform her that the Wizard of Oz can help her. She embarks on a dangerous journey to meet the Wizard of Oz. The Wizard tells her to fetch the magical broomstick of the Wicked Witch of the West. Alas, the Wizard turns out to be a fraud and the broomstick is worth no more than your standard K-mart broom. However Glinda, the Good Witch of the North, tells Dorothy that she has had the power within her to return home all along. All she has to do is click her heels together 3 times and repeat, "There's no place like home. There's no place like home. There's no place like home."

Conference recommendations

1. Religious liberty is one of the most important core values which deserves preservation and protection provided it is kept within the bounds of the private sphere.
2. The state should maintain a neutral stance toward the religions adhered to by its citizens and others residing within its territories.
3. In a religiously pluralistic society, it is not possible to develop and preserve a fair and just society based on freedom, equality and neutrality without the separation of state and religion.
4. Islam is in reality a religion that promotes peace and understanding among people of all faiths, and it strongly prohibits all forms of violence and aggression against all people regardless of their faith or race. It has nothing to do with terrorism.
5. All religious organizations, institutions and leaders must step forward to contribute to shared security for the Horn of Africa. Horn of Africa conflict system is complex and not static. Dealing with this complexities require an expanded and multi-level holistic approach.
6. In order to create an environment where the multiplicity and diversity of societies in the Horn of Africa would be a source of enrichment in their day life instead of a source of division and conflict, it is recommended:

Firstly, celebrate diversity in all its dimensions. But above all recognise the duality of citizenship that is the hallmark of the societies. And subsequently design a genuine political arrangement that both reflect the diversity and replace the politics of domination by the politics of rights and equality.

Secondly, avoid political parallelism in locating the dual citizenship formations. That is, keep them apart at the national level. Their relation should be hierarchical, the national should be represented by civic citizenship, and ethnic citizenship should be relegated to the sub-national.

Thirdly, citizenship modalities should correlate with the nation building project. The fundamental problem of the region is the incompleteness of the project of nation formation. Therefore, citizenship modalities should serve the process of nation formation. Nation is not conceptualised here in its narrow meaning of congruence of the cultural and the political, but rather in its poly-ethnic conception.
7. Universal human rights values are not at odd with the fundamental beliefs of major religions, local traditions, norms and customs.

8. Somaliland approach attempts to fuse the traditional community-based conceptual system of decision making with the modern institutions of democracy. This approach is recommended for the rest of Somalia.
9. The conference recommends that the Horn of Africa conflicts (Ethiopia-Eritrea Border conflict, Somalia and Sudan civil wars) should be solved by means of dialogue, reconciliation.
10. The countries of the Horn have historically reflected external and cross-border political tensions and the spreading of internal conflicts across national borders. New diplomatic efforts and mediation processes are urgently needed to resolve or reduce these conflicts one-by-one, as they all bring enormously destructive and harmful consequences for human rights.
11. Why is it so difficult to win the peace and so easy to pursue a seemingly endless conflicts? Do we have a wrong approach to peace-mediation, to peace-building or conflict prevention? What new entry points are required to make peace and reconciliation attractive and how shall we make sure that peace once agreed is also delivering on its promises? Further researches on these issues are commended.

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